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First, do no harm.' He who seeks to
regulate everything by law is more likely to
arouse vices than to reform them.2 It is
one of the happy incidents of the federal
system that a single courageous state may,
if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory;
and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the
country.3 It is clear after all these many
years that our federal government does not
have the right answers. It is time for other,
more local governments to retake
command.4
I. Introduction
On June 28, 2004, the Supreme Court granted
review in Gonzales v. Raich,5 one of the California
medical marijuana cases.6 Oral argument was heard
*Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of
Tennessee, Knoxville. J.D. Ph.D. Thanks to John Scheb for
his valuable feedback on this project.
1 Hippocrates, c. 420 B.C.
2 Benedict de Spinoza, Freedom of Thought and Speech,
reprinted in CHIEF WORKS OF BENEDICT DE SPINOZA, at 261
(R.H.M. Elwes, trans. 1936).
3 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
4 JAMES GRAY, WHY OUR DRUG LAWS HAVE FAILED AND
WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT: A JUDICIAL INDICTMENT OF
THE WAR ON DRUGS 15 (2001).
5 See Transcript of Oral Argument, Nov. 29, 2004, Ashcroft v.
Raich, No. 03-1454 (hereinafter, Oral Arg.) Since Alberto
Gonzales replaced John Ashcroft as U.S. Attorney General on
February 3, 2005, the Supreme Court's ruling will be titled
Gonzales v. Raich.
6 See, e.g., United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop.,
10
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on November 29, 2004, and a ruling is expected by
June, 2005. 7 Raich presents the Court an historic
opportunity to enable sensible drug law reform at
the State level.8
A. Legal Context
Raich arises at the nexus of three sources of
law. It began as a conflict, brewing for some time, 9
between state and federal legislation. The state law
is Proposition 215. It was enacted by a California
ballot initiative in 1996 and codified as the
532 U.S. 483 (2001); Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629 (9th
Cir. 2002); Women's Alliance for Med. Marijuana v. United
States, No. 02-MC-7012 JF (N.D. Cal. 2002); County of Santa
Cruz v. Ashcroft, 279 F. Supp. 2d 1192 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
7 See Charles Lane, High Court Not Receptive to Marijuana
Case, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 2004, at A03, and David Savage,
Justices Take on Medical Pot Law, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 30,
2004, at Al.
8 It is fortunate that the Court has granted review at a
relatively early stage in the litigation. As we shall see, the case
came up in the remedial context, i.e., whether the District
Court properly denied appellants' request for a preliminary
injunction, pending trial, against enforcement of the CSA.
Had the Supreme Court waited until the District Court, on
remand, had granted the preliminary injunction and proceeded
to trial, followed by an appeal from a final judgment in that
case, any guidance the Court could provide on this urgent
issue might have been postponed for years. When we consider
that Judge Beam, dissenting in the Ninth Circuit opinion,
would have remanded to the District Court for hearings on
justiciability issues of standing and ripeness, see Raich v.
Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1237 (8th Circuit, 2003), the
unlikelihood of this opportunity seems even clearer.
9 As the Mayor of Santa Cruz observed two years ago,
"Clearly, state law and federal law are on a collision course."
Christopher Krohn, Why I'm Fighting Federal Drug Laws
from City Hall, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 21, 2002, at A15.
309
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Compassionate Use Act (CUA).I 0 The appellants in
Raich possessed and used marijuana under the
CUA, which is intended to ensure that seriously ill
Californians have the right to obtain and use
marijuana for medical purposes. Medical use is
deemed appropriate once a physician determines
that the person's health would benefit from the use
of marijuana in the treatment of the following
10 Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11362.5. For background on
Proposition 215, see ALAN BOCK, WAITING TO EXHALE: THE
POLITICS OF MEDICAL MARIJUANA (2000); ROBERT J.
MACCOUN & PETER REUTER, DRUG WAR HERESIES:
LEARNING FROM OTHER VICES, TIMES, AND PLACES, 378-380
(2001) (Rand Studies in Policy Analysis) (hereinafter,
"RAND"); and ED ROSENTHAL & STEVE KUBBY, WHY
MARIJUANA SHOULD BE ILLEGAL 94-101 (2003).
On federal and state responses to medical
marijuana generally, see RUDOLPH. J. GERBER,
LEGALIZING MARIJUANA: DRUG POLICY REFORM AND
PROHIBITION POLITICS chs. 1-3; 5-7 (2004); Lauryn
Gouldin, Cannabis, Compassionate Use and the
Commerce Clause: Why Developments in California
May Limit the Constitutional Reach of the Federal Drug
Laws, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 471,475-82 (1999);
Alistair Newbern, Good Cop, Bad Cop: Federal
Prosecution of State-Legalized Medical Marijuana Use
After United States v. Lopez, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1575,
1586-89 (2000); Erik R. Neusch, Medical Marijuana 's
Fate in the Aftermath of the Supreme Court's New
Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 72 U. COLO. L. REV.
201 (2001); Dennis Newitt, The Medical Use of
Marijuana: State Legislation, Judicial Interpretation
and Federal Drug Laws, 4 J. LEGAL ADVOC. & PRAC.
156, 158-68 (2002); Alex Kreit, The Future of Medical
Marijuana: Should the States Grow Their Own? 151 U.
PA. L. REV. 1787, 1793-1800 (2003). Every state that
has voted on medical marijuana has legalized it. See
Ethan Nadelmann, Going to Pot: The Growing
Movement Toward Ending America 's Irrational
Marijuana Prohibition, NAT'L REVIEW, July 12, 2004, at
30.
12
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medical conditions: cancer, anorexia, AIDS, chronic
pain, spasticity, glaucoma, arthritis, migraine, or
any other illness for which marijuana has shown to
provide relief.1
The federal law, enacted in 1970, is the
Comprehensive Drug Prevention and Control Act,
popularly called the Controlled Substances Act
(CSA). The CSA classifies marijuana as a
Schedule I controlled substance, which means that
in Congress' view, it has a high potential for abuse,
no officially accepted medicinal uses, and no safe
level of use under medical supervision. 13 Except for
rare controlled experiments, federal law flatly
prohibits the possession or use of even small
quantities of marijuana. 14
Under the Supremacy Clause of Article VI,
15
federal law preempts contrary state law. 16 At the
same time, Congress can act only within its
constitutional powers. Among the most important
of these is the power "[t]o regulate Commerce ...
among the several States . . . "17 on which it
expressly relied when enacting the CSA. 18 For 60
years, such reliance would almost certainly have
ensured federal power to enact the law in
11 Cal. Health& Safety Code § 11362.5(b)(1)(A).
12 21 U.S.C. § 801 et. seq. (2002).
" 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1). On the rest of the CSA scheduling
system, see Gouldin, supra note 10, at 477-78, and Bock,
supra note 10, at 223-224.
14 In Oakland Cannabis, the Supreme Court ruled that there is
no medical necessity exception to enforcement of the CSA.
532 U.S. at 497-99.
15 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
16 See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992);
Conant, 309 F.3d at 645-46 (Kozinski, J., concurring).
17 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
18 See Raich, 352 F.3d at 1227; 21 U.S.C.S. § 801 (2002).
13
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question. 19 Since 1995, however, the High Court
has established precedent2 0 striking down certain
federal laws as beyond the power of Congress under
the Commerce Clause. Though federal law may
preempt contrary state law, it can do so only if the
federal law is within Congress' power in the first
place.E1 Constitutional law, specifically Commerce
Clause jurisprudence, is thus the third and
overarching source of law within which Raich must
be resolved.
In Part II, I argue that Judge Harry Pregerson's
9 th Circuit opinion in Raich is correct: appellants'
possession and use of marijuana under the authority
of the CUA is beyond Congress' commerce power,
and the CSA is unconstitutional as applied to
them. 2 Notwithstanding Judge Arlen Beam's
19 See Neusch, supra note 10, at 221-23; Newbem, supra note
10, at 1600-05; and Glenn Reynolds & Brandon Denning,
Rulings and Resistance: The New Commerce Clause
Jurisprudence Encounters the Lower Courts, 55 ARK. L. REV.
1253, 1257 (2003).
20 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Jones v. United
States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000).
21 As the court notes in Raich, in Oakland Cannabis the
Supreme Court expressly reserved the question whether the
CSA exceeds Congress' power under the Commerce Clause.
352 F.3d at 1227.
22 The activity at issue in Raich is distinct from that for which
other possible regimes of state law might provide, like the
regulated cultivation and distribution of medical marijuana
under controlled circumstances. See, e.g., Kreit, supra note 10;
Newitt, supra note 10; Gouldin, supra note 10; J. GRAY, supra
note 4, at 222-29; DIRK CHASE ELDREDGE, ENDING THE WAR
ON DRUGS (1998); Eric Sterling, Principles and Proposals for
Managing the Drug Problem, in HOW To LEGALIZE DRUGS,
523-24 (Jefferson Fish ed., 1998). Regarding attempted bills at
the state level, see Stanley Neustadter, Legalization
Legislation: Confronting the Details of Policy Choices, in
14
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spirited dissent and the Ninth Circuit's reputation
for frequent reversal,23 I shall argue that the Court
HOW TO LEGALIZE DRUGS (Jefferson Fish, ed., 1998). Though
many such regimes are defensible policy, they do not seem
promising insofar as distribution, particularly where money
changes hands, is commerce that could constitutionally be
regulated under the CSA. By contrast, appellants' activity in
Raich is the private, personal cultivation, possession and
(medical) use of marijuana.
The political branches of the federal government might
seem best suited to provide drug policy reform. See
ELDREDGE, supra note 22, at 165-66. The Bush
Administration's appeal in Raich indicates the low likelihood
of reform through the executive branch. As for Congress,
Neusch observed that "[tihe most logical solution to the
problem, rescheduling marijuana from a Schedule I to a
Schedule II category, is not politically viable." Neusch, supra
note 10, at 211. Indeed, shortly after Proposition 215 was
enacted, Congress passed a "sense of the Congress" resolution
in opposition to medical marijuana. Statement of National
Antidrug Policy, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681, 2757-
61. As Uelman adds, "Ultimately, the final resolution of the
medical marijuana issue will not come until Congress is ready
to reclassify marijuana, removing it from Schedule I of the
Controlled Substances Act. That's not likely to happen in the
Congress elected on November 5, 2002." Gerald Uelman,
Marijuana: Federal Authorities Can't Distinguish Medical
Use from Recreational Use, But Voters Can, at
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/forumnew83.php (Jan. 8,
2003). Most recently, Congress even rejected a bill directing
the DEA not to enforce the CSA contrary to state laws
allowing medical marijuana. See Viewpoint, ROLL CALL, July
13, 2004; For the Record, WASH. POST, Jul. 11, 2004, at T11.
Neustadter opines that that the states can do nothing in this
area until federal policy changes. See Neustadter, supra note
22, at 389-90. Raich, however, provides an opening for reform
even assuming Congress' continued intransigence.
23 The Ninth Circuit has a reputation for being overruled, even
unanimously, more often than any other federal appellate
court. See Adam Liptak, Court That Ruled on Pledge Often
Runs Afoul of Justices, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 30, 2002, at 1.
313
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should affirm Judge Pregerson's opinion on the
merits.
While the Ninth Circuit should be affirmed, we
shall see in Part III that there is a fundamental
oversight in the opinion that Acting Solicitor
General Paul Clement predictably mentioned both
in his brief and at oral argument. Pregerson
repeatedly suggests that a key reason for his ruling
is that appellants' use of marijuana is for medicinal
purposes. While we shall see that this emphasis on
the medicinal character of appellants' use is
understandable, Mr. Clement suggested that this
purpose is irrelevant to the constitutional issue at
stake: 24 if the private possession and use of
marijuana by adults is beyond Congress' commerce
power, then that is so whether or not the
consumption is for medicinal purposes, for the
activity that Congress seeks to regulate is identical
either way. Accordingly, the argument would run, a
vote to affirm Pregerson is a vote for a slippery
slope into a nightmare scenario in which states will
be free to legalize the use of any Schedule One drug
for recreational purposes.
Activities involving commerce are usually
reachable by Congress, and Mr. Clement
understood that no state would enact most of the
noncommercial regimes he might have predicted.
Had he had the time to develop his argument,
however, he could plausibly have insisted that some
states might seriously consider enacting what I shall
call the Personal Cultivation Initiative (PCI). The
PCI would allow any adult to cultivate and possess
a limited number of marijuana plants within his
24 See Brief for Petitioners, Ashcroft v. Raich, No. 03-1354
(Aug. 2004) at 40, and Oral Arg., at 15.
16
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domicile strictly for personal consumption, not sale
or trade, solely by adults within that domicile.
Commerce Clause merits aside, then, the
refined policy question in Raich is whether a State
could rationally enact the PCI. I shall answer this
question in the affirmative, arguing that even if the
Justices are concerned about the policy implications
of upholding Judge Pregerson, on reflection they
could conclude that a State could rationally enact
the PCI.25
On this basis, I conclude that the Court should
affirm Judge Pregerson with a broad ruling clearly
acknowledging, or at least not denying, that State
level reformers would not be wasting resources
working to enact the PCI. As an empirical matter,
however, any majority that could be formed to
uphold Judge Pregerson would likely do so only on
narrow grounds. Assuming this is correct, and that
the medicinal/recreational distinction is irrelevant to
the Commerce Clause question, I conclude by
offering 1) an alternative basis for a narrow ruling
upholding Judge Pregerson, and 2) some thoughts
on the implications of a reversal of Judge
Pregerson.
II. The Ninth Circuit Ruling
A. Factual and Procedural Background
Judge Pregerson succinctly presented the facts
and procedure in Raich:
25 As this discussion suggests, Raich involves an interesting
confluence of liberal social policy and conservative
constitutional interpretation. I shall return to this point.
17
et al.: Vol 1 No 3
Published by Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange, 2014
316 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY VOL. I: 3
Appellants Angel McClary Raich and
Diane Monson (the "patient-appellants")
are California citizens who currently use
marijuana as a medical treatment.
Appellant Raich has been diagnosed with
more than ten serious medical conditions,
including an inoperable brain tumor, life-
threatening weight loss, a seizure
disorder, nausea, and several chronic pain
disorders. Appellant Monson suffers from
severe chronic back pain and constant,
painful muscle spasms. Her doctor states
that these symptoms are caused by a
degenerative disease of the spine.
Raich has been using marijuana as a
medication for over five years, every two
waking hours of every day. Her doctor
contends that Raich has tried essentially
all other legal alternatives and all are
either ineffective or result in intolerable
side effects; her doctor has provided a list
of thirty-five medications that fall into the
latter category alone. Raich's doctor states
that foregoing marijuana treatment may
be fatal. Monson has been using
marijuana as a medication since 1999.
Monson's doctor also contends that
alternative medications have been tried
and are either ineffective or produce
intolerable side effects. As the district
court put it: "Traditional medicine has
utterly failed these women.... "
Appellant Monson cultivates her own
marijuana. Raich is unable to cultivate
her own. Instead, her two caregivers,
appellants John Doe Number One and
18
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy, Vol. 1, Iss. 3 [2014], Art. 1
http://trace.tennessee.edu/tjlp/vol1/iss3/1
GONZALES v. RAICH
John Doe Number Two, grow it for her.
These caregivers provide Raich with her
marijuana free of charge. They have sued
anonymously in order to protect Raich's
supply of medical marijuana. In growing
marijuana for Raich, they allegedly use
only soil, water, nutrients, growing
equipment, supplies and lumber
originating from or manufactured within
California. Although these caregivers
cultivate marijuana for Raich, she
processes some of the marijuana into
cannabis oils, balm, and foods.
On August 15, 2002, deputies from the
Butte County Sheriffs Department and
agents from the Drug Enforcement
Agency ("DEA") came to Monson's
home. The sheriffs deputies concluded
that Monson's use of marijuana was legal
under the Compassionate Use Act.
However, after a three-hour standoff
involving the Butte County District
Attorney and the United States Attorney
for the Eastern District of California, the
DEA agents seized and destroyed
Monson's six cannabis plants.
26
Fearing raids in the future and the
prospect of being deprived of medicinal
marijuana, the appellants sued the United
States Attorney General John Ashcroft
and the Administrator of the DEA Asa
26 As Schlosser notes, Ashcroft had "vowed to 'escalate the
war on drugs."' ERIC SCHLOSSER, REEFER MADNESS: SEX,
DRUGS, AND CHEAP LABOR IN THE AMERICAN BLACK
MARKET 67 (2004).
317
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Hutchison on October 9, 2002. Their suit
seeks declaratory relief and preliminary
and permanent injunctive relief. They
seek a declaration that the CSA is
unconstitutional to the extent it purports
to prevent them from possessing,
obtaining, manufacturing, or providing
cannabis for medical use. The appellants
also seek a declaration that the doctrine of
medical necessity precludes enforcement
of the CSA to prevent Raich and Monson
from possessing, obtaining, or
manufacturing cannabis for their personal
27
medical use.
On March 5, 2003, the district court
denied the appellants' motion for a
preliminary injunction. The district court
found that "despite the gravity of
plaintiffs' need for medical cannabis, and
despite the concrete interest of California
to provide it for individuals like them,"
the appellants had not established the
required "'irreducible minimum' of a
likelihood of success on the merits under
the law of this Circuit ... ,28
B. The Commerce Clause Merits
As this background indicates, though Raich
centers on the substantive domain of the Commerce
27 Since the Ninth Circuit ruled for appellants on the
Commerce Clause issue, it did not address their other
arguments, including the medical necessity claim. See Raich,
352 F.3d at 1227.
28 Id. at 1225-26.
20
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Clause, the case came to the Ninth Circuit in the
remedial context of a request for a preliminary
injunction. The questions are fused, however, since
the substantive question must be addressed in order
to resolve the remedial issue. As Judge Pregerson
explains, "[T]he traditional test for granting
preliminary injunctive relief requires the applicant
to demonstrate: (1) a likelihood of success on the
merits; (2) a significant threat of irreparable injury;
(3) that the balance of hardships favors the
applicant; and (4) whether any public interest favors
granting the injunction. ' '29  Pregerson gives the
merits prong of this test, which embodies the
Commerce Clause analysis, the lengthiest treatment.
In this analysis, three cases are central: Wickard v.
Filburn,3 ° United States v. Lopez, 31 and United
States v. Morrison. 32
1. Wickard, Lopez, and Morrison
Wickard involved amendments to the 1938
Agricultural Adjustment Act. In order to stimulate
trade, Congress sought to stabilize the national price
of wheat by regulating the volume of wheat in
interstate commerce. The Act thus provided for a
national acreage allotment of wheat, which was
subdivided into quotas for individual farmers.
Roscoe Filburn owned a small farm in Ohio, and
was allotted 11.1 acres for his 1941 wheat crop. He
29 Id. at 1227. (emphasis added). While Pregerson mentions an
alternative test, he notes the two "are not inconsistent," and,
indeed, "likelihood of success on the merits" is a key factor in
both. Id.
" 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
31 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
32 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
319
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grew 23 acres of wheat, intending to keep the
excess crop for his own consumption. Filburn was
fined under the Act, but he refused to pay the fine
and filed suit, challenging the law's application to
him under the Commerce Clause.
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Robert
Jackson upheld the law as applied to Mr. Filburn.
Rejecting the formalist distinctions of earlier
cases, 33 Jackson wrote:
[I]t is well established by decisions of this
Court that the power to regulate
commerce includes the power to regulate
the prices at which commodities in that
commerce are dealt in .... It can hardly
be denied that a factor of such volume
and variability as home-consumed wheat
would have a substantial influence on
price and market conditions.
34
How could a single wheat farmer have had
such an influence? Wickard established the
aggregation principle: "[A]ppellee's own
contribution to the demand for wheat may be trivial
by itself, [but it] is not enough to remove him from
the scope of federal regulation where, as here, his
contribution, taken together with that of many
others similarly situated, is far from trivial. ' 35
Moreover, even "if we assume that [the wheat] is
13 See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 123-25.34 id. at 128.
" Id. at 127-28. As Newbern notes, "Wickard stands for the
proposition that no matter how personalized or local an
economic actor's conduct might be, if her conduct, multiplied,
would affect interstate commerce, it may fall under Congress'
regulatory control." Newbem, supra note 10, at 1601.
22
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never marketed, it supplies the needs of the man
who grew it which would otherwise be reflected by
purchases in the open market. Home-grown wheat
in this sense competes with wheat in commerce
.... 9,36 Establishing "perhaps the most far-reaching
example of Commerce Clause authority over
intrastate activity," 37 Jackson held that "even if
appellee's activity be local and though it may not be
regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its
nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a
substantial economic effect on interstate commerce
,,38
Issued more than 50 years after Wickard,
Lopez was a landmark ruling.39 Section 922(q) of
36 Wickard, 315 U.S. at 128.
37 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560.
38 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125.
39 It has been described as the opening shot in a Commerce
Clause revolution. See Newbern, supra note 10, at 1632;
Reynolds & Denning, supra note 19 at 1257-62. Newbern
notes that "[w]ithin eight months of Lopez's decision, more
than eighty challenges to federal Commerce Clause based
criminal statutes were filed in district courts. Four years after
Lopez was handed down, that number had grown to 566 cases
filed in federal courts." Newbem, supra note 10, at 1607-08.
As Marcus Green thus observes, "[T]he Lopez decision is
central to the 'new federalism revival' (consisting of) three
interrelated lines of cases (those involving the Tenth
Amendment, Eleventh Amendment, and the Commerce
Clause)." Marcus Green, Guns, Drugs, and Federalism:
Rethinking Commerce-Enabled Regulation of Mere
Possession, 72 FORDHAM L. REv. 2543, 2545-46 (2004). In
Calabresi's view, "perhaps the most striking feature of the
Rehnquist Court's jurisprudence has been the revival over the
last 5-10 years of doctrines of constitutional federalism."
Steven Calabresi, Federalism and the Rehnquist Court: A
Normative Defense, 574 ANNALs AM. ACAD. POL. & Sci. 24,
25 (2001). For a nuanced view in which "there is both less and
more to the federalism revolution than generally meets the
23
et al.: Vol 1 No 3
Published by Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange, 2014
322 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY VOL. I: 3
the Gun-Free Zones Act (GFZA) created a federal
crime "for any individual knowingly to possess a
firearm at a place the individual knows, or has
reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone," i.e.,
on or within 1000 feet of a public or private
school.40 Though Lopez was arrested and charged
under the state counterpart of the GFZA, those
charges were dropped when federal agents charged
him with a violation of § 922(q).4' Upon conviction,
Lopez appealed, challenging § 922(q) as beyond
Congress' commerce power.
Writing for a five-four majority, Chief Justice
Rehnquist upheld the Fifth Circuit's reversal of
Lopez's conviction. Though the Court did not
directly overrule Wickard, "it carefully limited the
reach of Wickard ... ,42 Beginning with "first
principles, 'A3 and embracing a dual, rather than
cooperative, model of federalism,44  Rehnquist
eye," see Richard Fallon, The "Conservative " Paths of the
Rehnquist Court's Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV.
429, 493 (2002).
Linda Greenhouse recently opined that "the Rehnquist
Court's federalism revolution ... appeared this term to stall in
its tracks," but she relies primarily on an Eleventh
Amendment case, Tennessee v. Lane, 54 U.S. 509 (2004), for
this assertion. Linda Greenhouse, The Year Rehnquist May
Have Lost His Court, N. Y. Times, Jul. 3, 2004 at Al. On the
Eleventh Amendment, see Newbern, supra note 10, at 1614-
17.
40 18 U.S.C. § 922 (q)(1)(A).
41 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
42 United States v. McCoy, 823 F.3d 1114, 1120 (9 th Cir.
2003).
43 Newbern, supra note 10, at 1618 ("foreshadow[ing] the tone
of the originalist argument to follow").
44 See CRAIG DUCAT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION:
POWERS OF GOVERNMENT 271-76 (7th ed., 2000). In an
influential article, Irving Kristol argued that federalism is one
of four major pillars of our constitutional system, the others
24
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quoted Madison's proposition: "[T]he powers
delegated by the proposed Constitution to the
federal government are few and defined. Those
which are to remain in the State governments are
numerous and indefinite., 45 Citing John Marshall,
he observed that "the federal government is
acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated
powers. '46  Regarding the Commerce Clause,
Rehnquist wrote, "Gibbons . . . acknowledged that
limitations on the commerce power are inherent in
the very language of the Commerce Clause ....
enumeration presupposes something not
enumerated. 47  In other words, if the power to
being democracy, republicanism, and capitalism. See Irving
Kristol, On the Character of the American Political Order, in
TAKING SIDES: CLASHING VIEWS ON CONTROVERSIAL
POLITICAL ISSUES 4-10 (George McKenna & Stanley Feingold
eds., 12th ed. 2001).
As an analogue, in spite of the powerful links between
education on the one hand and the success of liberal
republican democracy (via the exercise of fundamental rights
like free speech and voting) on the other, the Court properly
ruled in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), that education is not a
fundamental interest for Equal Protection purposes. Among
other reasons, principles of both federalism and separation of
powers render the federal courts the last branch and level of
government that should oversee the operation of public
education. See generally, MARTIN D. CARCIERI, DEMOCRACY
AND EDUCATION IN CLASSICAL ATHENS AND THE AMERICAN
FOUNDING (2002).
45 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552 (quoting The FEDERALIST No. 45
(James Madison), 292-93 (C. Rossiter, ed., 1961)).
46 Id. at 566 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316,
405 (1819)).47 Id. at 553. In the words of Marshall, one of the staunchest
and most influential Federalists ever, "[I]t is not intended to
say that these words comprehend that commerce which is
completely internal, which is carried on between man and man
in a state, or between different parts of the same state, and
323
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regulate interstate commerce is to have any
coherent meaning, there must be activity that is not
interstate commerce, i.e., that is intrastate and/or
noncommercial.
The Court thus established firm limits on the
meaning of "commerce" for Commerce Clause
purposes. Drawing a line between commercial and
noncommercial activity,48 the Supreme Court wrote:
[S]ection 922(q) is a criminal statute that
by its terms has nothing to do with
"commerce" or any sort of economic
enterprise, however broadly one might
define those terms. Section 922(q) is not
an essential part of a larger regulation of
economic activity, in which the regulatory
scheme could be undercut unless the
intrastate activity were regulated ....
The possession of a gun in a local school
zone is in no sense an economic activity.
49
In concurrence, Justices Kennedy and O'Connor
added:
which does not extend to or affect other states." Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
48 As Justices Kennedy and O'Connor wrote, "we cannot
avoid the obligation to draw lines, often close and difficult
lines, in adjudicating constitutional rights." Lopez, 514 U.S. at
579.49 Id. at 561, 567. Thus, though the Court upheld the federal
loansharking law (Title II of the Consumer Credit Protection
Act) in Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971), money
changes hands by definition in such transactions. Because this
is commercial as well as criminal activity, Perez is
distinguishable from Raich.
26
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[H]ere neither the actors nor their conduct
have a commercial character and neither
the purposes nor the design of the statute
have an evident commercial nexus. The
statute makes the simple possession of a
gun within 1,000 feet of the grounds of
the school a criminal offense. ... [A]nd it
does so by regulating an activity beyond
the realm of commerce in the ordinary
and usual sense of that term5° (emphasis
added).
In dissent, Justice Breyer powerfully argued
that gun violence greatly impacts public education
and thus interstate commerce. 5' Yet this seamless
substantive argument failed to meet the minimum
requirements of any coherent theory of the balance
of power that is necessarily imposed by federalism.
As Kennedy and O'Connor replied:
In a sense any conduct in this
interdependent world of ours has an
ultimate commercial origin or
consequence, but we have not yet said the
commerce power may reach so far. If
Congress attempts that extension, then at
the least we must inquire whether the
exercise of national power seeks to
intrude u on an area of traditional state
concern.
50 Id. at 580, 583 (Kennedy and O'Connor, JJ., concurring)
(emphasis added).
51 Id. at 615-31 (Breyer, Stevens, Souter and Ginsberg, JJ.,
dissenting).
52 Id. at 580 (Kennedy and O'Connor, JJ., concurring).
325
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In other words, the limit imposed on
congressional powers by the enumeration of those
powers is reinforced by the fact that, in our system,
states alone have a police power.53  As the Chief
Justice wrote, "Under our federal system, the States
possess primary authority for defining and
enforcing the criminal law."
54
53 The police power is defined as "an authority conferred by
the American constitutional system in the Tenth Amendment
upon the individual states .... The power of the State to place
restraints on the personal freedom and property rights of
persons for the protection of the public safety, health, and
morals or the promotion of the public convenience and general
prosperity." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1041 (5th ed. 1979).
See Newbem, supra note 10, at 1617-18 (on the Tenth
Amendment). See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567 (stating that "[t]o
uphold the Government's contentions here, we would have to
pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair
to convert congressional authority under the Commerce
Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the
States").54 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 n.3, 564 (stating that "areas such as
criminal law enforcement" are areas "where the States
historically have been sovereign"). As Hamilton wrote,
"[tihere is one transcendent advantage belonging to the
province of the State governments... the ordinary
administration of criminal and civil justice." The FEDERALIST
No. 17 (Alexander Hamilton), 120 (C. Rossiter, ed., 1961).
See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 583 (Kennedy and O'Connor, JJ.,
concurring) (writing that "the statute now before us forecloses
the States from experimenting and exercising their own
judgment in an area to which States lay claim by right of
history and expertise"). It is noteworthy that for most of
American history, marijuana was regulated by colonial or state
law. A 1619 Virginia statute even required every household to
grow hemp. See Schlosser, supra note 26, 19-25; EDWARD
BLOOMQUIST, MARIJUANA: THE SECOND TRIP 27-28 (1971).
See Newbern, supra note 10, 1581-85, 1627 (discussing
explosion of federalization of crime since 1970 and noting the
28
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Morrison involved a provision of the federal
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) that
provided a civil remedy for gender-motivated
violence. 55 Christy Brzonkala, a student at Virginia
Tech, claimed that another student raped her and
made statements showing a gender motivation for
the attack. She sued him under the VAWA, and the
District Court dismissed the action, partly on
grounds that the civil remedy was beyond
Congress' commerce power. The Fourth Circuit
affirmed, as did the Supreme Court. Speaking for
the same five-four majority as in Lopez, the Chief
Justice wrote, "[A] fair reading of Lopez shows that
the noneconomic, criminal nature of the conduct at
issue was central to our decision in that case....
Gender motivated crimes of violence are not, in any
sense of the phrase, economic activity. ' 56 Rehnquist
also indicated that the Court was serious about
enforcing the "noninfinity principle, 57  by
skeptically regarding any interpretation that would
in effect convert the commerce power into a general
police power.
58
majority of federal drug arrests are for minor street crimes).
See also id. at 1607 (stating that "[a]fter over half a century of
allowing Congress to exercise [a general police power of the
sort retained by the States], the Court finally said 'no' and
decided to rein in the 'Hey, you-can-do-whatever-you-feel-
like-Clause"').
5 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2004).
56 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 610, 613. As the Court wrote, "(i)ndeed,
we can think of no better example of the police power, which
the Founders denied the Federal Government and reposed in
the States, than the suppression of violent crime and
vindication of its victims"). Id. at 618.57 See Reynolds and Denning, supra note 19, at 1260.
58 Though Morrison figures prominently in our analysis, it is
distinct from Lopez and Raich in that 42 U.S.C. § 13981 did
not seek to regulate possession, but rather physical violence.
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In Lopez and Morrison,59 the Court identified
three broad categories of activity that Congress may
regulate under its commerce power-the use of the
channels of interstate commerce, the use of the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and those
activities that substantially affect interstate
commerce. 60  Judge Beam, who dissented in the
Ninth Circuit Raich opinion, does not dispute Judge
Pregerson's claim that Raich falls within the third
category, 61 and so we turn to the test developed in
Lopez, and refined in Morrison, for evaluating
whether a regulated activity "substantially affects"
interstate commerce. 62  In Pregerson's words, the
test is:
(1) whether the statute regulates
commerce or any sort of economic
enterprise; (2) whether the statute
contains any "express jurisdictional
element that might limit its reach to a
discrete set" of cases; (3) whether the
statute or its legislative history contains
"express congressional findings"
regarding the effects of the regulated
activity upon interstate commerce; and (4)
whether the link between the regulated
activity and a substantial effect on
interstate commerce is "attenuated.,
63
59 See Jones, 529 U.S. 848. See also Reynolds and Denning,
supra note 19, at 1261 (Jones decided same day as Morrison,
and it "shores up some of the supporting timbers of Lopez").
60 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59; Morrison 529 U.S. at 608-
09.
61 See Raich, 352 F.3d at 1229.
62 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609-13.
63 Raich, 352 F.3d at 1229 (citations omitted).
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Citing United States v. McCoy, 64 Pregerson
observes, "[T]he first and the fourth factors are the
most important."
65
2. Judge Beam's Thesis
Although the Lopez/Morrison test has been
criticized as lacking clarity and the force of
precedent, 66 these cases embody the law in this area
64 McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1115. In this case, a mother who
possessed a photograph of herself and her ten year old
daughter "partially unclothed, posed side by side for the
camera, with their genital areas exposed," was convicted
under a federal law prohibiting the possession of child
pornography. The Ninth Circuit invalidated the conviction on
grounds that the photograph had "not been mailed, shipped, or
transported interstate and [was] not intended for interstate
distribution, or for any economic or commercial use ....
Raich, 352 F.3d at 1228 (citing McCoy at 1115).
65 See Raich, 353 F.3d at 1229 (quoting Morrison, at 610-12,
and McCoy, 823 F.3d at 1119, 1129). As for the second
factor, Judge Pregerson observed that "no ... jurisdictional
hook exists in relevant portions of the CSA," Raich, 352 F.3d
at 1231. As far as the third factor, the Court in Lopez and
Morrison downplayed the force of congressional findings
where Congress otherwise appears to have exceeded its
commerce power.
66 See Kreit, supra note 10, at 1808 (stating that "while
striking, the Court's revival of the Commerce Clause doctrine
has also come without expressly overturning old law, or
announcing new law. This has led to a great deal of confusion
about the reach of the new Commerce Clause"). See also
Reynolds and Denning, supra note 19, at 1258. As Gouldin
observes of Lopez and Morrison:
[T]he precedential value of these cases should
not be overstated. The interpretation of the
leanings of the Justices and application of the
holding to future cases is an inherently
329
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and are the proper basis for evaluating and
responding to Judge Beam's core thesis. Judge
Beam asserts that the facts in Raich are
indistinguishable from those in Wickard6 7 and that
Lopez and Morrison "expressly affirm the
continuing validity of Wickard.,68 There are two
fatal flaws with Beam's argument, however: first,
Raich is indistinguishable from Lopez for
Commerce Clause purposes; second, Raich is
distinguishable from Wickard for Commerce Clause
purposes.
6 9
(a) Raich is indistinguishable from Lopez
for Commerce Clause purposes
To lay the foundation for applying the first
Morrison factor, Pregerson defined the "class of
activities" in which appellants are engaged as the
"intrastate, noncommercial cultivation and
possession of cannabis for personal medical
purposes., 70  He conceded that the Ninth Circuit
upheld the CSA's application in past Commerce
speculative undertaking .... The highly
charged political and moral debate over drug
policy in the United States makes it more
difficult to predict how the Court would decide
a case that threatened to upset the federal drug
control scheme.
Gouldin, supra note 10, at 512-13.67 Raich, 352 F.3d at 1235, 1243 (Beam, J., dissenting).
68 Id. at 1239 (Beam, J., dissenting).
69 My two replies partly converge, insofar as Lopez struck
down § 922(q), notwithstanding the holding in Wickard. If
Pregerson is correct that Raich is indistinguishable from
Lopez, then the reach of the CSA attempted in Raich is
likewise properly invalidated, notwithstanding the holding in
Wickard.
70 Raich, 352 F.3d at 1228-29.
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Clause challenges. 71  However, he justified his
narrow definition of the class of activities by citing
to Mc Coy.72 He further noted that none of the Ninth
Circuit cases presented the Commerce Clause issue
that exists in Raich in pure form. He wrote:
• . . [N]one of the cases in which the
Ninth Circuit has upheld the CSA on
Commerce Clause grounds involved
the use, possession, or cultivation of
marijuana for medical purposes. [By
contrast] ... here the appellants are not
only claiming that their activities do
not have the same effect on interstate
commerce as activities in other cases
where the CSA has been upheld.
Rather, they contend that, whereas the
earlier cases concerned drug
71 See United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475 (9th Cir.
1996); United States v. Tisor, 96 F.3d 370 (9th Cir., 1996);
United States v. Kim, 94 F.3d 1247 (9th Cir. 1996); United
States v. Visman, 919 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1990).
72 Raich, 352 F.3d at 1228-29 (stating that "[a] narrow
categorization of the appellants' activity is supported by our
recent decision in... McCoy.. .", and continuing:
[U]nder McCoy, the class of activities at issue in this
case can properly be defined as the intrastate,
noncommercial cultivation, possession, and use of
marijuana for personal medical purposes on the
advice of a physician and in accordance with state
law. This class of activities does not involve sale,
exchange, or distribution.)
See also Gouldin, supra note 10 at 517-18; Susan Klein, A
Colloquium on Community Policing: Independent-Norm
Federalism in Criminal Law, 90 CALIF. L. REv. 1541, 1590
(2002).
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trafficking, the appellants' conduct
constitutes a separate and distinct class
of activities: the intrastate,
noncommercial cultivation and
possession of cannabis for personal
medical purposes as recommended by a
patient's physician pursuant to valid
California state law.
73
Having defined the class of activities,
Pregerson next addressed the first Morrison factor:
whether the statute regulates commerce or any sort
73 Raich, 352 F.3d at 1227-28 (emphasis added). Indeed, post-
Lopez lower federal court rejections of Commerce Clause
challenges to CSA § 841(a)(1), as applied, have virtually
never involved the narrow question of whether Congress can
regulate mere intrastate possession and personal medicinal use
of marijuana. These cases have involved one or more of the
following: (a) another substance, usually cocaine or
methamphetamine, (b) use of a firearm while engaged in a
drug transaction, (c) possession of a controlled substance
within 1000 feet of a school, (d) conspiracy, or (e) drug
trafficking. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 288 F.3d 359
(8th Cir. 2002); United States v. Koons, 300 F.3d 985 (8th Cir.
2002); United States v. Walker, 142 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 1998);
United States v. Patterson, 140 F.3d 767 (8th Cir. 1998);
United States v. Westbrook, 125 F.3d 996 (7th Cir. 1997);
Proyect v. United States, 101 F.3d 11 (2d Cir. 1996); United
States v. Zorilla, 93 F.3d 7 (1st Cir., 1996); United States v.
Smith, 920 F.Supp. 245 (D. Me. 1996). See generally,
Neusch, supra note 10, at 235-43. The last of the Ninth
Circuit cases cited above, U.S. v. Visman, was pre-Lopez, and
so provides no guidance in resolving Raich.
For an assessment of lower courts' compliance with Lopez and
Morrison in a variety of Commerce Clause contexts, see
Reynolds and Denning, supra note 19, at 1297-99. Whatever
problems there may be with lower court applications of Lopez
and Morrison, they are irrelevant for our purposes since we
are concerned only with what the Supreme Court should do in
this case.
34
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of economic enterprise. Both this inquiry and that
concerning the class of activities concern, inter alia,
whether or not the activity in question is
"commercial." Thus, Pregerson wrote:
As applied to the limited class of
activities presented by this case, the
CSA does not regulate commerce or
any sort of economic enterprise. The
cultivation, possession, and use of
marijuana for medicinal purposes and
not for exchange or distribution is not
properly characterized as commercial
or economic activity. Lacking sale,
exchange, or distribution, the activity
does not possess the essential elements
of commerce.74
Accordingly, in light of key precedent, the
private possession and use of marijuana cannot be
considered "commerce" regulable by federal law.
Although the seeds, soil, planters, and lights
required to produce a marijuana plant could have
moved in interstate commerce, Lopez drew a crucial
line, rooted in the balance of power which
federalism demands. Mere possession, without
more, is not economic activity under the Commerce
Clause. If possession of a gun, as in Lopez, and
74 Raich, 352 U.S. at 1229-30 n.3 (emphasis added) (adding
further that "although the Doe appellants are providing
marijuana to Raich, there is no "exchange" sufficient to make
such activity commercial in character"). Though Oakland
Cannabis also involved the CUA, the activity regulated in that
case was sale and distribution, which is clearly commercial
activity. 532 U.S. 483. Even if the Court had reached the
Commerce Clause issue in that case, its ruling would be
irrelevant where, as here, there is no economic activity.
333
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commission of malum in se physical violence, as in
Morrison,75 do not qualify as economic activity,
then Pregerson was correct that the peaceful,
private, merely malum prohibitum possession and
medicinal use of marijuana also does not qualify. 76
In response, Judge Beam, analogizing to
Wickard, noted that Raich's marijuana could be sold
in the marketplace.77 He asserted that appellants
"ignore the fungible economic nature of the
substance at issue - marijuana plants - for which
there is a well-established and variable interstate
market. 78  Under the same rationale, Mr. Lopez
75 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617 (rejecting the argument "that
Congress may regulate noneconomic violent criminal conduct
based solely on that conduct's aggregate effect on interstate
commerce").76 See RAND, supra note 10, at 64 (describing marijuana use
as merely malumprohibitum). See Raich, 352 F.3d at 1230
(holding that Raich's activity was not commerce and that the
Wickard "aggregation principle" is simply inapplicable).
Under these circumstances, there is simply nothing to
aggregate. One billion times zero still equals zero.
Judge Beam tries to bootstrap Angel Raich's supplier's
act of giving her marijuana into a commercial transaction by
observing that "the consideration the caregivers receive is
knowing that Ms. Raich is purportedly in less pain because of
their efforts." Raich, 352 F.3d at 1240 n.6 (Beam, J.,
dissenting). Such sleight of hand, however, cannot transform
a mere gift into a commercial transaction and thus a legally
enforceable contract. Consideration is defined as "[s]ome
right, interest, profit, or benefit accruing to one party, or some
forebearance, detriment, loss, or responsibility given, suffered,
or undertaken by the other." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 277
(5th ed., 1979). The psychic gratification that Judge Beam
suggests does not rise to this level. Even if it did, Beam can
make no such claim against Diane Monson, who grows her
own marijuana. This distinction, we shall see, may provide an
opening for rational reform.
Raich, 352 F.3d at 1239, 1242 (Beam, J., dissenting).
78 Id. at 1239.
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could also have found a purchaser for his gun. That
possibility, however, did not transform possession
of that gun into commerce.79  Indeed, the
implications of a legal principle under which the
possibility of an event is equated with that event are
staggering-both Orwellian80 and Kafkaesque.
81
Under this principle, if a person could commit a
crime, we can assume for legal purposes that the
person has. Beam was on particularly weak ground
in relying on such a principle.
82
Having dealt with the first Morrison factor,
Judge Pregerson then addressed the second
Morrison factor: whether the link between the
regulated activity and its substantial effect on
interstate commerce is attenuated. He asserted that
this is the case in Raich, observing that "[a]s the
photograph in McCoy stood in contrast to the
commercial nature of the larger child pornography
industry, so does the medical marijuana at issue in
79 Though Judge Reinhardt in McCoy argues that the
photograph in question was not fungible, see McCoy, 823 F.3d
1122, it is by no means clear that buyers for such an object
could not be found.
80 See generally, GEORGE ORWELL, 1984.
81 See generally, FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL.
82 Ignoring another key distinction, Beam argues that
Pregerson's attempt to distinguish Raich from Proyect v.
United States, 101 F.3d 11 (2d Cir. 1996), fails. Proyect
involved over 100 marijuana plants, thus establishing a
reasonable inference of intent to traffic. See Proyect, 101 F.3d
at 13. Though the DEA seized only six plants from Diane
Monson, Beam writes that "[o]ver time it is likely that many
times over 100 plants will be consumed by [Raich and
Monson] alone." Raich, 352 F.3d at 1239 n. 5 (Beam, J.,
dissenting). In other words, for constitutional purposes,
possession for merely personal use can simply be equated with
possession with intent to traffic. Such an attempt to paper
over a key distinction cuts directly against the thrust of Lopez.
37
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this case stand in contrast to the larger illicit drug
trafficking industry."83  In response, Judge Beam
quoted a Fourth Circuit ruling that "Lopez expressly
reaffirmed the principle that 'where a general
regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to
commerce, the de minimis character of individual
instances is of no consequence'.
'
"
8 4
There are at least two problems with this reply.
First, the above quote is taken out of context. Far
from reaffirming the principle cited by Judge Beam,
the Lopez Court's thrust was in the opposite
direction. The full quote was:
[T]he [Maryland v.] Wirtz Court had held
that "neither here nor in Wickard has the
Court declared that Congress may use a
relatively trivial impact on commerce as
an excuse for broad general regulation of
state or private activities . . . ." Rather,
"the Court has said only that where a
general regulatory statute bears a
substantial relation to commerce, the de
minimis character of individual instances
arising under that statute is of no
consequence.
85
Secondly, even beyond this contextual
problem, the statement on which Beam relies seems
to be legerdemain. As we have seen, it is the
activity that Congress seeks to regulate that must
bear a substantial relation to interstate commerce.
If it does not, then one cannot simply assert that the
83 Raich, 352 F.3d at 1230.
4 Id. at 1240 (quoting United States v. Leshuk, 65 F. 3d 1105,
1112 (4th Cir. 1995)).
85 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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statute bears such a relation.86  If the activity
Congress seeks to regulate is not commerce, then by
definition the statute bears no relation to commerce.
On these bases alone, I submit that Judge
Pregerson was correct on the merits. Neither of the
two key factors developed in Lopez and refined in
Morrison was met, and so application of the CSA to
appellants is beyond Congress' commerce power.
The Supreme Court justifiably drew a line in Lopez
that it reinforced in Morrison, and Pregerson is
correct that appellants' activity in Raich falls on the
same side of that line as did the activity reached by
the laws in those cases.
Yet, there is a third problem with Judge
Beam's argument that Raich satisfies the second
Morrison factor. It concerns the meaning of the
words "effect on interstate commerce." As we saw,
Wickard held that "even if appellee's activity be
local and though it may not be regarded as
commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be
reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial
economic effect on interstate commerce .... 87 To
understand more fully the weakness of Judge
Beam's position, we now turn to his analysis of
Wickard.
86 The same is true of the activity in Raich: the CSA is a
criminal regulation and not an economic one. Therefore,
marijuana grown and used at home could be deregulated
without undercutting the rest of the CSA.
87 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125.
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(b) Raich is distinguishable from Wickard
for Commerce Clause Purposes
Judge Beam claims that Raich is
indistinguishable from Wickard. To be sure,
marijuana grown at home for personal consumption
seems like wheat grown at home for personal
consumption. As Beam notes, quoting Wickard,
"[I]t supplies a need of the man who grew it which
would otherwise be reflected by purchases on the
open market." 88  Further, Wickard held that
intrastate, noncommercial activity is still sometimes
reachable under the commerce power. 89 There are,
however, two problems with Beam's comparison of
Raich with Wickard.
The first problem is evident in Beam's claim
that "as with the wheat consumed by the Filbums
[in Wickard], plaintiffs are supplying their own
needs, here symptom-relieving drugs, without
having to resort to the outside marketplace. This
deportment obviously has an effect on interstate
commerce."
90
88 Raich, 352 F.3d at 1239 (Beam, J., dissenting) (quoting
Wickard, 317 U.S. at 111).
89 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125.
90 Raich, 352 F.3d at 1240. The same confusion is evident in
Beam's observation that Congressional findings in the CSA
included the finding that "local distribution and possession of
controlled substances contribute to swelling the interstate
traffic in such substances." Id. at 1241-42 (Beam, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added).
Regarding the third Morrison factor, the existence of
congressional findings, Beam observes that "Congress
contemplated individual growers, possessors, and users when
it made its findings regarding the CSA." Id. at 1242 (Beam,
J., dissenting) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 801(4)). Pregerson,
however, notes:
40
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In the aggregate, to be sure, an individual's
cultivation, possession and personal use of
marijuana will likely have an "effect on interstate
commerce." That "effect," however, is a decrease
rather than an increase in the volume of the
interstate market, an inescapably vital distinction
for Commerce Clause purposes. Where activity
decreases the volume of illicit interstate marijuana
traffic, Congress lacks even a legitimate, and
certainly not compelling, interest in addressing the
"problem." Far from undermining any rational
congressional goals, the activity advances them.91
[T]hese findings are primarily concerned with the
trafficking or distribution of controlled substances
.... [Further,] there is no indication that
Congress was considering anything like the class
of activities at issue here when it made its
findings. The findings are not specific to
marijuana, much less intrastate medicinal use of
marijuana that is not bought or sold and the use of
which is based on the recommendation of a
physician .... [Moreover,] Morrison counsels
courts to take congressional findings with a grain
of salt.
Id. at 1232.
This seems correct, as it is untenable that Congress can
regulate anything it wants simply by issuing "findings." As
the court in Lopez notes, "simply because Congress may
conclude that a particular activity substantially affects
interstate commerce does not necessarily make it so." Lopez,
514 U.S. at 557 (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining
and Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 311 (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring)). On this point, see Neusch, supra note 10, at
248.
91 Along these lines, relying on Lopez' distinction of § 922(q)
from any "essential part of a larger regulation of economic
activity, in which the regulatory scheme would be undercut
unless the intrastate activity were regulated," Lopez, 514 U.S.
at 561, Beam suggests that making appellants' activity a
federal crime is "an essential part of the regulation of some
339
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In contrast to Wickard, there is not a problem that
Congress needs to remedy. 92 Raich's lack of need
to buy marijuana is simply not a concern of
Congress that justifies its power to make her mere
possession and use of it a federal crime. The cited
"effect on interstate commerce" is but a pretext for
Congress to regulate activity properly addressed by
the states, if necessary, under their police power.
93
The second problem with Beam's thesis is that
the laws by which Congress sought to reach the two
activities serve very different functions. As
Rehnquist wrote in Lopez:
commercial activity," Raich, 352 F.3d at 1240 (Beam, J.,
dissenting). As indicated, however, Congress' purposes are
advanced where appellants and others in their position need
not purchase marijuana.
92 The same confusion is evident in Proyect. See Proyect, 101
F.3d at 14, n. 1. As Gouldin notes, "[T]he problem for
Congress is lessened. If everyone grew their own marijuana,
the interstate market would disappear, and current
congresssional justifications for regulation would likewise
evaporate." Gouldin, supra note 10, at 519. Justices Scalia
and Stevens conceded this point at oral argument. See Oral
Arg., at 6-8, as well as Neusch, supra note 10, at 251, and
Newbern, supra note 10, at 1623.
93 Granted, Rehnquist uses the word "affect" with respect to
interstate commerce, Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567, yet his point is
that Lopez' gun possession neither increased nor decreased
the volume of interstate commerce. It is interesting that Judge
Beam even admits that he does not "believe that the
commodity involved in Wickard was composed of any parts
that had ever moved in interstate commerce." Raich, 352 F.3d
at 1243 (Beam, J. dissenting). Yet, because "the grain was
still deemed by the Supreme Court to be the proper subject of
congressional regulation through the commerce power," id.,
he woodenly, and in flat defiance of the thrust of Lopez, insists
that Wickard controls.
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[E]ven Wickard, perhaps the most far
reaching example of Commerce Clause
authority over intrastate activity, involved
economic activity in a way that
possession of a gun in a school zone does
not .... [T]he Agricultural Adjustment
Act of 1938 ... was designed to regulate
the volume of wheat moving in interstate
and foreign commerce in order to avoid
surpluses and shortages.
94
As this suggests, the Agricultural Adjustment Act
was part of Congress' New Deal efforts to stabilize
the price of wheat during the depression by
regulating the volume of wheat in interstate
commerce. The CSA, by contrast, seeks to destroy
an interstate market by criminalizing the activity in
question. 95 Indeed, Beam simply repeats the words
"open market" used in Wickard; yet, there is no
"open market" for marijuana similar to the legal
market in which Filbum could have purchased
wheat for personal consumption.96  Beam simply
94 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560. As Justices Kennedy and O'Connor
add, "Congress can regulate in the commercial sphere on the
assumption that we have a single market and a unified purpose
to build a stable national economy." Id. at 574 (Kennedy and
O'Connor, JJ., concurring).
95 As we saw, Lopez's distinction between economic and
criminal activity was heightened in Morrison. See Newbem,
supra note 10, at 1620. As Kreit observes, "[T]he CSA does
not seek to control the price of marijuana but rather to prevent
its interstate distribution entirely." Kreit, supra note 10, at
1824.
96 As Gouldin notes, the "analogy between growing marijuana
for personal use and the cultivation of wheat for household use
... ignores the critical differences between effects on a
legitimate market and on a black market." Gouldin, supra
note 10, at 514.
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equates, for Commerce Clause purposes,
regulation and criminal prohibition. Yet,
Lopez Court's twin emphases on the
economic
given the
limits of
Congress' powers and the states' traditional
responsibility for administering criminal law under
their exclusive police power, 97what is permissible
for Commerce Clause purposes in one situation
cannot simply be assumed permissible in the other.
That case must be made, and Beam did not make
it.9
8
To conclude, Judge Pregerson had the better
argument. Where the activity in question is purely
intrastate, noncommercial, and not an essential part
of a larger regulatory scheme, as in Lopez and
97 Beam tries to smuggle in another basis for Congress'
regulation of the activity in question by noting that in United
States v. Visman, 919 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1990), the court
deferred to Congress' findings on the public health impact of
intrastate drug activities. See Raich, 352 F.3d at 1240. Health
policy, however, is also traditionally left to the States under
the police power. See Kreit, supra note 10, at 1820-21.
98 Contrary to Beam's claim, thus, just as Judge Reinhardt
held McCoy distinguishable from Wickard, see McCoy, 823
F.3d at 1122-23, Raich is also distinguishable from Wickard.
In passing, let us observe that in his attempt to ignore
recent precedents in favor of exclusive reliance on Wickard, a
60 year old case, Beam nowhere addressed the fundamental
structural reason for the necessity of clear limits, under our
federalism, on Congress' permissible reach under its
commerce power, as articulated in Lopez and Morrison. He
thus overlooks the balance that must exist in any viable, stable
human institution, including a political constitution. The
legislative and the executive powers are thus like two human
legs that necessarily work together and cannot be clearly
understood without the other. Given the dangers of
concentrated power, there must be substantial balance between
two power centers, whether they are different branches of the
same level of government, or different levels of government,
as in federalism.
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McCoy, it is beyond Congress' commerce power.99
Therefore, the Supreme Court should affirm the
Ninth Circuit's ruling that the CSA is
unconstitutional as applied to appellants. By
upholding Judge Pregerson's decision, the Court
would provide much needed coherence and
continuity to its Commerce Clause jurisprudence.' 00
III. Solicitor General Clement's Reply and its
Implications
A. The Irrelevance of Medicinal Use to the
Commerce Clause Merits
At this point, we must note something about
Pregerson's opinion that Mr. Clement has
predictably tried to use to his advantage. Whenever
Pregerson describes appellants' activity in relation
to the commerce power, he emphasizes key
features, e.g., that it is "instrastate, .... personal use,"
"noncommercial," and "under a valid state law." At
every opportunity, however, he also mentions, and
usually elaborates upon, the medicinal purpose of
99 As Herman writes, "[W]hen one examines the CSA under
the heightened standards the Court set forth in Lopez and
Morrison, it becomes clear that the Act, as applied to the
wholly intrastate cultivation, possession, and use of medical
marijuana is highly constitutionally suspect, if not wholly
unconstitutional." Caroline Herman, Whatever Happened to
Federalism? United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers'
Cooperative, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 121, 122 (2002).
100 As Justices Kennedy and O'Connor note, "[T]he Court as
an institution and the legal system as a whole have an
immense stake in the stability of our Commerce Clause
jurisprudence as it has evolved to this point." Lopez, 514 U.S.
at 574 (Kennedy and O'Connor, JJ., concurring).
343
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appellants' activity and its use under a physician's
recommendation. '
0
'
In presenting the facts, for example, Pregerson
underscores that Raich suffered from ten serious
medical conditions and that she had tried dozens of
alternative, legal medicines that failed her.' 02 In
defining appellants' "class of activities," he thrice
mentions that it was "for medical purposes."'
0 3
When contrasting Raich to Proyect v. United States,
he notes that "while Proyect argued that the
marijuana was only for his personal consumption,
he did not allege that it was for medicinal
purposes. ' 04 Finally, with respect to congressional
findings supporting the CSA, Pregerson writes that
"the findings are not specific to marijuana, much
less intrastate medicinal use of marijuana that is not
bought or sold and the use of which is based on the
recommendation of a physician."'
0 5
101 In speaking to this precise point in Conant, it bears noting,
Pregerson's Ninth Circuit colleague Judge Kozinski does the
same thing. Conant, 309 F.3d at 647 (Kozinski, J.,
concurring).
102 See Raich, 352 F.3d at 1225.
103 Id. at 1227-28.
'04 Id. at 1230, n.4.
105 Id. at 1232. To illustrate further, consider the following
passage from Pregerson's opinion:
Clearly, the way in which the activity or class of
activities is defined is critical. We find that the
appellants' class of activities-the intrastate,
noncommercial cultivation, possession and use of
marijuana for personal medical purposes on the
advice of a physician-is, in fact, different in kind
from drug trafficking. For instance, concern
regarding users' health and safety is significantly
different in the medicinal marijuana context,
where the use is pursuant to a physician's
recommendation. Further, the limited medicinal
46
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To be sure, Pregerson's emphasis on the
medicinal purpose of appellants' marijuana use is
understandable. For one thing, such a purpose
ensures that the plaintiffs' activities are within the
scope of a valid state law, which is essential to their
position's legitimacy. Secondly, describing the
"class of activities" as narrowly as possible seems
to bolster Pregerson's holding that appellant's
activities are beyond the reach of the CSA. Third,
whether marijuana use is for medicinal rather than
recreational purposes is a key policy issue. Polls
suggest that many who support legalizing medical
marijuana draw the line at recreational use,' 06 and
use of marijuana as recommended by a physician
arguably does not raise the same policy concerns
regarding the spread of drug abuse. Moreover, this
limited use is clearly distinct from the broader
illicit drug market-as well as any broader
commercial market for medicinal marijuana-
insofar as the medicinal marijuana at issue in this
case is not intended for, nor does it enter, the
stream of commerce.
Id. at 1228.
Here, Pregerson claims to give three reasons that
appellants' activities are distinct from drug trafficking for
Commerce Clause purposes, but only the third is relevant to
the constitutional issue. The first two reasons are concerns
properly left to the states where the activity in question is
otherwise not federally regulable under the Commerce Clause.
The first reason, "concern regarding users' health and safety,"
is, by definition, within the state's police power, and
Pregerson expressly labels the second one a policy concern.
The third reason, by contrast, while relevant to the Commerce
Clause issue, would be true of some regimes of legalized
recreational marijuana use.
106 A TIME/CNN poll found that 80 percent of Americans
favor legalizing marijuana for medical use, and 72 percent
believe those arrested for possessing small amounts of
marijuana should be fined, not jailed. See Joel Stein, The New
Politics of Pot, TIME, Nov. 4, 2002, at 57-8.
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although 12 states have legalized medical marijuana
to date, 10 7 none currently legalize it for recreational
purposes.
While Pregerson's emphasis on appellants'
medicinal purposes is understandable, the Bush
administration argued that it obscures a key
problem. Where a State legalizes the private,
personal possession and use of marijuana, it is
categorically irrelevant to the Commerce Clause
issue whether that use is for medicinal rather than
recreational purposes. As the Solicitor General
wrote, "for purposes of defining Congress's power
under the Commerce Clause in enacting the CSA..
. , there is no basis for distinguishing marijuana
production, distribution, or use for purported
medicinal purposes, as opposed to recreational (or
any other) purpose." 10 8  As he added at oral
argument, "if Respondents are right on their
Commerce Clause theory, . . . then I think their
analysis would extend to recreational use of
marijuana, as well as medical use of marijuana...
,,109
In response, Justice Souter suggested that
medicinal use can be distinguished from
recreational use based on doctors' claims of the
medical benefits of smoked marijuana for sick
patients. 110 This overlooks, however, that from a
constitutional perspective all that matters is whether
107 See David Savage, Justices Take on Medical Pot Law, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 30, 2004, at Al.
108 Brief for the Petitioners, Ashcroft v. Raich, supra note 24,
at 40. While he thus raised the issue in his brief, Mr. Clement
did not draw out its implications, rather simply declaring that
the CSA reaches the medicinal use of cannabis. Id.
9 OralArg., at 15.
"0 See id., at 23-25.
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the activity Congress seeks to criminalize
constitutes interstate commerce. Whatever motive
different people may have in engaging in the
activity, or benefits they may derive therefrom, the
activity itself - in this case, the private, personal
adult possession and use of marijuana - remains the
same. The possession and consumption in
question have as little or as much impact on
interstate commerce either way. Judge Pregerson
nowhere addresses this problem, and neither his
intentions nor his repetitions make it disappear.
That the medicinal/recreational distinction has great
policy moment does not bestow constitutional
significance. A wish is not a fact." 2
Mr. Clement could thus have argued that if the
Court upholds the Ninth Circuit ruling that
appellants' private possession and use of marijuana
for medicinal purposes are beyond Congress' reach,
this immunity exists regardless of whether that use
is medicinal. Such a ruling, he could have argued,
will unavoidably enable States to legalize the
possession and use of marijuana, and indeed any
Schedule I drug, purely for recreational purposes.
We should not assume that Mr. Clement would
have overplayed his hand with this point. To be
sure, he might have been tempted to warn that
upholding the Ninth Circuit would yield a
nightmare scenario in which States legalize
1 " Even where motive can plausibly determine whether an
activity is commercial or not, monetary gain is the prime
motive in neither medicinal nor recreational use, and so this
line of argument is unavailable.
112 As it turns out, like many lower federal court §841(a)(1)
rulings, Raich does not present the Commerce Clause issue in
pure form. Stripped of the constitutionally irrelevant
dimension of "medicinal purpose," the question is laid bare.
347
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marijuana for minors, cocaine and heroin for adults,
cocaine and heroin for minors, Amsterdam-style
"cafes," public opium dens, and "Needle Parks."" 3
Yet he knows that some such regimes would impact
interstate commerce in a way reachable by
Congress. Even among those that would not,
fIrther, it is virtually impossible as a practical
matter that any State would enact some of them.
As for minors, for example, special protections
and disabilities for minors are strewn throughout
U.S. law for reasons well understood, 14 and there is
no good reason to assume things would be different
with the legalization of certain drugs. As for
cocaine and heroin, notwithstanding the DEA's
representations to the contrary,' 15 Americans
understand that these substances are far more
113 See RAND, supra note 10, at 281-86. See also U.S.
Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration,
Speaking Out Against Drug Legalization, Mar. 2003, at
http://www.dea.gov, at 3 (hereinafter DEA) (last visited June
12, 2005).
114 See RAND, supra note 10, at 63. All states impose age
limits for the purchase of alcohol. Beyond this, a contract with
a minor is voidable at the option of that minor. In First
Amendment law, time, place and manner restrictions may be
imposed on otherwise protected speech in the interest of
protecting minors. In the law of negligence, standards of the
duty of care differ depending on the defendant's age. Finally,
in family law, the welfare of the child is a primary criterion for
the resolution of custody disputes.
115 Both the DEA and ONDCP websites refer in many places
simply to "drug use" and "drug addiction" without
distinguishing between marijuana on the one hand and cocaine
and heroin on the other. See generally the Office of National
Drug Control Policy (hereinafter ONDCP), at
http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/ (last visited September
4, 2005); DEA, supra note 113.
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dangerous and addictive than marijuana." 16 Indeed,
even private adult recreational use of marijuana
goes too far for many Americans. 117  Any
suggestion that States would legalize everything
under the sun is unsupported by what we know of
actual behavior.
1. The Personal Cultivation Initiative
Yet let us give Mr. Clement his due. Let us
concede that, given the chance, some states would
seriously consider legalizing the private cultivation,
possession and use of marijuana for recreational
116 As MacCoun and Reuter note, "[flor purposes of the
legalization debate, marijuana is the cutting edge drug, the
only politically plausible candidate for major legal change."
RAND, supra note 10, at 341. Even James Q. Wilson
distinguishes marijuana for these purposes. See J.Q. Wilson,
Against the Legalization of Drugs, COMMENTARY, Feb.,
1990, at 21, 23.
That the distinction between marijuana and the harder
drugs is well and widely understood is reflected in the fact that
"[t]here are two major categories of bills: marijuana-only bills,
and the omnibus legalization bills that would legalize the sale
and possession of virtually all nonmedical substances."
Neustadter, supra note 22, at 390. The basis for this distinction
consists largely of two key ways in which marijuana differs
from these other substances: it has (1) a much higher safety
margin and (2) a much lower dependence potential. See
Robert Gable, Not All Drugs are Created Equal, in FISH,
supra note 22, at 414.
In passing, I do not claim that decriminializing the
private possession of small amounts of other drugs would
constitute insanity, given the well documented, multilevel
costs of the War on Drugs. That vast subject, however, is
beyond the scope of this article. In any case, since few if any
States, given the option, would legalize or decriminalize
cocaine or heroin, it is a moot point for our purposes.
117 See Stein, supra note 106, at 61.
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purposes by adults. Imagine, for instance, that a
state contemplates enacting the following law:
It shall not be unlawful for an adult to cultivate
within his domicile up to X cannabis plants per
adult legally residing in that domicile for
consumption solely by adults within that
domicile, not for sale or trade. 118
Let us call this imaginary law, a variation on
regimes tried or suggested before,1 19 the Personal
Cultivation Initiative (PCI). Though the PCI
118 So long as this is roughly the substance of the law, it
matters not whether a state enacts it by legislation or
constitutional amendment. Since none of the medical
marijuana laws recently enacted have been enacted by state
legislation, however, the citizen's initiative process would
seem the more likely avenue for such reform. For a defense of
the legitimacy of the initiative process in the context of the
medical marijuana debate, see Newbern, supra note 10, at
1631-32.
119 Several regimes introduced as bills or adopted as law by
States in the 1980's allowed home growing for personal use.
See RAND, supra note 10, at 364-66, and Neustadter, supra
note 22, at 390-91. As one drug advisory council suggested,
"the elimination, as an offense, of personal possession and use
of marijuana.... Growing up to five plants per household for
personal use would also no longer be an offense. This would
apply to a normal residence, but should not apply to schools,
colleges, or private institutions." Drugs and Our Community:
Report of the Premiere's Drug Advisory Council (1996) in
Government & Private Commissions Supporting Marijuana
Law Reform, at http://www.nornl.org/index. Further, as
Schlosser notes, "[i]n 1972, the National Commission on
Marijuana and Drug Abuse . . . unanimously agreed that
possessing small amounts of marijuana in the home should no
longer be a crime. Growing or selling marijuana for profit,
using it in public, or driving under the influence would remain
strictly forbidden." SCHLOSSER, supra note 26, at 23. As
Sterling adds, "[slince marijuana is easily grown, cultivation
for personal or family use should be allowed without
registration or taxation." Sterling, supra note 22, at 524.
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legalizes a narrowly circumscribes zone of cannabis
use, it would function in effect like
decriminalization. 12  Though the PCI legalizes a
narrowly circumscribed zone of cannabis use, it
would, in effect, function like decriminalization. 12
1
Further, since it bans the sale or exchange of
marijuana (unlike some proposals for regulated
distribution) otherwise legitimate concerns about
the commercialization of legal marijuana would not
120 Several regimes introduced as bills or adopted as law by
states in the 1980's allowed home growing for personal use.
See RAND, supra note 10, at 364-66, and Neustadter, supra
note 22, at 390-91. One drug advisory council has suggested
"the elimination, as an offense, of personal possession and use
of marijuana .... Growing up to five plants per household for
personal use would also no longer be an offense. This would
apply to a normal residence, but should not apply to schools,
colleges, or private institutions." Drugs and Our Community:
Report of the Premiere's Drug Advisory Council (1996) in
Government & Private Commissions Supporting Marijuana
Law Reform, at http://www.norml.org/index. Further, as
Schlosser notes, "In 1972, the National Commission on
Marijuana and Drug Abuse. . . unanimously agreed that
possessing small amounts of marijuana in the home should no
longer be a crime. Growing or selling marijuana for profit,
using it in public, or driving under the influence would remain
strictly forbidden." SCHLOSSER, supra note 26, at 23. As
Sterling adds, "Since marijuana is easily grown, cultivation for
personal or family use should be allowed without registration
or taxation." Sterling, supra note 22, at 524.
121 Judge Gray describes decriminalization as follows: "[T]he
possession, use, and sale of street drugs are still illegal. But as
long as people stay within certain well-known guidelines, and
do not otherwise commit any crimes, the police will 'look the
other way' and not enforce the drug laws." J. GRAY, supra
note 4, at 218. The bottom line is the same: keep it discrete,
and there will be no trouble. For further analysis, see Richard
Evans, What Is "Legalization "? What Are "Drugs "? in Fish,
supra note 24, at 369-75.
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arise. 122 Because the PCI would have as little effect
on commerce as would the activity in Raich, it
would be as immune from the reach of Congress'
commerce power as Pregerson has shown
appellants' activity under the CUA to be, and for
the same reasons. If anything, the activity protected
by the PCI is even further from interstate commerce
than Raich's activity under the CUA. The latter
requires a person wishing to use marijuana to obtain
a physician's written recommendation, and a
doctor's visit is virtually always a commercial
transaction. The act of obtaining the doctor's note is
thus quite plausibly "connected with a commercial
transaction."' 23 The same can hardly be said of an
adult who decides to grow a cannabis plant next to
the tomatoes and carrots in his garden for his
personal home consumption.
B. The Refined Issue
Any hesitation the Justices might have before
issuing the broad ruling I advocate would likely be
a matter of policy preference. While conscientious
jurists try to separate their policy preferences from
their constitutional interpretation, we know that
they are not always successful. Taking the policy
question head one, then, the issue for the Court is
whether a state could rationally enact the PCI.
124
Weighing the risks of the PCI against the costs of
122 See RAND, supra note 10, at 326-27, 362-63.
123 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
124 Since the United States Constitution, as we have seen,
reserves the police power to the states alone, then where they
are acting within the police power to regulate noneconomic
activity, a presumption of constitutionality is appropriate, such
that their action need only pass the rational basis test.
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the current regime of absolute cannabis prohibition,
could states rationally conclude that the latter
outweigh the former? There are barriers to clear
thinking on drug law reform, to be sure,' 25 yet if the
Justices can honestly say that a state could
rationally enact the PCI, then given the strength of
Pregerson's constitutional argument, they should
rule that the states can decide this for themselves. 2
6
125 See RAND, supra note 10, at 371-409; James Ostrowski,
Drug Prohibition Muddles Along: How a Failure of
Persuasion Has Left Us with a Failed Policy, in Fish, supra
note 24, at 363-67.
126 At this point, Mr. Clement might suggest that in the
modem era, notwithstanding Lopez and Morrison, the Court
should always defer to Congress in Commerce Clause cases,
as it did in response to challenges to the 1964 Civil Rights
Act. See Heart of Atlanta Hotel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241
(1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). In
those cases, after all, it was Congress, not the states, that had it
right on the policy merits: because an individual's race is
categorically irrelevant to his character, intelligence, ability, or
any other proper basis of treatment by the private or public
sector (particularly at the core of civil society, as in public
accommodations and public university admissions), state
policies to the contrary were properly prohibited.
Beyond the amusing absurdity of such a conservative
administration making this argument, racial nondiscrimination
is now pass6 as a policy goal. Heart of Atlanta and McClung
involved Title II of the 1964 Act, which bans race
discrimination in public accommodations. While Title VI,
which expressly forbids race discrimination by institutions
accepting federal funds, may seem just as sounds, this is now
wrong. With the Court's recent blessing, public institutions
like the University of Michigan, which receive millions
annually in federal funding, may openly engage in racial
discrimination if they claim that it advances "diversity." See
Grutter v. Bollinger, 139 U.S. 306 (2003). Since Grutter flatly
contradicts the racial nondiscrimination standard expressly
imposed by Title VI, Congress is apparently now obliged to
repeal Title VI as bad policy, replacing the racial
nondiscrimination standard with a "racial discrimination if
353
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An exhaustive consideration of the PCI's policy
merits would, of course, require a lengthy
discussion that is necessarily beyond our present
scope. For present purposes, I need only show that
the Court could conclude that enactment of the PCI
would not be irrational.
1. The Risks of the Personal Cultivation
Initiative
Let us begin by acknowledging Mr. Clement's
likely claim that the PCI is not without risks. Four
common, related concerns are: (1) the impact of
legalization on minors,' 27 (2) that marijuana is a
"gateway" to harder drugs, 128 (3) that legalization of
cannabis will increase its use, and (4) that today's
marijuana has a much higher potency than that of a
generation or two ago. While these concerns are
not completely unfounded, the Justices could find
that States contemplating the PCI would be justified
in concluding that these risks are greatly
exaggerated. Even granting that they remain, we
must still consider whether those risks are
nonetheless outweighed by the costs of the present
regime.
As for minors, let us concede that it is
generally better for minors not to consume
marijuana (or alcohol, tobacco, or fatty foods).
experts have good reasons" standard. I predict that will
happen the same week Congress reclassifies marijuana under
the CSA.
127 As the DEA tells us, "The Legalization Lobby claims that
the United States has wasted billions of dollars in its anti-drug
efforts. But for those kids saved from drug addiction, this is
hardly wasted dollars." DEA, supra note 113, at 2.
128 See, e.g., ONDCP, supra note 115, at 9.
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While the DEA assures us that "almost two-thirds
of teens say their schools are drug-free,"'129 Judge
Gray observes:
[O]ur current system is completely
unable to keep illicit drugs out of our
communities and away from our
children . . . . Ask your local high
school or junior college students and
they will tell you... that it is easier for
our children and underage adults to get
illicit drugs than it is for them to get
alcohol. 1
30
As Rosenthal, et al., notes:
[Parent groups] regularly complain to
authorities that marijuana is more
available than alcohol to their junior
high and high school children. Laws
forbid storeowners to sell alcohol or
tobacco to minors, so teenagers need to
use phony IDs or find an adult willing
to buy liquor or cigarettes for them.
However, marijuana may be only a
phone call or bicycle ride away.
13 1
129 DEA, supra note 113, at 4.
130 j. GRAY, supra note 4, at 50-5 1.
131 ROSENTHAL ET AL., supra note 10, at 75-76. As Mike Gray
notes, a University of Maryland survey of high school students
found that the hardest drug to obtain is not marijuana, but
alcohol. See MIKE GRAY, DRUG CRAzY: How WE GOT INTO
THIS MESS AND How WE CAN GET OUT OF IT 188, 191 (1998)
(citing University of Maryland, Center for Substance Abuse
Research, Cesar Fax 5:42, Oct. 28, 1996). See also
SCHLOSSER, supra note 26, at 71; HUSAK, infra note 144, at
71-72; ELDREDGE, supra note 22, at 176-77; and Anita
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As for the "gateway theory," even if most
cocaine and heroin addicts previously smoked
marijuana, a one-way correlation does not prove
that marijuana use is either necessary or sufficient
for later addiction to harder drugs. As Mike Gray
observes:
[T]he fallback line for cannabis
prohibition, the moat around the castle,
has always been the idea that marijuana
is a stepping stone to harder drugs. But
here again the actual experience of the
[baby] boomers did not mesh properly
with the official line. Of the seventy
million Americans who smoked the
weed, 98% didn't wind up on anything
harder than martinis. Only a tiny
fraction went on to become heroin or
cocaine addicts, and the cause-effect
connection to reefer for this group was
no more evident than was the
connection to coffee.'
1 32
Hamilton, This Bud's For the U.S., TIME, Aug. 23, 2004, at
36-37. Concededly, the PCI might provide some minors an
additional avenue of access to cannabis they would not
otherwise have had, i.e., their parents' plants. Just as a liquor
cabinet can be locked, however, it would not be difficult to
secure such plants. See STERLING, supra note 22, at 517.
132 M. GRAY, supra note 131, at 187. Satirist George Carlin
once observed that "mother's milk leads to everything," and as
Sullivan has elaborated:
[Tihe tired argument that pot is a 'gateway' drug to
more serious narcotics is a fallacy. Sure, if you ask
hardened drug addicts whether they started with pot,
they usually say yet. But I doubt many of them are
teetotalers, either. Why wasn't their first beer a
gateway drug? And if you ask a bunch of white-collar
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The RAND report sums up the matter: "[W]e
believe that there is little evidence that expanding
marijuana use does increase the use of other, more
harmful drugs .... [Cannabis] depenalization has
no consequence for the prevalence of cannabis use.
Moreover, it will not increase the use of other drugs
for several reasons. 1 33
As for the claim that legalization of marijuana
will cause its increased use,' 34 the RAND report
notes that "[t]he effects of drug laws on drug use are
considerably more uncertain and complex than is
generally acknowledged by advocates on either side
of the drug policy debate .... There are too many
unknowns to predict the effects of drug legalization
with any specificity."' 35 As one study found,
however, "[T]here is little evidence that
decriminalization of marijuana use necessarily leads
to a substantial increase in marijuana use."'' 36
Another observed:
professionals in their fifties whether they have ever
smoked marijuana, they'd probably say yes as well.
Andrew Sullivan, Enjoy, NEW REPUBLIC, May 28, 2001, at 6.
133 RAND, supra note 10, at 346, 358. Putting the issue into
broader perspective, Martinez adds that "the vast majority of
caffeine, tobacco, and alcohol, or marijuana users do not
advance to stronger drugs." MARTIN MARTINEZ, THE NEW
PRESCRIPTION: MARIJUANA AS MEDICINE 65 (2000).
134 As the DEA says, for example, "[I]f the relatively modest
outlays of federal dollars ($19 billion in 2002) were not made,
drug abuse and the attendant social costs... would be far
greater." DEA, supra note 113, at 12-13.
35 RAND, supra note 10, at 100.
136 INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, Marijuana and Medicine:
Assessing the Scientific Base 326 (Janet E. Jay et al. eds.,
1999).
357
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Between 1973 and 1978, possession of
marijuana was reduced to a
misdemeanor in twelve states, but the
predicted explosion in cannabis use
failed to materialize. The University of
Michigan's annual high school survey.
. showed the seniors in these dozen
states reported no more marijuana use
than their counterparts in the other
states.'
37
Further, although the Dutch decriminalized
cannabis, "Dutch national rates [of cannabis usage]
now are somewhat lower than those in the United
States .... [T]hroughout two decades of the 1976
policy, Dutch [cannabis] use levels have remained
at or below those in the United States."'
' 38
As for the alleged higher potency of today's
marijuana, 139 finally, this is seriously contested. As
a European Union drug monitoring agency recently
reported:
[s]tatements in the popular media that the
potency of cannabis has increased by ten
times or more in recent decades are not
supported by the limited data that are
available from either the USA or Europe.
The greatest long-term changes in potency
appear to have occurred in the USA. It
should be noted here that before 1980
137 L.D. Johnston et al, Marijuana Decriminalization: The
Impact on Youth 1975-1980 in UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN,
INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH, MONITORING THE FUTURE,
OCCASIONAL PAPER 13.
138 RAND, supra note 10, at 256, 263.
139 See DEA, supra note 113, at 9, and ONDCP, supra note
115, at 4.
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herbal cannabis potency in the USA was
very low by European standards.... The
natural variation in the THC content
between and within samples of herbal
cannabis or cannabis resin at any one time
and place far exceeds any long-term
changes that may have occurred either in
Europe or the USA.14
0
Even putting this report aside, however, and
assuming for the sake of argument that cannabis
140 European Union Monitoring Centre on Drugs and Drug
Addiction, Overview of Cannabis Potency, 2004, at
http://www.csdp.org/research/insights6web.pdf. As Mike
Gray adds:
[D]rug Czar William Bennett was among the
first to break the bad news: the children of the
boomers were facing a far more powerful form
of cannabis than the stuff their parents
experimented with in the sixties .... But once
again, close inspection revealed a flaw in the
official tale. It seems the baseline samples from
the 1970's were not properly preserved, so
there's really no way to tell what their original
THC content was. On top of that, the
government's own long-term study of
marijuana potency at the University of
Mississippi undermined Bennett's argument.
The official numbers showed an average THC
content in marijuana seized by the police since
1981 ranging between 2.3 and 3.8 percent. In
the 1970s on the other hand, independent
analysts found THC averaging 2 to 5 percent
with some samples as high as 14 percent. As
one authority put it, "If parents want to know
what their kids are smoking today, they need
only recall their own experience."
M. GRAY, supra note 131, at 186-87. See also
Hamilton, supra note 131, at 37.
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potency in the USA has greatly increased in the last
generation, two things are notable. First, as Judge
Gerber explains, this increase may be directly
traceable to market responses to the U.S
government's efforts in the 1970's and 1980's to
eradicate marijuana smuggled from Mexico. 14 1
Second, even if one who buys cannabis illegally can
likely not know its potency, that risk is eliminated if
he allowed to grow his own cannabis from the seeds
of plants he has already consumed.
While the PCI poses risks, then, they are often
exaggerated and plausibly minimal. Even conceding
some risk, however, this is only part of a State's
basis for rational policymaking in this area. To
complete our assessment of whether the Court could
find that States could rationally enact the PCI, thus,
we turn to the costs of the current regime.
2. The Costs of the Current Regime
Two stark facts in particular would give states
contemplating the PCI considerable pause before
rejecting it. First, while American law completely
prohibits marijuana, to which not a single death has
ever been attributed, 42  it properly regulates
substances far more dangerous than marijuana, like
141 See Gerber, supra note 10, at 145-46. This dynamic seems
to parallel that of alcohol bootleggers during Prohibition who
recognized that greater profits could be realized at the same
level of risk by smuggling hard liquor instead of beer and
wine. See RAND, supra note 10, at 161.
142 As Harvard Medical Professor Lester Grinspoon has
observed, "[D]espite its use by millions of people over
thousands of years, cannabis has never caused a death." Lester
Grinspoon, Cannabis, the Wonder Drug, in THE DRUG
LEGALIZATION DEBATE 101-02 (James A. Inciardi, ed., 1999).
See also ROSENTHAL ET AL., supra note 10, at 40.
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alcohol, tobacco, 143 firearms, and explosives. 144
Second, by completely prohibiting marijuana, the
143 Alcohol and tobacco in particular have often been singled
out in this connection. A study recently commissioned by the
U.S. government concluded that "users of marijuana are less
likely to become dependent on the drug in comparison to
alcohol and nicotine." INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note
136, at 98. As for harms beyond dependence, alcohol related
deaths total more than 100,000 per year, and tobacco causes
more than 400,000 U.S. deaths each year. See ROSENTHAL ET
AL., supra note 10, at 40-41, 103.
Several authorities and leading studies thus declare that
marijuana is far less harmful than alcohol and tobacco. In the
words of two reports cited, "An objective consideration of
marijuana shows that it is responsible for less damage to the
individual and society than are alcohol and cigarettes."
CALIFORNIA RESEARCH ADVISORY PANEL, Twentieth Annual
Report of the Research Advisory Panel (1989), at
http://www.norml.org. According to an article in The Lancet,
a leading British medical journal, "The smoking of cannabis,
even long-term, is not harmful to health .... It would be
reasonable to judge cannabis as less of a threat ... than
alcohol or tobacco." Deglamorising Cannabis, 346 THE
LANCET1241 (Nov. 14, 1998). See also ERIC GOODE,
BETWEEN POLITICS AND REASON: THE DRUG LEGALIZATION
DEBATE 155 (1997); SCHLOSSER, supra note 26, at 74; and
Stein, supra note 106, at 61. As MacCoun and Reuter sum
things up:
[T]hough cannabis use is not without harm,
especially for adolescents, as a source of
danger it is certainly trumped by alcohol,
tobacco, reckless driving, criminality, and
unsafe sexual behavior .... [Nonetheless]
there are enormous political obstacles to
prohibition of these substances; alcohol and
tobacco have much larger and better organized
constituencies than do(es) cannabis .... This
begs the question: why not remove the
inconsistency by changing the pot laws?
RAND, supra note 10, at 345, 358 (emphasis added).
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Notwithstanding these authorities, the DEA simply
declares in sweeping terms that "[d]rug use can be deadly, far
more deadly than alcohol .... [D]rugs are far more addictive
than alcohol." DEA, supra note 113, at 8, 18. The most
astonishing claim, however, may be the following:
"Legalization proponents claim.., that many people can use
drugs in moderation and that many would choose not to use
drugs, just as many abstain from alcohol and tobacco now. Yet
how much misery can be attributed to alcoholism and
smoking? Is the answer to just add more misery and
addiction?" Id. at 14. This claim, it will be noticed, does not
simply equate the effects of marijuana with the misery and
addiction of alcohol and nicotine, which is patently false, but
it does so in the service of blatant paternalism, which is
antithetical to a free society. If free adults can be trusted to
decide whether to risk the devastation of alcoholism and
tobacco addiction, it is absurd to say they can not be trusted to
decide whether to use marijuana, which is unquestionably far
safer.
144 Two other substances are noteworthy in this connection:
fatty foods and caffeine. As for the former, though access to
fattening foods is not regulated, "in March, the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention predicted that obesity will
overtake smoking as the leading cause of preventable deaths in
the United States by next year if current trends continue."
Rashad & Michael Grossman, The Economics of Obesity, 156
THE PUBLIC INTEREST 104. As Husak observes, "[P]eople
overeat and grow obese, their health suffers, they may die
prematurely. None of this is good .... What should be done
about it? What about criminalizing it? ... This is crazy ....
The problem is not large enough to warrant such extreme
infringements of liberty." DOUGLAS HUSAK, LEGALIZE THIS!
THE CASE FOR LEGALIZING DRUGS vii-viii (2002). As for
caffeine:
[T]he risks of caffeine are greater than THC in
every way .... Caffeine is physically
addicting (with headache as the most often
cited symptom) and can cause unnecessary
stress, lightheadedness, breathlessness, and an
irregular heartbeat or much worse in larger-
than-average doses. Marijuana isn't even
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United States stands firmly against the recent tide of
practice in other leading western democracies.
45
These facts standing alone may not sway
rational people on this matter. They should,
however, lead them to inquire into and seriously
reflect upon the actual costs of our current regime.
While this is a vast subject that cannot be fully
treated here, we can at least summarize some of the
remotely as dangerous-no deaths by overdose,
no physical addiction, and minimal health risks
Gable, supra note 116, at 406 (quoting D. Larsen).
Still, I assert that these substances that are far more
dangerous and addicting than cannabis are properly regulated
without a blanket prohibition. We know how prohibition of
alcohol worked. As for nicotine (equaled in addictive power
only by heroin) prohibition of cigarettes would create a truly
nightmarish black market. See Fish, supra note 22, at 346. In
light of these contrasts, the United States government's claims
of concern for health risks, see ONDCP, supra note 115, at 2;
DEA, supra note 113, at 8-9, and lost productivity, see DEA,
supra note 113, at 11, are exposed as blatant hypocrisy, which
states can be trusted to put into perspective when
contemplating the PCI.
145 This includes several European countries and Canada. See,
e.g., J.F.O. McAllister, Europe Goes to Pot, TIME, Aug. 20,
2001, at 60-61; European Drug Policy: Analysis and Case
Studies, at http://www.norml.org/index. As Hamilton
observes, "[A]t the popular New Amsterdam Caf& in
downtown Vancouver, customers openly smoke marijuana...
• If passed within the year, as seems likely, new Canadian
legislation would decriminalize possession of less than 15
grams of marijuana, meaning that offenders would given the
equivalent of a traffic ticket." Hamilton, supra note 131, at
37. MacCoun and Reuter conclude that "this reluctance (of
political candidates to advocate change in U.S. marijuana law)
is particularly a pity because major changes in the United
States would be consistent with a general international trend
toward less aggressive use of the criminal sanction against
marijuana." RAND, supra note 10, at 376.
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economic and social costs of complete marijuana
prohibition. 146 These costs are multidimensional,
largely inextricable, and staggering.
146 As for the constitutional costs of the war on marijuana, an
account of these could fill volumes. See, e.g., ROSENTHAL ET
AL., supra note 10, at ch. 1; ELDREDGE, supra note 22, at chs.
5-6; Newbern, supra note 10, at 1590-94; JOEL MILLER, BAD
TRIP: HOW THE WAR AGAINST DRUGS IS DESTROYING
AMERICA ch. 8 (2004), at chs. 5-6; J. GRAY, supra note 4, at
ch. 3; Robert Sweet & Edward Harris, Moral and
Constitutional Considerations in Support of the
Decriminalization of Drugs, in Fish, supra note 22, at 430-84.
This war threatens several fundamental constitutional
interests, including those arising under the First, Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Amendments, as well as the Tenth
Amendment and the Commerce Clause. Some of these
problems largely overlap with the economic and social costs
we shall consider, however, and they can be expressed as
technical legal objections, as well as "costs." I shall thus
underscore a single way in which our government's
propaganda in this war casually disregards fundamental
Fourteenth Amendment values.
The ONDCP asks, "[W]hy legalize marijuana and add a
third drug to the current list of licit threats?" ONDCP, supra
note 115, at 8. See also DEA, supra note 113, at 18-19. The
answer is that it is blatantly arbitrary simply to decree that the
ravages of alcohol and tobacco, but not the demonstrably
lesser evils of marijuana, will be tolerated simply because the
former are currently legal and have powerful lobbies. The
degree of actual harm a substance causes must be at least a
major criterion for determining whether it will be regulated
rather than completely prohibited. Where it is not, both due
process and equal protection are deeply offended. As Justice
Jackson wrote:
The framers of the Constitution knew, and we
should not forget today, that there is no more
effective practical guaranty against arbitrary
and unreasonable government than to require
that the principles of law which officials would
impose upon a minority be imposed generally.
Conversely, nothing opens the door to arbitrary
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a. Economic Costs
The DEA declares that "legalization [of
marijuana] would result in skyrocketing costs that
would be paid by American taxpayers and
consumers." The current prohibition regime,
however, includes a range of steep costs, both direct
and indirect. The criminal justice process, of
course, accounts for many of the direct economic
costs. There are approximately seven hundred
thousand marijuana arrests in the United States each
year, 148 and the annual bill for prosecution, defense,
incarceration, and court supervision of such
nonviolent offenders is in the tens of billions of
dollars. 149 As the RAND report notes, "[R]eductions
action so effectively as to allow those officials
to pick and choose only a few to whom they
will apply legislation and thus to escape the
political retribution that might be visited upon
them if larger numbers were affected.
R. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-13
(1949).
On the liberty due process argument in the context of
Raich, further, see Julie M. Carpenter, Yes, Federal Power is
Limited, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 29, 2004, at 34.
147 DEA, supra note 113, at 11.
148 In 2002, there were 697,082 marijuana arrests, and 6.5
million U.S. marijuana arrests since 1993. Crime in the United
States, FBI Uniform Crime Reports (1993-2002, reported
annually).
14 9 See FAS Drug Policy Analysis Bulletin, at
http://www.mpp.org/arrests/fas61699 1; Still Crazy After All
These Years: Marijuana Prohibition 193 7-1997 at
http://nonnl.org; FBI's combined Uniform Crime Reports:
Crime in the United States (1990-2000), at
http://www.norml.org/index; and ROSENTHAL ET AL., supra
note 10, at 82. See generally, MILLER, supra note 146;
ELDREDGE, supra note 22, ch. 7; ROSENTHAL ET AL., supra
note 10, ch. 3.
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in criminal sanctioning, almost by definition,
produce significant reductions in the criminal
justice costs and burdens, as well as the
intrusiveness associated with those sanctions."' 150
The indirect economic costs of complete
prohibition are also staggering. Persons imprisoned
for marijuana offenses generate numerous losses,
such as "loss of income, potential welfare costs for
dependents, and loss of productivity to society,"'
5
'
as well as loss of tax revenues that these prisoners
and marijuana suppliers would generate if legally
employed. It is a fundamental law of economics
that criminalizing a substance greatly increases its
150 RAND, supra note 10, at 326. As Fish writes:
[L]egalizing marijuana, and releasing from
prison those who are there solely for its
possession, would instantly save huge amounts
of money, end the shortage of prison space,
free up funds for drug treatment, and raise the
possibility that consumers seeking intoxication
might choose it in preference to the much more
dangerous alcohol.
Fish, supra note 22, at 542.
Rosenthal adds that "if marijuana were legal or
civilly regulated, there would be five percent fewer
cops, cop cars, criminal court cases, and prisoners.
The change in policy would result in a direct saving
of $16 billion a year." ROSENTHAL ET AL., supra note
10, at 88. It has been estimated that marijuana
decriminalization saves California $100 million in
enforcement costs each year. See Michael Aldrich &
Tod Mikuriya, Savings in California Marijuana Law
Enforcement Costs Attributable to the Moscone Act
of 1976 - A Summary, 20 J. OF PSYCHOACTIVE
DRUGS at 75-81 (Jan.-Mar. 1988).
151 ROSENTHAL ET AL., supra note 10, at 29.
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price, 152 yet criminalizing marijuana does not
appear to decrease its use. . Under the PCI, then,
the $10.6 billion that the ONDCP estimates that
Americans annually spend on cannabis, at prices
dictated by its illegal status, would be spent or
invested elsewhere in the U.S. economy (rather than
the Canadian).
In passing, marijuana suppliers who become
multimillionaires under the current regime 154 must
152 As Goode observes, "[B]ecause drugs are illegal, they are
expensive and hence, they are hugely profitable to sell."
GOODE, supra note 143, at 152. As the RAND report adds,
"[C]annabis... is extraordinarily expensive relative to its
production cost or what it might cost if legal." RAND, supra
note 10, at 344. As Miller explains, "What appear to be
absurdly high prices are simply the way the market rations
supply and encourages new supplies in response to demand."
MILLER, supra note 146, at 18.
153 According to a 2001 study sponsored by the United States
government, "Existing research seems to indicate there is little
apparent relationship between the severity of sanctions
prescribed for drug use and prevalence or frequency of use,
and that perceived legal risk explains very little in the variance
of individual drug use." Nat'l Research Council, Informing
America's Policy on Illegal Drugs: What We Don't Know
Keeps Hurting Us, Nat'l Acad. Press 192-93 (2001). As one
commentator notes:
Between 1988 and 1998, British arrests for
marijuana nearly quadrupled, reaching almost
100,000 a year. As many as 5600 marijuana
offenders were annually imprisoned. And yet
British marijuana use during that period
continued to rise. Despite having the most
punitive marijuana laws in Europe, Great
Britain soon had the highest rate of marijuana
use among young people.
SCHLOSSER, supra note 26, at 69-70 (emphasis added).
154 See MILLER, supra note 146, at 15-18; ELDREDGE, supra
note 22, ch. 3.
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be understood as economic actors responding
rationally to a market in which the profit potential
exceeds the risks. 155 The PCI would inevitably
destroy most of the illicit market. Since the PCI
prohibits the sale of marijuana, a person buying
marijuana rather than growing it would not only risk
imprisonment, but would have to pay the inflated
price associated with an illegal market. 156  Judge
Gray notes that "[a] black market of some kind will
always be with us, but it can be severely diminished
155 As Miller observes, "These high prices lure entrepreneurs
into the illegal drug markets like honey draws flies." MILLER,
supra note 146, at 16. Mike Gray notes, "[T]he black market
is the purest form of unfettered free-market capitalism. The
rules are Darwinian - survival of the fittest - and no matter
what you do, the pirates will always be a step ahead ....
[Thus,] the only way to destroy the black market is to
underbid it." M. GRAY, supra note 131, at 191. According to
the RAND report:
Depenalization [of cannabis] along with
removal of sanctions for home production and
gifts [within quantity limits - the model used in
South Australia] should substantially weaken
the black market and generate a much greater
reduction in criminal justice costs, with at most
a small effect on prevalence and intensity of
use.
RAND, supra note 10, at 11.156 As the DEA writes, "[O]nly about 5 percent of inmates in
federal prison are there because of simple possession. Most
drug criminals are in jail - even on possession charges -
because they have plea-bargained down from major trafficking
offenses .... In New York .... it is estimated that 97% of
drug felons sentenced to prison were charged with sale or
intent to sell, not simply possession." DEA, supra note 113, at
3, 23. By destroying most of the adult market for marijuana,
the PCI would give potential marijuana suppliers much less
opportunity to become "drug felons" whom we must imprison.
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in size and power.' ' 157 Thus, a state could rationally
conclude that the PCI would severely diminish the
size and power of the illicit marijuana market. If
the demand for marijuana is here to stay, 158 and
subject to inexorable economic laws, states could
quite sensibly decide to take advantage of those
laws, rather than be taken advantage of by them.
Given the ongoing costs of homeland security and
the war in Iraq, as well as massive federal budget
deficits and widespread state budget shortfalls, the
Supreme Court could conclude on economic
grounds alone that a state could rationally enact the
PCI.
b. Social Costs
The DEA underscores the social costs of "drug
abuse,"'159 yet nowhere does it speak to the
devastating social costs of marijuana prohibition.
For one, the current regime drains billions of dollars
that would enable honest law enforcement officials
to combat serious, violent crime, which greatly
affects law-abiding citizens' quality of life.
16°
Beyond this, marijuana prohibition creates
157 j. GRAY, supra note 4, at 243.
158 See ELDREDGE, supra note 22, at 160. As Hamilton
observes, "[T]he U.S. seized more than 48,000 lbs. of
marijuana along the Canadian border last year, nearly double
the 26,000 lbs. it retrieved in 2002." Hamilton, supra note
131, at 36-37.
159 DEA, supra note 113, at 11.
160 Notwithstanding our government's claims that using
marijuana causes one to be violent, see ONDCP, supra note
115, at 5, it is marijuana's illegality that causes the violence
that unavoidably attends the competition for huge profits
where a widespread activity is criminalized. See Hamilton,
supra note 131, at 37.
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incentives for dishonest public officials, especially
given their typically modest salaries, to cooperate
with the illicit drug markets' 61 and to make
budgetary ends meet through draconian forfeiture
laws. 162  Not only does the present regime
undermine respect for and cooperation with law
enforcement,16 3 it also disproportionately burdens
racial minorities and the poor, 164 exacerbating race
161 See generally MILLER, supra note 146, ch. 2; ELDREDGE,
supra note 22, at 54-57; J. GRAY, supra note 4, at 67-77. As
Rosenthal explains:
As with other banned substances from time
immemorial, agencies charged with enforcing
marijuana laws also have to deal with official
corruption. Because of the high risk of the
marijuana basis, those involved in marijuana
sales on a large basis often try to bribe police
officers and other agents. Given the huge sums
of money involved, some portion of the law
enforcement community will always be
seduced.
ROSENTHAL ET AL., supra note 10, at 20. As Mike Gray thus
writes, "Honest cops everywhere are watching in dismay as
their departments are sucked under by payoffs at every level."
M. GRAY, supra note 131, at 190.
162 See SCHLOSSER, supra note 26, at 61-62. See generally
MILLER, who notes that "by linking police budgets to law
enforcement, forfeiture laws induce police and prosecutors to
neglect other, more pressing, crime problems .... [Florfeiture
laws create . . . a great temptation for state and local police
departments to target assets rather than criminal activity."
MILLER, supra note 146, at 133 (citations omitted).
163 See, e.g., ROSENTHAL ET AL., supra note 10, at 14, 71-72.
In the words of the RAND report, "Depenalization of cannabis
... should significantly enhance the perceived legitimacy and
credibility of the government's control efforts against other
illicit drugs." RAND, supra note 10, at 358-59.
164 See, e.g., Steven Jonas, Why the Drug War Will Never End,
in THE DRUG LEGALIZATION DEBATE 132-36 (James Inciardi
ed., 1999); ELDREDGE, supra note 22, ch. 8; SCHLOSSER,
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and class antagonisms. In addition, drug pushers
become millionaires and are viewed as heroes,
165
which is hardly a message we want to send to
youth. Perhaps most importantly, the CSA's flat
prohibition of marijuana devastates countless
families and individual lives through unnecessary
imprisonment. We considered the economic costs
of the incarceration of tens of thousands of
nonviolent marijuana offenders, but the social costs
of this regime extend to the effects of thrusting a
nonviolent marijuana user into a world of prison
gangs, sexual violence, hard drugs, and learned
criminality. 166 These problems are exacerbated by
prison overcrowding, which also may require the
early release of violent offenders to make room for
nonviolent ones. 167 As the RAND report concludes:
Like President Carter our judgment is
that at present the primary harms of
supra note 26, at 51-52; M. GRAY, supra note 131, at 189;
ROSENTHAL ET AL., supra note 10, at 77-78; RAND, supra
note 10, at 2, 5, 38. As former San Jose Police Chief Joseph
McNamara observes, "Ninety million Americans have tried
marijuana. When you look at who's going to jail, it is
overwhelmingly disproportionate - it's Latinos and Blacks."
Stein, supra note 106, at 61. As Ostrowski concludes, "It is
difficult to resist the temptation to call the war on drugs a war
on blacks." Ostrowski, supra note 125, at 354.
165 See MILLER, supra note 146, at 18; ELDREDGE, supra note
22, at 105-06.
166 See MILLER, supra note 146, at 173-78; ROSENTHAL ET AL.,
supra note 10, at 75, 77; SCHLOSSER, supra note 26, at 57.
167 As Miller notes, part of the overcrowding problem is
traceable to mandatory minimum sentences for drug
convictions. MILLER, supra note 146, at 164-68. See J. GRAY,
supra note 4, at 36. The very recent case of United States v.
Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005) may provide some relief
regarding this problem.
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marijuana use . . . . come from
criminalization, expensive and
intrusive enforcement, inequity, shock
to the conscience from disproportionate
sentence, and a substantial [though
generally nonviolent] black market.
This is not to ignore that the drug itself
causes damage .... But the adverse
consequences of criminalization, with
current U.S. enforcement, seem more
substantial. 1
68
c. The Imperative of Harm Reduction
This brief overview of some risks associated
with the PCI, along with the costs of the current
regime, should be enough to establish that a state
could rationally enact the PCI. It also brings us
back to the fact that the current United States
regime of complete cannabis prohibition runs
counter to the recent trend of other western
democracies. 169 These countries have embraced the
168 RAND, supra note 10, at 356-57 (emphasis added).
169 In Grutter, Justices Ginsberg and Souter rested their
concurrence in part on the use of race preferences in other
countries. While it is debatable whether this is appropriate,
this inclination to take international developments into account
should lead them to seriously consider the results of the
European experience in harm reduction. Indeed, even
Lawrence, authored by Justice Kennedy and joined by Justice
O'Connor, relied on recent international legal trends in more
than one place. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572, 576,
(2003). McAllister writes, "[Als Europe is learning, it may be
easier to knock down rogue missiles than to beat back a
consensus among allies and neighbors who think it is smarter
to live with cannabis than to fight it." McAllister, supra note
145, at 61.
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goal of harm reduction170 by asking the question: In
the cold light of concrete experience, which does
more harm to the individual and society-the use of
marijuana or the enforcement of a regime of
complete marijuana prohibition? 171  For all these
reasons, the Supreme Court should find that states
could rationally decide that the PCI would yield far
less harm than does the current regime. 17
2
170 Hippocrates wrote, "First, do no harm." Of course, with
respect to marijuana law reform, this is impossible because
there are risks or harms no matter what. A logical corollary of
the ancient wisdom, however, must be that, where harm can
not be avoided, it must be minimized.
171 Our government assures us that "European experiments
with drug legalization have failed." DEA, supra note 113, at
15. Such a sweeping condemnation, however, gratuitously
oversimplifies a complex phenomenon, implying that Dutch
cannabis reform, for example, has had the same success as the
Swiss "Needle Park" experiment. As the RAND report sums
up, however, "The Dutch have significantly reduced the
monetary and human costs of incarcerating cannabis offenders
with no apparent effect on levels of use." RAND, supra note
10, at 261. See also Mary Cleveland, Downsizing the Drug
War and Considering "Legalization, " in Fish, supra note 22,
at 547, 570. For this reason, among others we have seen,
states considering enacting the PCI and investigating the facts
for themselves could conclude that our federal government is
misleading us, if not lying to us, about this matter.
172 Both liberals and conservatives on the Court will likely
have reservations about ruling as I have advocated. Newbem
refers to the following:
The "liberal paradox" - the odd position in
which liberal advocates of state-legalized
medical marijuana use are placed in arguing for
a reduced role for the federal government
against a history that equates such arguments
with a time in which states clung to their
autonomy as means of preserving a racist past.
Newbern, supra note 10, at 1590.
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The Court's liberals, however, should recognize that
marijuana policy is categorically distinct from race policy.
Marijuana legalization, be it for medicinal or recreational
purposes, can simply not be equated with an attempt to
resurrect Jim Crow. If anything, States are now trying to
discriminate in favor of racial minorities, not against them, as
in Grutter.
Under these circumstances, the liberals on a "pragmatic"
Court, see Linda Greenhouse, The Year Rehnquist May Have
Lost His Court, N. Y. Times, July 3, 2004, at 3, would be
inclined to be sympathetic toward the CUA and even the PCI
and should finally be willing to concede that Lopez and
Morrison drew a valid line rooted in a division of power for
which the Constitution clearly provides. They should be
willing, that is, to accept what another great liberal Justice
wrote long ago: "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal
system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country."
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
The Court's conservatives, by contrast, will struggle
with the unpleasant fact that their federalism revolution may
enable liberal social policy like the CUA and PCI. While
authoritarian conservatives like Justices Scalia, Thomas, and
Rehnquist may sufficiently support the war on marijuana and
will argue Judge Pregerson misapplied Lopez and Morrison,
the libertarian inclinations of Justices Kennedy and O'Connor
might lead them to rule as I have advocated. To illustrate,
consider Lawrence, in which the Court struck down a State
law criminalizing private consensual homosexual sodomy by
adults as a violation of the right of privacy, which is rooted in
Fourteenth Amendment liberty due process. 539 U.S. 572.
Implicitly relying on Mill's "harm principle," see J.S. MILL,
ON LIBERTY 68 (G. Himmelfarb, ed. 1975), and the distinction
between self regarding and other regarding behavior, see
RAND, supra note 10, at 58-59, Kennedy and O'Connor held
that the activity of adults in the privacy of their home is
beyond the regulatory reach of government. As Kennedy
wrote, "The present case does not involve minors. It does not
involve persons who might be injured or coerced who are
situated in relationships where consent might not easily be
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IV. Conclusion
Gonzales v. Raich provides the Supreme Court
with an historic opportunity to enable much needed
reform. The Court should affirm the Ninth Circuit's
ruling that the Controlled Substances Act is
unconstitutional on Commerce Clause grounds, as it
applies to the appellants. The Court should issue a
broad rather than narrow ruling, acknowledging that
the medicinal purpose of state-legalized marijuana
use is irrelevant to whether it is beyond the reach of
Congress' commerce power, and affirming, or at
least not denying, that states could constitutionally
enact the Personal Cultivation Initiative.
The Personal Cultivation Initiative would
displace but a small comer of the CSA, legalizing
only (1) the cultivation, possession and use, not sale
or trade, of (2) marijuana (3) by adults, (4) in the
home. Further, in ruling as I have advocated, the
Court would not be making substantive policy.
Rather, it would give expression to a coherent
understanding of federalism by leaving the policy
decision to the discretion of states under their police
power. In the process, the Court would provide
continuity and coherence in our Commerce Clause
jurisprudence.
As suggested at the outset, however, the Court
seems unlikely to issue the broad ruling I have
advocated. It may instead rule narrowly for the
respondents, although I have argued that it would
refused. It does not involve public conduct ...." Lawrence,
539 U.S. at 578. This substantially describes the activity
protected by the PCI, and the right of privacy recognized in
Lawrence takes on even added force when a State seeks to
protect it, as under the PCI, rather than violate it, as did the
Texas statute.
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err by trying to rest such a narrow ruling on the
medicinal/recreational distinction, irrelevant as it is
to the Commerce Clause question. If the Court is
not prepared to acknowledge that irrelevance, I
submit that it should remain silent on the issue,
allowing lower courts to forge a consensus as this
area of law develops. The crux of a workable
alternative basis for a narrow ruling in respondents'
favor might look like the following:
1) Unlike the federal laws in Lopez and
Morrison, the CSA as applied in Raich neither
complements nor cooperates with State law. To the
contrary, it completely undermines it.
2) The State law in Raich functions to reduce
the volume of a market that federal law seeks to
destroy.
Therefore, Congress has no rational basis to
criminalize the activity protected by the State law in
Raich, and so it is beyond its commerce power.
Whatever the merits of this formulation, we
must recognize that the Court may rule against the
respondents. Some have reported that the Court was
skeptical of Raich and Monson's position at oral
argument, 173 and comments by Justices Breyer
174
173 See, e.g., High Court Appears Hesitant to Endorse Medical
Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2004, at
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/national/AP-Scotus-
Medical-Marijuana; Tony Mauro, U.S. High Court not High
on Medical Pot, THE RECORDER, Nov. 30, 2004, at 1; Gail
Gibson, Medical Marijuana: Justices Skeptical over Patients'
Use, BALT. SUN, Nov. 30, 2004, at Al; and Linda
Greenhouse, States' Rights Defense Falters in Medical
Marijuana Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, at
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/30/politics/30scotus. As one
observer wrote, "a majority of the justices made comments
suggesting they thought that even small amounts of ostensibly
medical marijuana, obtained for free, were part of a national
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market for licit and illicit drugs - and thus subject to
Congress's constitutional power over trade among the states."
Charles Lane, High Court Not Receptive to Marijuana Case,
WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 2004, at A03.
174 Justice Breyer, of course, penned powerful dissents in
Lopez and Morrison. As Savage writes, "(a) former Senate
staffer, Breyer has consistently urged the Court to uphold acts
of Congress." Savage, supra note 7, at Al. At oral argument,
accordingly, Breyer did two things.
First, in response to Barnett's claim that respondents'
activity is noneconomic, Breyer responded that "it's non-
economic and it affects the economic." Oral Arg. at 33. This
echoes Breyer's rejection of the economic/noneconomic
distinction, see Morrison, 529 U.S. at 656-658, and reminds us
why the Chief Justice observed in Lopez that "although Justice
Breyer argues that acceptance of the government's rationales
would not authorize a federal police power, he is unable to
identify any activity that the States may regulate but Congress
may not." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564. For the commerce power to
have any coherent meaning, we have seen, there must be
something that is not interstate commerce. As Pregerson
amply demonstrates, the activity at issue in this case qualifies.
Second, Breyer suggested that the proper way for activists to
secure a change in federal cannabis law on medicinal grounds
is to request federal regulators at the FDA take it off the list of
schedule I drugs. See Oral Arg., at 50. This is consistent with
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, yet
Barnett directed the Court's attention to those amicus curiae
briefs documenting the federal government's obstruction of
scientific research as well as those studies commissioned by
the national government which have shown the medical
benefits of cannabis. See id. at 51. One hopes that Breyer's
reflection on such obstruction may finally yield a crack in his
"beltway mentality," i.e., the assumption that all wisdom
resides in Washington D.C., regardless of what the States or
other western liberal democracies are doing. It can also only
be hoped that Breyer will acknowledge the fundamental
distinction between Raich and Morrison, the latter in which he
dissented partly based on his description of § 13981 as "an
instance not of state/federal conflict, but of state/federal efforts
to cooperate in order to help solve a mutually acknowledged
national problem." Morrison, 529 U.S. at 662.
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and Scalia 175 strongly suggest that they will rule for
Congress. A majority ruling to this effect would
seem at first glance a victory for the U.S.
government. Beyond securing Washington's power
to raid, prosecute, and imprison the likes of Angel
Raich and Diane Monson, for example, it could
slow the momentum of state cannabis law reform.
175 Unlike Breyer, Scalia wrote nothing in Lopez and
Morrison. Yet also unlike Breyer, he joined the majority in
both opinions. His remark to Clement that "it seems rather
ironic to appeal to the fact that home-grown marijuana would
reduce the interstate commerce that you don't want to occur in
order to regulate it," Oral Arg., at 7, was thus no surprise.
Nonetheless, Scalia pressed Barnett on two points.
He noted first that, relying on its commerce power,
Congress has legitimately criminalized the mere possession of
articles like ivory and eagle feathers. Id., at 26-27. However,
not only are such articles not medicine in the eyes of a
substantial portion of the American medical community, but
the criminalization of their possession is necessary for the
protection of endangered species. As Barnett thus noted,
"they're an essential part of a larger regulatory scheme that
would be undercut unless those activities are reached," id. at
27, and so are well within a workable exception to Lopez and
Morrison.
Expressing concern about the proper definition of the
class of activities at issue in Raich, secondly, Scalia noted that
he had heard "that there are communes that grow marijuana
for the medical use of all the members of the commune." Id. at
28. Presumably not impressed by the fact that the CUA
requires all members of such a commune to have valid
doctor's notes, this line of challenge may suggest that his
cultural conservatism, perhaps including support for the war
on marijuana, will compel him to vote to reverse the Ninth
Circuit. Indeed, though we can not know whether he was
serious, he expressly opined that Raich "looks like Wickard to
me." Id. at 40. As I have argued, however, making that case,
as well as distinguishing Lopez and Morrison, may prove so
difficult that any opinion Scalia writes will convince none but
the drug warrior faithful.
80
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy, Vol. 1, Iss. 3 [2014], Art. 1
http://trace.tennessee.edu/tjlp/vol1/iss3/1
GONZALES V. RAICH
Given the U.S. government's broader interests,
however, a ruling against these women could
backfire in several ways.
To begin, since it would only establish that the
U.S. government has power under federal law to go
after medical cannabis patients, such a ruling could
underscore Washington's considerable irrelevance
on this issue. Though states could not prevent the
federal raids and prosecutions, that is, they would
be required neither to assist in those raids nor to
enforce the CSA's rigid federal prohibition in their
courts, where the vast majority of cannabis
prosecutions take place under state law. Since
states with medical cannabis laws would be free to
continue enforcing those laws, then, public
authorities and medical cannabis patients in those
states would likely find a ruling in Congress' favor
simply irrelevant to how they operate on a daily
basis. Indeed, just as Roe v. Wade176 energized its
opponents, such a ruling would likely have a similar
effect. Although many in Washington are still
gripped by the "reefer madness" hysteria of the
1930's, this issue is one of life and death for many
people, and organizations like NORML and the
Marijuana Policy Project would certainly ensure
that reformers in every state are aware of the limits
of such a ruling.
Beyond its reflection on the U.S. government
generally, a ruling against Raich and Monson could
leave the President, Congress, and the Court each
with egg on their faces.
As for the President, the Constitution requires
that the Chief Executive "shall take Care that the
176 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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Laws be faithfully executed."' 177 If the Court clears
the way for Raich and Monson's prosecution, then,
Mr. Bush would seem duty bound to direct Mr.
Gonzales to ensure that these women are convicted
and imprisoned as the "drug felons" that U.S. law
and propaganda declare them to be. The DEA, after
all, found the courage to break down a sick
woman's door and destroy what state law and her
doctor deemed medicine. The least Mr. Bush could
do is order that these dangerous women be put on
trial. His ratings are at an all time low, 178 to be sure,
but he can certainly face down any fears that in a
country where 80% of adults support legalized
medicinal cannabis, a jury faced with imprisoning
these women might resort to jury nullification, with
the bad publicity that would generate.
If the Court rules for Congress, it might try to
soften the blow by chanting the D word - not
diversity, but democracy, something like "if change
is to come, it must come through the democratic
process, and so reformers should focus their efforts
on Congress." Though perhaps predictable, this
would be a mockery of sick patients like Angel
Raich and Diane Monson. Not only has the
democratic process in twelve states already spoken,
but there is no reason to expect courage from
Congress on the medical cannabis issue any time
soon. Indeed, like those of the President, Congress'
ratings are as low as they have been for some
177 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
178 "President Bush's approval ratings have continued to slide,
with a Gallup/USA Today/CNN poll this week recording the
highest negatives of his presidency." David Ignatius, A New
Beginning? WASH. POST, May 25, 2005, at A27.
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time, 179 and for good reason. It is, for example, the
one body that could have prevented our disastrous
military invasion of Iraq, e.g., by threatening the
President with impeachment and removal absent
clear proof of weapons of mass destruction and
links between Iraq and Al Qaeda. Having failed to
act with the stakes this high, most members of
Congress could hardly be expected to stand up to
cultural conservatives and in favor of a few people
who may not even live to vote against them in the
next election. The scientific consensus that smoked
cannabis provides relief for a range of ailments,
based largely on studies commissioned by the U.S.
government, will thus continue to be ignored.
179 As Ignatius observed, "a Pew Research Center Poll this
month found that only 35 percent of the public approved of the
Republican leadership in Congress." Id. See also Donald
Lambro, Public Mood Swings, WASH. TIMES, May 12, 2005,
at A20. (In recent polls, "Congress' scores dropped
significantly.")
180 As Congressman Pete Stark said on the House floor in
1999:
Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of H.R.
912, The Medical Use of Marijuana Act, introduced by
Representative Barney Frank. This bill would move
marijuana from Schedule I of the Controlled Substances
Act to Schedule II of the Act, allowing physicians to
prescribe marijuana to patients with a clear medical need
for the drug.
Institute of Medicine studies have shown that
components of marijuana relieve symptoms associated
with terrible diseases such as AIDS, cancer, glaucoma,
and epilepsy. The New England Journal of Medicine
also supports the medical use of marijuana in relieving
the symptoms linked with these illnesses. As an appetite
stimulant, marijuana can help prevent the weight loss
associated with cancer and AIDS. It can alleviate the
nausea and vomiting associated with cancer
chemotherapy. Marijuana has also been proven to
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provide some relief to patients with glaucoma and
epilepsy. Additionally, marijuana can provide pain relief
to millions of patients suffering from conditions ranging
from post- surgery pain to chronic muscle spasms. Often
the alternative pain relief options for these conditions
have serious side effects such as liver and kidney
damage, stomach bleeding, and ulcers. Marijuana has
never been shown to cause death or serious illnesses
such as these.
Opposition to medical marijuana use has often
focused on the belief that legalizing the drug for medical
use will lead to an increase in its recreational use. I do
not condone recreational use of marijuana, nor does H.R.
912 seek to increase illicit use. This bill is simply meant
to treat marijuana as we treat drugs such as morphine. It
would only be available to those with a doctor's
prescription.
A recent Institute of Medicine report entitled
'Medicine and Health Flash' concluded that there is no
convincing data to support the belief that the medical use
of marijuana will lead to an increase in its illicit use. The
point of making marijuana a Schedule II drug is so that it
can be regulated as closely as other prescription drug
with the potential for abuse. As we have learned in the
failing 'War on Drugs', treating marijuana as an illicit
drug in all circumstances not only fails to curb its
recreational use, it eliminates a potential treatment for
some of the most painful and terrible diseases. Treating
marijuana as a prescription drug will give doctors more
alternatives for alleviating the pain and suffering of their
patients.
H.R. 912 would allow for the use and possession
of marijuana by those who have been prescribed the
drug by a physician. Passage of this bill will succeed in
opening the door to increased research into the ways
marijuana can be of a medicinal value. We must not
eliminate the drug as a potential tool for alleviating the
suffering of millions of Americans. I urge my colleagues
to support the Medical Use of Marijuana Act.
145 CONG. REc. 50 (1999).
Beyond this, cannabis' therapeutic potential has been
recognized for millenia throughout the world. In the U.S.,
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This, even though the U.S. government itself
acknowledged this scientific consensus in the late
1970's when it established the compassionate
investigative new drug (IND) program. Though it
stopped admitting patients in the early 1990's in
response to the AIDS epidemic, the U.S.
government to this day provides marijuana to a
handful of sick patients.'
8
American doctors began to explore cannabis-based medicine
in the 19 th century. The United States Pharmacopoeia, a
highly selective drug reference manual, began listing
Extractum Cannabis as a recognized medicine in 1850. In
1860, the Ohio State Medical Society held the first American
clinical conference on medical marijuana, concluding that it
was useful in the treatment of an array of ailments including
tetanus, painful menstruation, convulsions, asthma,
rheumatism, post-partum depression, gonorrhea, and chronic
bronchitis. It has been reported that over 100 articles were
published between 1840 and 1890 recommending cannabis for
one disorder or another. Accordingly, pharmaceutical
companies like Eli Lilly, Parke-Davis, and Squibb
manufactured preparations during this period with traces of
cannabis, made them available over the counter, and marketed
them largely as painkillers or sedatives.
See generally Michael Aldrich, History of Therapeutic
Cannabis, in CANNABIS IN MEDICAL PRACTICE (Mary Lynn
Mathre, ed., 1997); BLOOMQUIST, supra note 54; ALAN BOCK,
WAITING To INHALE: THE POLITICS OF MEDICAL MARIJUANA
(2000); RICHARD J. BONNIE & CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD II,
THE MARIJUANA CONVICTION: A HISTORY OF MARIJUANA
PROHIBITION IN THE UNITED STATES (1974); NICK
BROWNLEE, THE ILLUSTRATED GUIDE To CANNABIS (2003);
ALBERT GOLDMAN, GRASSROOTS: MARIJUANA IN AMERICA
TODAY (1979); LESTER GRINSPOON & SCOTT BAKALAR,
MARIHUANA: THE FORBIDDEN MEDICINE (1993); MARK
DAVID MERLIN, MAN AND MARIJUANA: SOME ASPECTS OF
THEIR ANCIENT RELATIONSHIP (1972); LARRY SLOMAN, THE
HISTORY OF MARIJUANA IN AMERICA: REEFER MADNESS
(1979); DAVID SOLOMON, THE MARIHUANA PAPERS (1966);
SOLOMON H. SNYDER, USES OF MARIJUANA (1971).
181 See BOCK, supra note 10, at 154-55.
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Under these circumstances, the least Congress
should have done long ago is to have reclassified
cannabis as a schedule II substance under the CSA.
As we have seen, however, even this modest step
toward reason is not politically viable.' 82 Indeed,
last year the House rejected a bill simply directing
the DEA not to enforce the CSA contrary to state
laws allowing medical marijuana. 183 Most recently,
on May 4, 2005, the States' Rights to Medical
Marijuana Act (HR 2087) was reintroduced and
referred to the House Energy and Commerce
Committee,' 84 where it remains in limbo. If the
Court rules against Raich and Monson, then, it will
not only highlight Congress' failures in this area,
but increase pressure for reform from a body with
little political courage, even on behalf of the sick
and dying.
As for the Court itself, finally, a realist can
certainly say that the Court must simply choose in
this case between conflicting but powerful and
relevant principles - deferring to federal power vs.
limiting federal power. I conclude, however, with
three observations.
First, Raich and Monson challenged the CSA
not on its face, but only as applied to the specific
facts of their case. They do not seek to invalidate an
entire statute or even a single provision of federal
law, only to void its application to the facts of their
182 Neusch, supra note 10, at 211. Indeed, shortly after
Proposition 215 was enacted, Congress passed a "sense of the
Congress" resolution in opposition to medical marijuana. Act
of Oct. 21, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-
760.
183 Viewpoint, ROLL CALL, July 13, 2004; For the Record,
WASH. POST, July 11, 2004, at T11.
184 151 CONG. REC. 2975 (2005).
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cases. In that sense, the ruling they seek is quite
limited in scope.
Second, if the activities in Lopez and Morrison
were beyond Congress' regulatory reach as non-
economic activities, the Court would be hard
pressed to make a convincing case that the activity
in Raich, which is at the core of states' police power
to legislate on behalf of public health and welfare,
IS economic activity within Congress' reach. If the
Court were to rule for Congress yet fail to make this
case, it would undermine the coherence of its
federalism jurisprudence for decades. Indeed, at that
point, it would be difficult to identify any human
activity Congress could not regulate. Even such a
champion of federal power as John Marshall would
never have gone that far.
Finally, beyond the Commerce Clause
dimension of this case, Monson and Raich also filed
suit under the Due Process clause of the Fifth
Amendment. 85 The lower courts did not address
this theory, and the justices did not focus on it at
oral argument, yet there is a profound liberty
dimension to this case. This in turn implicates cases
like Roe v. Wade, which held that a woman has a
constitutional right, early in her pregnancy and in
consultation with her doctor, to abort a fetus. That
being the law, it would be hard to see how a sick
patient, in consultation with her doctor, would have
no right to consume cannabis in the privacy of her
home in order to relieve illness. Destruction of
innocent potential human life would be protected,
but protection of innocent actual human life would
not. Once again, it would take decades to sort out
185 See Raich, 352 F.3d at 1227.
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such inconsistency in our constitutional law, and for
this the Court would have egg on its face as well.
Whichever way the Court rules, the U.S. can
resist the trend of other western liberal democracies
for only so long. Especially if the states, like
Canada and Europe, maintain their momentum
toward more rational cannabis policy, Congress will
eventually have to follow.
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I. Introduction
The pendulum of credibility weighs heavily
against a defendant who challenges the
admissibility of his confession. If admitted, it will
prove a virtual guarantee of conviction, as it is the
most "potent of weapons for the prosecution."'
Although prosecutors lament the layers of
constitutional rights in place to protect a defendant
against coercive interrogation methods, most
challenges to admissibility will come down to the
detective's word against that of the defendant.
Absent a recording, the court will be called upon to
decipher events that took place in communicado and
will be consigned to speculate about what actually
took place, weighing the relative credibility of
witnesses. Where the court is left to speculate about
what actually transpired, it is no secret that the
defendant rarely prevails when a confession is in
evidence. The entire set of rules governing the
relationship between the suspect and interrogators is
built on a house of cards whose major weakness
resides in the premise that a court can accurately
determine what transpired during the interrogation
2process.
1 Saul M. Kassin & Holly Sukel, Coerced Confessions and the
Jury: An Experimental Test of the "Harmless Error" Rule, 21
L. & HUM. BEHAV. 27 (1997); see also Gail Johnson, False
Confessions and Fundamental Fairness: The Need for
Electronic Recording of Custodial Interrogations, 6 B.U.
PUB. INT. L. J. 719, 741-43 (1997); Paul G. Cassell & Bret S.
Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical
Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839, 906-
07 (1996).
2 See Wayne T. Westling, Something is Rotten in the
Interrogation Room: Let's Try Video Oversight, 34 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 537 (2001).
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The system now relies on DNA testing and
widespread use of videotaping in DUI enforcement.
Crime scenes and drug investigations are recorded
on video cameras installed to monitor traffic and
record license plates of people who violate traffic
laws. New technology is employed on behalf of the
State in enhancing prosecution proof, not to ensure
or expand a defendant's right to a fair trial. Police
and prosecutors find the use of videotaping cost-
effective in many criminal justice activities, but not
during interrogations.3  Unfortunately, too many
interrogations are aimed at securing a confession
without regard to securing reliable, fair, and
objective indices of proof. Fundamental unfairness
may arise not only because the confession may be
unreliable, but also because no confession may have
been forthcoming if the interrogation had been
properly conducted. One irony of the failure to
electronically record an interrogation is that when
interrogators record such statements, courts readily
admit them at the prosecutor's request.
The Tennessee Legislature recently embarked
on an ambitious enterprise to render an accused's
statements made during custodial interrogation
inadmissible against the accused unless the entire
interrogation were recorded.4 Any statement made
during a prior custodial interrogation without being
recorded in compliance with the bill's guidelines
would be inadmissible for purposes other than
3 See Steven A. Drizin & Beth A. Colgan, Let the Cameras
Roll: Mandatory Videotaping of Interrogations Is the Solution
to Illinois Problem of False Confessions, 32 LOY. U. CHI. L.
J. 337 (2001).
4 The bill targets only custodial interrogations in detention
facilities. It would also require that Miranda rights and the
accused's waiver of them be part of the recording.
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impeachment. 5  Coerced and involuntary
confessions undermine both the integrity of our
criminal justice system and the constitutional rights
of defendants. One simple and expedient method of
addressing that problem is to videotape the entire
interrogation process. A videotape record would
provide a more complete accounting from which a
judge could make essential Miranda determinations
such as voluntariness, the presence of warnings, and
the waiver of rights.6 It would allow a judge to
view a suspect's demeanor to help determine
whether the suspect understood his rights. A
videotape would also alleviate the problems of any
contested confession by allowing a judge to view
the exact dialogue between suspect and interrogator
and determine whether that dialogue casts doubt on
the voluntary nature of the confession. By viewing
a recording of the entire interrogation process, a
judge is able to see exactly what transpired in the
interrogation room and further evaluate the
confession in its own context.
This article assesses the feasibility,
appropriateness and legal and political status of
recording interrogations. Section II of this paper
begins with a general discussion of the law of
confessions, both from the United States Supreme
Court and Tennessee courts. The current state of
the law makes assessment of the voluntariness of
confessions highly problematic. In that regard, we
discuss the "voluntariness" and "totality of
circumstances" tests and argue that both tests are
inherently vague and rely extensively on the court
5 See generally S.B. 0343iH.B. 1138, (2003) (amending TENN.
CODE ANN. § 40-14, et seq., if enacted) [hereinafter
"Tennessee proposal"].
6 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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and jury to engage in specific fact-finding as to
what took place in the interrogation room.
Section III deals with a variety of topics related
to the current climate, both political and legal,
regarding mandatory interrogations. Included in
this section is an extensive survey of the costs and
benefits of recording interrogations as well as a
discussion of the current national state of the law
regarding videotaping. In addition, we discuss
Tennessee's legislative attempts at implementing
recording requirements. In addition, this section
examines the findings and recommendations of the
Tennessee Law Enforcement Advisory Council.7
In Section IV we argue that the Tennessee
Supreme Court could bring the current legislative
impasse to an end if the court ordered mandatory
videotaping of interrogations as a function of its
inherent supervisory powers to regulate and
administer a fair and reliable criminal justice
system.
I. The Problematic Nature of Confessions
A. The Voluntariness Test
The traditional test for admissibility of a
confession is the "voluntariness" test. 8 A statement
is "involuntary" and inadmissible if the defendant's
was "overborne" or his "capacity for self-
7 Pursuant to H.R.J. Res. 862, 104th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess.
(Tenn. 2002), the Tennessee Law Enforcement Advisory
Council was directed to report its study and evaluation of
issues related to electronic recording of custodial
interrogations in Tennessee to the Senate and House Judiciary
Committees.
8 See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 224 (1973).
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determination critically impaired when making the
statement." 9 In order to make a determination of
voluntariness, a court must examine the "totality of
the circumstances," including the characteristics of
the individual suspect and details of the manner in
which the interrogation was carried out. Without
some improper state action such as coercive police
tactics, there is little likelihood that a court will
deem a confession involuntary. If involuntariness
were found to exist, the prosecution would be
precluded from using the statement for any purpose
whatsoever.
Later, as established in Miranda v. Arizona,
10
police were required to first tell a suspect of his
rights and then obtain a waiver of those rights prior
to a custodial interrogation.1 Failure to satisfy any
of the Miranda requirements would result in a
suppression of the confession, even when a suspect
had given a voluntary confession. The prosecution
is precluded in its case-in-chief from using a
defendant's statement that was obtained in violation
of Miranda. Unlike involuntary statements,
however, statements obtained as a result of a
Miranda violation may be used to impeach a
testifying defendant who perjured himself at trial. 2
As a result of Miranda v. Arizona, most
litigation regarding confessions centers on the
applicability of the Fifth Amendment. However,
until the Miranda decision in 1966, the United
States Supreme Court relied on other constitutional
provisions for determining the admissibility of
confessions, focusing largely on the voluntariness
9Id.
'o 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
" Id. at 467-77.
12 Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
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of a suspect's confession in determining its validity
and admissibility.13
In Brown v. Mississippi, the United States
Supreme Court recognized Fourteenth Amendment
due process principles as requiring the exclusion at
trial of involuntary confessions extracted by
coercive police methods. 14 The case involved three
suspects brutalized by sheriff's deputies. One of the
suspects was hanged from the limb of a tree.15 He
was later tied to a tree and beaten until he
confessed. 16 The other suspects were stripped and
whipped with a leather strap in such a severe and
atrocious manner that their backs were "cut to
pieces."'17  The United States Supreme Court
described the techniques used by the deputies as
"compulsion by torture" and revolting to the sense
of fundamental fairness and justice.' Ultimately,
the Supreme Court of the United States found that
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits the use of involuntary
confessions or coerced confessions. 19  The
Tennessee Constitution provides the same
protections.2 °
Tennessee was not immune from review under
the standard enunciated in the Brown decision. In
the case of Ashcraft v. Tennessee,2 1 police
interrogators carried out 36 hours of uninterrupted,
incommunicado interrogation of a suspect using a
13See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936).
14 See Brown, 297 U.S. 278.
15 Id. at 281.
16 id.
17 Id. at 282.
'8 Id. at 285.
19 See Arizona v. Fulminate, 499 U.S. 279, 287 (1991).
2 0 TENN. CONST. art. I, § 8.
21 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
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string of replacement interrogators during which the
interrogated individual was allowed virtually no
sleep or other rest. In reviewing the interrogation
procedure used, the United States Supreme Court
held that the situation was "so inherently coercive"
that, by its very nature, the interrogation was
"irreconcilable with the possession of mental
freedom by a suspect against whom [the] full
coercive force [of the criminal justice system was]
brought to bear."
22
With the cases of Massiah v. United States23 and
Escobedo v. Illinois,24 the focus of the Supreme
Court shifted for a brief time from the voluntariness
of a suspect's confession under the Due Process
Clause to a defendant's right to assistance of
counsel, as provided by the Sixth Amendment.
However, two years later with the decision in
Miranda, the Court directed that the Fifth
Amendment be the guiding force behind inquiries
25into the admissibility of confessions.
The burden of proving the voluntariness of a
suspect's confession lies with the prosecution. It is
the trial judge who determines whether or not that
burden has been sufficiently met to admit the
confession into evidence. 26 The standard under due
process for determining the admissibility of a
confession ultimately focuses on the issue of
whether the behavior of state officials overcame the
suspect's will to resist, such that the suspect's
22 Id. at 154.
23 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
24 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
25 See 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
26 See State v. Pursley, 550 S.W.2d 949 (Tenn. 1977).
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confession was not freely given.2 7 The dispositive
question in each case is whether a suspect confessed
because his "will was overborne.,
28
B. The Totality of the Circumstances Test
A court's determination of "voluntariness"
utilizes the totality of circumstances test.
Voluntariness is assessed by looking at the totality
of circumstances surrounding the process of
interrogation including, but not limited to, a
suspect's age, education, and mental and physical
condition. 29 Courts also consider the nature of the
interrogation itself, including the location, duration,
and methods used by the interrogators. 30  The
totality of circumstances test, however, made the
applicable guidelines to be followed less than clear.
Under Supreme Court precedent, physical torture
and abuse of suspects would constitute per se
coerciveness. 31 Perhaps the primary problem with
the totality of circumstances tests is that no single
factor, short of physical torture or abuse of the
suspect, is determinative of a finding of
involuntariness. There are no precise limiting
factors restricting interrogators in obtaining
confessions.
The factors a court must take into consideration
include both internal attributes of the suspect and
external factors affecting a suspect. The relevance
27 See State v. Kelly, 603 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Tenn. 1980)
(citing Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961)).
28 Fulminate, 499 U.S. at 287 n.3 (1991).
29 See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
30 Id.
31 See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
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of both a suspect's personal attributes and external
pressures exerted by a suspect's surroundings and
methods of interrogation means that the amount of
coercion needed to render a confession
"involuntary" may vary from context to context.
Courts have acknowledged that a person with a
weaker mental framework might be much more
prone to give an involuntary statement due to
certain external factors which might be insufficient
to render a confession involuntary if made by a
suspect with a stronger internal make-up or
character.
32
The failure by the courts to offer clear
guidelines has made courts have to rely more on a
factual examination of events that transpired
between interrogators and suspects. The problem is
that in situations where no full, objective record of
the entire interrogation event exists, the application
of the voluntariness test turns largely on a swearing
contest between the suspect and his interrogators.
A major turning point in the use of the totality
of circumstances test under the due process
voluntariness standard took place in the case of
Escobedo v. Illinois.33 Escobedo was significant in
the sense that it reflected the Court's disfavor of the
voluntariness approach. It explicitly recognized the
strong link between a defendant's right to counsel
and his privilege against compelled self-
incrimination. Rather than focusing its attention on
the voluntariness issues of Escobedo's confession,
the Court turned its attention to the fact that police
continually denied Escobedo's repeated requests to
32 See, e.g., State v. Benton, 759 S.W.2d 427 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1988).
" 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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speak to his attorney.34 In addition, the Court was
mindful of the fact that no one ever informed the
defendant of his right to remain silent. 35 The Court
struck a poignant note with its comment that no
system worth preserving should have to fear that a
defendant permitted to consult with an attorney will
exercise his rights even if the exercise of such rights
will "thwart the effectiveness" of the interrogation
process.
36
The Fifth Amendment applies to the states
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and provides that "[n]o person.. .shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself."37 The Tennessee Constitution also
provides that a defendant cannot be compelled to
give evidence against himself.38 These privileges
against self-incrimination appear to frame and limit
police interrogation methods and the admissibility
of confessions. In Miranda v. Arizona, the Court
extended the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination by making it applicable to police
interrogations of suspects in custody. 3  In that
decision the Court delineated certain safeguards
deemed necessary to protect a suspect's rights.40
The Court determined that no statements by a
suspect, which stem from a custodial interrogation
of the defendant, can be used in the criminal
prosecution "unless [the State] demonstrates the use
of procedural safeguards effective [in] secur[ing a
34 Id. at 481.
" Id. at 482-83.
16Id. at 490.
37 U.S. CONST. amend. V.38 TENN. CONST. art. I § 9.
3' 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
41 See id.
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suspect's] privilege against self-incrimination. ' 'A
According to the Court, before a custodial
interrogation can take place law enforcement
officers must advise a suspect of his rights to
remain silent and to consult an attorney.42 If the
suspect indicates either a desire to remain silent or
requests an attorney, the questioning must cease.43
The suspect can invoke these privileges "in any
manner, at any time prior to or during
questioning. ' 44 The state bears a heavy burden in
demonstrating that a suspect "knowingly and
intelligently" waived his privilege against self-
incrimination and his right to counsel.45  In the
absence of demonstrated police compliance with the
procedures articulated in Miranda, statements
obtained from a suspect in custody are presumed to
be coerced and are not admissible in a criminal
prosecution as a matter of law.46 As a result, the
Miranda warnings and a valid waiver are
prerequisites to the admissibility of any statement
made by a suspect during custodial interrogation.
47
Subsequent decisions have gradually diminished
Miranda's importance by expanding the types of
words and actions constituting a waiver and
recognizing that some statements in violation of the
Miranda requirements may be introduced into
evidence to impeach a defendant's credibility.
48
Moreover, the Supreme Court created a "public
41 Id. at 444.
42 Id. at 467, 470.
41 Id. at 473-74.
44d. at 473.
4 Id. at 475.
46d. at 478.
47 Id. at 473-76.
48 See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); see also
Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
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safety" exception, doing away with the need for
Miranda warnings when police question a suspect
at the scene of a crime that involves an imminent
threat to public safety.49 However, it is important to
note that involuntary statements cannot be used for
any purpose, including use of those statements for
impeachment of the credibility of a defendant who
takes the stand and perjures himself. °
C. Tennessee Decisions
The Tennessee Supreme Court case law on
confessions and interrogations has largely mirrored
that of the Supreme Court. While Tennessee courts
employ the "voluntariness" test to judge the
admissibility of confessions, the test of
voluntariness for confessions under Article I,
Section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution is
interpreted as being more protective of individual
rights than the test of voluntariness under the Fifth
Amendment. 51  Further, the Tennessee Supreme
Court does not recognize any authority requiring
that interrogations be electronically recorded.
Indeed, as the Supreme Court of Tennessee noted in
State v. Godsey, S neither the Tennessee Constituion
nor the United States Constitution requires
electronic recording of interrogations. The court
noted that mandatory electronic recording of
custodial interrogations would reduce court time
49 See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
50 See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978); Harris v.
New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
51 See generally State v. Smith, 933 S.W.2d 450, 455 (Tenn.
1996); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530 (Tenn. 1994).
See also, V. Lakshmi Arimilli, Confessions and the Tennessee
Constitution, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 637 (1995).
52 60 S.W. 3d 759 (Tenn. 2001).
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required to resolve disputes over what took place
during the interrogation process, and opined that
sound policy considerations would support its
adoption as a law enforcement practice.53 The court
stopped short of requiring electronic recording of
interrogations as a constitutionally grounded
prerequisite to the admissibility of statements by a
defendant, while acknowledging that such recording
could be beneficial. At the same time, as the court
noted, "the issue of electronic recording of custodial
interrogations 'is one best suited to the direction of
the General Assembly' [of the Tennessee
Legislature]."54
III. Recorded Interrogations
A. Overview
The common characteristic of almost all
unrecorded interrogations is that they take place in
communicado, totally closed to outside scrutiny.
The content of statements can be controlled by how
investigators choose to interrogate, and too often a
suspect's confession appears to be a doctored
version of what the interrogator has suggested.
Without the knowledge that an interrogation is
being recorded, an interrogator's dedication may
become an unhealthy zeal, which may in turn lead
to perjury or slanted testimony. An accurate
recording of the entire interrogation would enable a
fact-finder to ensure that witnesses testimony was
based on genuine recall. A recording would also
" Id. at 771-72.54 Id. at 772 (citing State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23-24
(Tenn. 1996)).
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assist the trier of fact in ascertaining the
voluntariness of a suspect's confession and the
context in which a particular statement was elicited.
At the very least, it would be a step toward
protecting suspects from coercive police tactics and
the police from false claims of coercion. It would
also instill some reliability into judicial
determinations as to what went on during an
interrogation in which a suspect made statements.
Finally, recording the interrogation would reduce
skepticism regarding the integrity of the process.
Given the well-publicized developments in the
Central Park Jogger case, as well as the rampant use
of coerced or otherwise improper confessions in
Chicago, Illinois, the advantages and necessity of
mandatory recording of interrogations should be
self-evident. 55  The absence of a recording
requirement hurts everyone except the police.
Defendants questioning the voluntariness of their
confessions, the adequacy of the Miranda
admonitions, or their purported waivers must do so
without the best evidence. Fact-finders must
determine voluntariness, adequacy of rights
admonitions and the validity of a waiver without the
best evidence. Failure to record and preserve the
best possible evidence undermines the legitimacy
and credibility of the criminal justice process and
opens the possibility of the abuse of power by the
police.
55 See Charles D. Weisselberg, Deterring Police from
Deliberately Violating Miranda: In the Stationhouse After
Dickerson, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1121 (2001). See also Drizen &
Colgan, supra note 3; Stevan A. Drizen & Richard Leo, The
Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82
N.C. L. REV. 893 (2004).
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Mandating that interrogations be electronically
recorded has long been recognized as a means of
advancing our criminal justice system.56  The
American Law Institute's Model Code of Pre-
Arraignment Procedure and the Uniform Rules of
Criminal Procedure require electronic recording of
custodial interviews. In Miranda, the Court noted
various forms of psychological pressure routinely
employed by interrogators. 57  As Chief Justice
Warren recognized, the only purpose of such
techniques was to "subjugate the individual to the
will of the examiner."
58
Little systematic reform of the interrogation
process has taken place despite recognition that
psychological pressures are often present in such
encounters. In developing the Miranda rules, the
Court likely believed that a suspect informed of her
right to remain silent and the right to counsel would
understand those rights and make appropriate
decisions. That belief has turned out to be
incorrect. Miranda was a small step toward
confronting various forms of psychological
pressure.59 Trial judges who make determinations
as to whether a suspect waived his rights during an
56 James P. Barber & Philip R. Bates, Videotape in Criminal
Proceedings, 25 HASTINGS L. J. 1017, 1020-26 (1974);
Yale Kamisar, Foreword: Brewer v. Williams-A Hard Look
at a Discomfiting Record, 60 GEO. L. J. 209, 23 8-43 (1977);
See Roscoe Pound, Legal Interrogation of Persons Accused or
Suspected of Crimes 24 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1014, 1017 (1934).57 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 446-54; see also Johnson, supra note
1 (providing an excellent exposition of the psychological
9sames played by interrogators during interrogations).8 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457.
59 See Geoffrey R. Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the
Supreme Court, 1977 SUP. CT. REV. 99-169.
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interrogation are hampered by the lack of objective,
reliable evidence as to precisely what was said or
done during an unrecorded interrogation.
As discussed more fully in this Section, there is
cause for optimism. Currently three states - Alaska,
Minnesota, and Texas - require the electronic
recording of custodial interrogations. A fourth
state, Illinois, recently enacted a more limited
recording requirement requiring officers to tape
interrogations of murder suspects. 60 In 1985, the
Supreme Court of Alaska held that "an unexcused
failure to electronically record a custodial
interrogation conducted in a place of detention
violates a suspect's right to due process" under the
Alaska Constitution, and that any statement thus
obtained is generally inadmissible. The court
mandated recording of station-house interrogations
as a reasonable and necessary safeguard, essential to
the adequate protection of a defendant's right to
counsel, his right against self-incrimination, and
ultimately, his right to a fair trial. 61  The court
further reasoned that the integrity of the judicial
system was at issue whenever a court determined
the admissibility of a questionable confession based
upon the testimony of interested parties. The
Alaska Court recognized that a recording
requirement would buttress judicial integrity merely
by "the flip of a switch."
62
In State v. Scales,63 the Minnesota Supreme
Court utilized its supervisory power and authority
by mandating that all custodial interrogations of
criminal suspects at a place of detention, including
60 See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/103-2.1 (West 2003).
61 Stephan v. State, 711 P. 2d 1156, 1159-60 (1985).
6 2 Id. at 1164.
63 State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587 (Minn. 1994).
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any information concerning rights, waiver of those
rights, or questioning, be electronically recorded
where feasible. The court recognized that the
process of in communicado interrogation and its
perceived benefits by the police would be preserved
while at the same time facilitating the judiciary's
task of fact-finding since it would be based on
reliable information.
The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure requires
that custodial statements used against a defendant in
a criminal proceeding be recorded.64 Illinois will
become the fourth state in the nation to require
police to record interrogations.65 The Illinois statute
requires officers to tape interrogations of murder
suspects only.66 The statute was one of numerous
reforms recommended by then-Governor George
Ryan's Commission on Capital Cases. The
commission was a response to 13 condemned men
who had been exonerated, some due to allegations
of police misconduct, including coerced
confessions.
67
B. The Benefits and Costs of Recording
Every year, hundreds of innocent Americans are
convicted of crimes because of false confessions. It
64 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. Art. 38.22 §3 (1999). See
also Ragan v. State, 642 S.W.2d 489, 490 (Tex. Crim. App.
1982).
65 See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/103-21 (West 2003).
66 This legislation was signed into law by the Governor on
July 17, 2003, and takes effect in 2005. Steve Mills, Law
Mandates Taping of Police Interrogations, CHI. TRIB., July
18, 2003, § 1, at 1; see also, Leonard Post, Illinois to Tape
Questioning: It Gets Mostly Good Reviews in 2 States, 25
NAT'L L.J. 46, P1 (2003).
67 See Post, supra note 66.
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is impossible to count how many people are charged
based on false confessions and subsequentl!y
released after exonerating evidence comes to light.
Confessions obtained through coercion and
intimidation are inherently untrustworthy; they
obfuscate rather than illuminate the truth. The
courts have to encourage practices that promote the
truth, particularly in capital cases, in which the
defendant's life is in jeopardy. Taking steps to
ensure the integrity of our criminal justice system is
of the utmost importance. Requiring electronic
recordings as a prerequisite to the admissibility of a
confession would significantly aid courts by
presenting accurate facts to a jury for deliberation.
Electronic recordings of police interrogations
facilitate a number of desirable goals. A recording
provides an objective record and prevents a police
officer from unfairly intimidating a suspect to
obtain a statement before actually recording it. An
interrogator who is aware that he is on tape would
most probably act appropriately rather than risk his
credibility. Moreover, law enforcement agencies
that videotape interrogations find that it improves
the ability of police to assess the guilt or innocence
of a suspect.69 Videotaping allows detectives to
review the entire interrogation as the case unfolds in
light of subsequent evidence. It also preserves the
details of a suspect's statement that may not have
been initially recorded in an interrogator's notes but
subsequently become important. Furthermore,
68 See Drizin & Leo, supra note 55 (documenting and
analyzing over 125 false confessions).69 See William A. Gellar, Police Videotaping of Suspect
Interrogations and Confessions: A Preliminary Examination
of Issues and Practices, in NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE
(1992).
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videotaping permits other officers to evaluate the
plausibility of suspects' statements.70
In addition to aiding police in their assessment
of guilt and innocence, videotaped admissions may
be used against co-conspirators more effectively
than written statements. Such recordings are
especially effective against suspects who are
familiar with deceptive physical evidence ploys.
Police departments already using videotaping
reported that videotaped interrogations and
confessions led to more guilty pleas by suspects.7 1
Prosecutors have noted that by catching details
that would otherwise remain missing from written
interview notes or reports, videotaped interrogations
provide a more complete record with which to
better assess the state's case against an accused.
They found that such taping enabled them to better
prepare for trial. Because videotaped interrogations
provided them with better knowledge of the case,
including the demeanor and sophistication of the
suspect, prosecutors found that videotaping assisted
them in negotiating a higher percentage of guilty
72pleas and obtaining longer sentences. Judges and
juries found that videotaping allowed them to
determine more accurately a defendant's state of
mind, as well as the sincerity of the defendant's
remorse for any wrongdoing.73
Recording would also conserve judicial
resources by reducing the number of frivolous pre-
trial challenges to confessions, which often involve
70 /d. at 5.
71 Id. at 5, 6 and 10.
72 Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical
Reassessment, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 387, 409 (1996).
73 See Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J.
GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621 (1996).
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a "he said, she said" contest. A recording speaks
for itself, literally, on the issue of what was said and
the manner in which it was said. It would facilitate
the resolution of a case in most instances because,
in many cases, recording would eliminate debate
over the circumstances surrounding such
confessions. Issues of compliance with Miranda,
voluntariness, and allegations of physical abuse and
psychological overbearing would be minimized
because a trial judge could make a determination
based on objective and reliable information.
Recording would serve as the best method for
aiding the court's determination of voluntariness in
light of the totality of the circumstances.
A variety of objections have been raised about
videotaping the interrogation process. It has been
suggested that videotaping is not feasible, for
example, because of space, personnel and funding
limitations. Also, videotaping of suspects puts an
unfair burden on law enforcement and would
significantly lower the successful clearance rate in
investigations of serious crimes.74  In the early
stages of an investigation, the police often do not
have a clear idea of what happened, let alone who
the suspects are. To require that all questioning of
suspects be videotaped might significantly slow the
course of many investigations and create an
unacceptable risk for public safety. The main
objection raised by police and prosecutors against
recording is that it would prove to be impractical
and costly to record all stationhouse interrogations.
Specifically, such an objection centers on limited
resources, including the price of videotape copies
74 /d.
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and the number of hours involved in recording and
storage.
75
However, the cost of video or audio-electronic
recording machines and tapes is relatively small
compared to the cost incurred by investigation time,
attorney time, and court time in conducting pre-trial
hearings regarding the admissibility of a
confession.76  Cost-saving considerations may
include reducing interrogation time. Recording
could alleviate the need for detailed note taking.
Additionally, increases in the number of guilty pleas
and decreases in the number of suppression
hearings involving defense challenges to the
admissibility of an unrecorded interview could
decrease the expenditure of judicial resources. Not
only could the criminal justice process see savings,
but the ancillary costs of civil litigation over false
and problematic confessions could be reduced as
well.
Ironically, police and prosecutors view
videotaping to be cost-effective in other aspects of
the criminal justice process, but not in the context of
the interrogation process. Anyone familiar with
DUI cases knows that most patrol cars are equipped
with video cameras. The ultimate cost-benefit
determination in favor of recording is the
enhancement of the integrity of the judicial system.
Any objective method of determining the credibility
75 See Drizin & Colgan, supra note 3, at 408-10;
Memorandum from David Jennings, Deputy Director, TBI, to
Curtis Person, Chairman Senate Judiciary Committee and Joe
Fowlkes, Chairman, House Judiciary Committee, on The
Report of the Tennessee Law Enforcement Advisory Council
on Recording Custodial Interrogations 2 (May 6, 2003) (on
file with authors).
76 GellAr, supra note 69 at 47-49.
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of the respective parties enhances integrity. 7 State
recording would open the door to the interrogation
room and shine light on the process. Given the
overriding importance of systemic integrity, it
seems odd that the issue needs debate. Indeed, as
the United States Supreme Court recently made
clear, the reliability of evidence involving
statements taken by police must be assessed "by
testing in the crucible of cross-examination. 78 The
Court's decision reflects not only the desire for
reliable evidence, but also a means to determine
reliability.7 9 If out-of-court statements elicited in
interrogations were important enough to require
cross-examination for admissibility, then surely the
procedural mandate of recording an interrogation
would be conducive to the goal of reliability.
A 1992 study for the National Institute of
Justice found that a number of police agencies
throughout the United States regularly videotaped
all or portions of the interrogation process.
80
Furthermore, over half of the nation's police
agencies use video technology for other purposes,
even if not necessarily the recording of
interrogations.81  Those who implemented.
electronic recording for interrogations expressed
widespread satisfaction. According to the study,
video technology has taken hold as one of the
important administrative and operational tools of
modem criminal justice agencies. The researchers
found that of police departments that videotape
interrogations, 65.8 percent found the procedure
77 See Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156 (1985).
78 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
79 id.
80 Gellar, supra note 69, at 94.
81 Id. at 91-94.
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"very useful" and another 31.3 percent found the
procedure "somewhat useful."' 2 Given the
technology, the general sentiment expressed by
departments using videotaping was that it was
appropriate. Not using video is like not using state-
of-the-art fingerprint analysis equipment. The
larger the department, the more likely they are using
videotaping. The study found that 97 percent of all
departments in the nation that are videotaping either
confessions or full interrogations find such
videotaping, on balance, to be useful.83
The broad findings of the 1992 study indicate
that videotaping has fostered improvement in the
quality of police interrogations. Desirable changes
in interrogations included: (1) better investigator
preparation for interview by forcing investigators to
think out their questions and the sequence of
questions in advance; (2) the ability to interrogate a
suspect without the distractions of a typewriter,
notebooks, statement forms, or court reporters; (3)
the ability of other police and prosecutorial
personnel to monitor the interrogation live via
closed-circuit television and to send suggested
questions into the interview room; and (4) the
opportunity for interrogators to view the videotape
in order to evaluate the suspect's earlier statements
and demeanor and to formulate further questions for
any continuation of the interview. Taping would
also allow for training new detectives and for
providing advanced training to experienced
detectives.
84
One important finding was the distinction
between agencies videotaping the entire
82 Id. at 152.
83 id.
4Id. at 110-11.
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stationhouse interrogation, including preliminaries
such as the admonitions and waivers required by
Miranda, and those videotaping only the
"recapitulation" 
-- a statement recited by the suspect
only after some prior "softening up" or unrecorded
questioning of the suspect by police personnel. The
distinction is important with regard to the reactions
of the various groups surveyed. Generally, all
participants supported recording of the entire
interview whereas recapitulation tapes were
criticized for neglecting to record the most critical
portion of the questioning process.
85
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has
provided anecdotal support for the recording of the
entire interrogation session. In Zimmerman v.
State,86 the trial court overruled the defendant's
motion to suppress his confession despite his
testimony that he was physically mistreated.
Following his conviction for capital murder, a
federal investigation into the interrogating officer's
conduct resulted in discovery of a recording of the
officer's conversation with the defendant in which
the defendant inquired whether he would be beaten.
The officer answered in the negative, adding that
the defendant would not have been beaten in the
first instance had he not been lying. Ruling on a
motion for a new trial, the trial judge acknowledged
his error in overruling the motion to suppress the
confession.
All participants in the survey agreed that
videotaping saved time and promoted greater
respect for police procedures. There were fewer
allegations of improper police conduct and those
85 Id. at 133-34.
86 Zimmerman v. State, 750 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. Crim. App.
1988).
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made were easier to resolve. Participants involved
in the criminal justice process agreed with the
merits of videotaping. Importantly, in jurisdictions
in which interrogations were recorded, there was
greater confidence in the judicial determination of
the admissibility of a suspect's statements, as well
as a higher degree of credibility afforded the
verdict.8f
The issue for our system, as the study began by
noting, is not whether video technology presents an
ideal tool to fix all existing problems, but whether it
is more reliable and efficient than traditional
documentation methods and does not present
offsetting complications or costs.88  Despite
variations, such as taping full interrogations versus
recapitulations only, and taping overtly versus
covertly, the videotaping of suspects' statements is
a practical, efficient, and affordable step towards a
more reliable, objective and legitimate criminal
justice system. Electronic recording might require
law enforcement officers to alter their interrogation
tactics and could force states to budget for audio
and video equipment. Notwithstanding these costs,
however, a suspect's constitutional rights ought to
be the underlying rationale for requiring electronic
recording of interrogations.
C. The State of the Law on Recording
During the past four decades of interrogation
monitoring, it has become obvious that recorded
interrogations can significantly buttress judicial
review of a process to which the police and a
suspect are often the only witnesses. The inherent
87 Gellar, supra note 69, at 133.
81 Id. at 28.
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difficulty of determining what actually transpired
during an interrogation together with the importance
of enforcing a suspect's right against self-
incrimination provided much of the motivation for
the Supreme Court's decision in Miranda v.
Arizona.89 The decision mandated that, prior to any
interrogation, police officers admonish suspects in
custody of certain constitutional protections they
possess. As a result, judges and legal scholars
began calling for routine tape recording of
stationhouse interrogations.
90
The arguments for reform have remained
consistent in their rationale that a recording would
best assist a court in deciphering what actually took
place in the interrogation room. An electronic
recording would provide the most efficient and
effective means for a court to reconstruct the actual
conditions of the interrogation in order to discern
whether constitutional procedural safeguards had
been followed. The ability to resolve a "swearing
contest" on the basis of an objective and reliable
record would minimize the speculative, fact-finding
function of the court in determining who is telling
the truth, a decision usually deferring to the police
officer.
Notwithstanding the recognized advantages of
electronic recording, only four states require
electronic recording of interrogations: Alaska and
Minnesota mandate recording through court
89 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 436.
90 See, e.g., Barber & Bates, supra note 56; Leo, supra note
73; Pound, supra note 56; Daniel Donovan & John Rhodes,
Comes a Time: The Case for Recording Interrogations, 61
MONT. L. REv. 223 (2000); Drizen & Colgan, supra note 3;
Westling, supra note 2.
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decisions; 91  Texas imposed a more narrow
requirement via a state statute that prohibits the
admission of an unrecorded oral confession;92 and
Illinois implemented the videotaping of
interrogations in homicide prosecutions. 93  The
question remains why many, if not most,
stationhouse interrogations in the United States
remain unrecorded. The fact that courts have
undertaken little reform in this area is confusing in
light of the fact that the Supreme Court seemed to
go out of its way in Miranda to encourage such
innovation. "Congress and the States are free to
develop their own safeguards for the privilege
against self-incrimination, as long as those
safeguards are as effective as those devised by the
Court." 94  Given the rather straightforward
arguments for mandatory recording, such as having
an accurate, objective record of what occurred
during the interrogation, one can only surmise that
critics of recording are threatened by the unveiling
of the interrogation process itself.
95
The Tennessee Supreme Court, considering the
issue in State v. Godsey,96 declined to require
taping, noting that neither the Tennessee State
Constitution nor the Federal Constitution requires
such recording. 97  Although the court in Godsey
provided a long list of states that have similarly
91 Stephan, 711 P.2d at 1156; Scales, 518 N.W.2d at 587.
92 George E. Dix, Texas "Confession " Law and Oral Self-
Incriminating Statements, 41 BAYLOR L. REv. 1 (1989).
93 Post, supra note 66; Mills, supra note 66.
94 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 490.
95 Leo, supra note 73, at 687; Drizen & Colgan, supra note 3,
at 392-93.
96 State v. Godsey, 60 S.W.3d 759 (Tenn. 2001).97 1d. at 771.
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declined to impose such a requirement,98 the court
nevertheless recognized the minimal inconvenience
and expense associated with recording
interrogations and the sound policy considerations
that support its adoption as a law enforcement
practice.99  It seems the court's justification for
rejecting a recording requirement was based solely
on the fact that it is not recognized as a
constitutional due process requirement.
The Godsey court ended its discussion of
electronic recording by stating that the issue was
more appropriate for legislative consideration.'
00
One legal commentator astutely pointed out that in
reading opinions such as Godsey it is easy to
conclude that courts are reluctant to be perceived as
acting as super legislative bodies. This reluctance is
due primarily to the fact that taking a stand on
constitutional grounds would demand some type of
affirmative action by the court that would force the
government to create a quasi-right with "financial
implications."'01
Other courts have commented little about why
tape recording of confessions is not constitutionally
required, and further, why, even in the absence of a
constitutional imperative, such a requirement should
not be mandated under a court's supervisory power.
As Sklansky points out, most courts have relied on
the United States Supreme Court decisions of
California v. Trombettal°2  and Arizona v.
9' I. at 772, n.7.
99 /d. at 772.
100 Id.
1o1 David A. Sklansky, Quasi-Affirmative Rights in
Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 88 VA. L. REv. 1229,
1269-70 (2002).
102 467 U.S. 479 (1984).
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Youngblood'0 3 in holding that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not
require the police to preserve evidence solely on the
basis that it might later prove exculpatory. 1°4
However, those cases were construed as such
because of the federal guarantee of due process and
did not impose restrictions on the application of
parallel guarantees within state constitutions, nor
did they restrict a state appellate court's right to
exercise its supervisory power in implementing
such a requirement.
The Tennessee Supreme Court has restrained
from establishing a recording requirement, either
out of unwillingness to interpret the Tennessee
Constitution in a different sense than the Federal
Constitution or perhaps out of deference to the state
legislature. Although recognizing the value that
such a rule would have in terms of conserving
judicial resources in resolving disputes over
interrogations, the Tennessee Supreme Court
continues to decline to adopt such a rule on due
process grounds.' 0 5 Tennessee judges seem to be
reluctant to act as gatekeepers for the jury except in
cases of overt and manifest abuse, particularly in
the absence of a reliable means of establishing
allegations of illegality and impropriety.
While a number of common law countries
including Great Britain, Canada, and Australia'1 6
have adopted a requirement that police tape record
103 488 U.S. 51 (1988).
104 See Sklansky, supra note 101, at 1267-68.
'o' See Godsey, 60 S.W.3d at 771-72.
106 See generally Donovan & Rhodes, supra note 90; Wayne
T. Westling & Vicki Waye, Videotaping Police
Interrogations: Lesson from Australia, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 493
(1998).
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interviews with suspects, only two state courts have
mandated a similar requirement. In the landmark
case of Stephan v. State,1°7 the Alaska Supreme
Court held that the Due Process Clause of the
Alaska Constitution requires electronic recording of
custodial interrogation conducted in a place of
detention. °8 Any statement obtained in violation of
that due process right is generally inadmissible in a
proceeding against the defendant.'0 9  Stephan
involved conflicting testimony about what occurred
during the unrecorded portions of the interrogation.
Stephan claimed that his confession was the product
of promises of leniency and was obtained in the
absence of an attorney after his request for one.
The officer testified to the contrary, leaving the trial
court to resolve the conflict and evaluate the
credibility of the witnesses. Without a full
recording, the court chose to believe the officer's
recollections in making a determination that the
confession was voluntary and, thus, admissible at
the defendant's trial.
Of course, courts faced with conflicting
testimony from defendants and officers tend to
defer to an officer's recollection of what took place
during the interrogation process at the expense of
the defendant's account. In most instances, in the
absence of a tape recording, the officer invariably
wins the swearing contest. 
10
The Stephan court was convinced that recording
"is now a reasonable and necessary safeguard,
essential to the adequate protection of the accused's
right to counsel, his right against self-incrimination
107 711 P.2d 1156.
1 8 Id. at 1158.
109 Id. at 1159-60.
110 See Harris v. State, 678 P.2d 397 (Alaska App. 1984).
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and, ultimately, his right to a fair trial."''  The
court emphasized that its holding was based solely
upon the requirements of Article I, §7 of the Alaska
Constitution. While recognizing that custodial
interrogations need not be recorded in order to
satisfy the due process requirements of the Federal
Constitution, the court felt obliged to adopt a more
rigorous safeguard for the admissibility of evidence
under the Due Process Clause of the Alaska
Constitution, thus construing Alaska's
constitutional provision as affording rights beyond
the framework of those guaranteed by the United
States Constitution. 12
It is interesting to note the Stephan court's
emphasis on the need to ensure that the
voluntariness of a confession is confirmed by
reference to an objective and complete record is at
least as important as the need to ensure the validity
of a breath alcohol test that is tested independently.
The court felt that given the relative ease with
which such confirmation could be provided, there
was no legitimate reason not to require it. 
113
The Stephan court also noted the heavy burden
upon the state to show that a defendant knowingly
and intelligently waived his privilege against self-
incrimination and his right to counsel. It found that
the contents of an interrogation are material to
determining the voluntariness of a confession. It
recognized that the trial court must resolve the
typical "swearing contest" between the officer and
defendant from a situation in which the
interrogation is conducted largely in communicado.
Private interrogations result in a "gap in our
.11 Stephan, 711 P.2d at 1159-60.
112/d. at 1160.
113 Id.
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knowledge as to what in fact goes on in the
interrogation room."'1 14 The Stephan court justified
its recording mandate on the basis that a tape
recording would provide the most objective means
for evaluating exactly what took place during an
interrogation.
In adopting the recording requirement, the
Stephan court held that the recording must clearly
indicate that it recounts the entire interview process,
including the admonition of the Miranda rights and
any waiver of them, so that the court is not left to
speculate about what transpired from the very
beginning of the interview. It further held that
anytime a full recording is not made, the state was
under a duty to provide proof by a preponderance of
the evidence that recording was not feasible under
the circumstances. However, in such cases, the
failure to record would be viewed with distrust." 5
In those instances in which the court determined
that a recording of the interrogation was not feasible
despite the good faith efforts of the officers
involved, the state would have the burden of
proving the defendant's confession was knowing
and voluntary. 1
16
In forging a clear mandate regarding recording,
the Stephan court adopted a general rule of
exclusion recognizing that while other approaches
have merit, an exclusionary rule would strike the
best balance of protecting a suspect's rights,
providing clear and definite direction to officers,
and preserving the integrity of the justice system." 17
The Alaska court sought to achieve two purposes in
14 Id. at 1161.
'
15 Id. at 1162-63.
161d .at 1163.
117 id.
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utilizing a general exclusionary rule: deterring
illegal methods of law enforcement, and ensuring
judicial integrity by preventing courts from
becoming parties to the invasion of a suspect's
constitutional rights." 1
8
The importance of the Alaska court's opinion is
its pointed intent to ensure and enhance the integrity
of the judicial system, which it felt to be in question
whenever a court ruled upon the admissibility of a
questionable confession. This was particularly the
case when such a confession was based solely upon
a court's acceptance of the testimony of an
interested party, the interrogating officer, or the
suspect. The Alaska Supreme Court deemed trial
courts to have even greater responsibility when
objective evidence of a confession could have been
preserved by the "mere flip of a switch."'1 19
Requiring recording of the custodial interrogation
process would provide objective, reliable evidence
and would go far in avoiding any suggestion that a
court was biased in favor of either party.
Ultimately, the Alaska court sought to further
the protection of individual constitutional rights
through a general exclusionary rule. As the court
noted, "[S]trong protection is needed to ensure that
a suspect's right to counsel, his privilege against
self-incrimination, and due process guarantees are
protected.' 120 Recognizing that a confession is
generally considered conclusive evidence of guilt,
the court found that such a rule of exclusion was
justified in any circumstance where the state,
without excuse, failed to preserve evidence of the
interaction between interrogator and interrogated
"' Id. at 1163, n.25.
"
9 Id. at 1164.
120d.
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leading up to the formal statement. Again, the court
noted that the arbitrary failure to preserve the entire
interrogation directly affected a defendant's ability
to present his defense, either at trial or at a
suppression hearing regarding the admissibility of
the confession. 12 1 The court went on to recognize
exclusion of the confession as the only appropriate
remedy for unexcused failure to electronically
record the interrogation when a recording was
feasible. 1
22
In almost two decades since the Supreme Court
of Alaska mandated the recording of stationhouse
interrogations whenever feasible, only one other
court has followed suit. Expressly endorsing the
reasoning of the Alaska court, the Minnesota
Supreme Court exercised its supervisory power in
holding that interrogators must record, whenever
feasible, all custodial interrogations of criminal
suspects when questioning takes place at a place of
detention.123 The court further held that violation of
this requirement could lead to suppression of any
evidence obtained from the interrogation. 124 The
Scales court chose not to determine at that time
whether a criminal suspect had a due process right
under the Minnesota Constitution to have his
custodial interrogation recorded. 125  Instead, the
court based its holding on its "supervisory power to
ensure the fair administration of justice."' 126
The Minnesota court had admonished law
enforcement officers on two prior occasions for
121 id.
122 Id.
123 Scales, 518 N.W.2d at 587.
124 Id. at 592.
125 id.126 id.
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their failure to electronically record the custodial
interrogations of criminal suspects.127  The
Minnesota court noted in State v. Robinson128 that
many factual disputes arising from a suspect's claim
of a violation of his constitutional rights could be
prevented if interrogations were recorded.
Similarly, in State v. Pilcher,129 the court criticized
officers for their failure to use technological means
at their disposal to fully record those conversations
and events transpiring before the actual questioning
itself The court issued the warning that it would
look with great disfavor upon further disregard of
its warnings. 130  The Scales case was the
consequence and, in essence, the result of law
enforcement's failure to heed the court's
admonitions.
The Minnesota court, in a finding similar to that
of the Alaska Supreme Court, noted the benefits
that a recording requirement would provide by
citing the resulting reduction in the number of
disputes over adherence to the Miranda
requirements and the voluntariness of purported
waivers of those Miranda rights. The benefits of
such recordings would facilitate a defendant's
challenge to an officer's misleading or false
testimony while protecting the state against
meritless claims by a defendant.'
31
Whereas the Stephan court adopted the
exclusionary rule as a sanction for violating its
recording requirement, the Scales court's reasoning
127 See State v. Pilcher, 472 N.W.2d 327, 333 (Minn. 1991);
State v. Robinson, 427 N.W.2d 217, 224, n.5 (Minn. 1988).
128 Robinson, 427 N.W.2d at 224, n.5.
129 Pilcher, 472 N.W. at 333.
130 id.
131 Scales, 518 N.W.2d at 591.
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was different. Although it utilized the same sort of
exclusionary rule for violating its recording
mandate, the Scales court noted that application of
the exclusionary rule to an interrogation statement
that was obtained in violation of its recording rule
would be decided on a case-by-case basis and
excluded only in the event that a statement was
obtained because of a "substantial" violation. 132
Texas is the third state that presently has a
recording requirement, but that requirement is much
more limited than in either Alaska or Minnesota.
Pursuant to the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure
Art.38.22, Section 2, the interrogator must only
record the confession, but not the interrogation
preceding the confession. 133  Dix 134 provides a
review of how Texas confession law developed
legislatively, noting that Texas courts have
traditionally adhered to the general rule prohibiting
the use of oral, out of court confessions against a
defendant. 135  It appears that the premise of the
Texas statute is that oral confessions made by
suspects in custody are inherently unreliable and,
consequently, inadmissible for any purpose. 36
Dix notes that the Texas legislature's decision to
allow the evidentiary use of recorded oral
statements was widely viewed as a major
modification of the Texas prohibition against use of
oral, out of court confessions.' 37 In legislating such
a modification, the state legislature exhibited a
132 Id. at 592.
133 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22, §3 (1999).
134 See generally Dix, supra note 92.
31 Id. at 5.
136 See Butler v. State, 493 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. Crim. App.
1973).
137 See Dix, supra note 92, at 71.
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concern for the interests of the reliability and
accuracy of the in-court representations of what a
defendant had orally admitted prior to trial. The
legislature seemed to manifest a desire to prevent or
deter unacceptable police behavior by requiring an
objective record of what transpired in the
interrogation and confession process. 138 While the
thrust of the Texas statute focuses on the reliability
aspects of recording, there is no right on the part of
a defendant to a visual recording as opposed to an
audio recording.'1
39
Illinois became the fourth state in the nation to
require police to tape interrogations. Beginning in
2005, under a new state law, officers are required to
tape interrogations of murder suspects or risk
suppression of the suspect's confession as
evidence. 140 The Illinois statute, which was signed
into law by Governor Rod Blagojevich on July 17,
2003, is an outgrowth of reforms recommended by
former Governor Ryan's Commission on Capital
Cases. The Commission's recommendations were a
consequence of alleged widespread police
misconduct, including coerced confessions, in
obtaining convictions against a number of
individuals sentenced to death and ultimately freed.
The statute contains a number of exceptions,
including one allowing use of untaped statements in
court if electronic recording was not feasible. Other
exceptions allow the admission of out-of-state
interrogations and spontaneous statements if not
made in response to questioning by officers. 14 1 The
138 d.
131 Id. at 73, n. 256.
140 See generally Post, supra note 66; Mills, supra note 66.
141 See Post, supra note 66, at 18.
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Illinois directive recognizes that in certain
circumstances it is neither practical nor possible to
obtain contemporaneous recordings. At the same
time, it recognizes the necessity of a recorded
statement when a suspect in a stationhouse gives a
formal confession.
Although only a few courts and legislatures
have enacted mandatory recording requirements
concerning interrogations, it is likely that more will
follow in the future. Tennessee recently considered
such a mandate through legislation. The following
section examines the Tennessee legislative proposal
that renders inadmissble any statement made by an
accused during an unrecorded custodial
interrogation.
D. Tennessee's Legislative Proposal
Although a strong argument could be made that
the mandatory recording of interrogations involves
a due process issue and is therefore a constitutional
issue necessitating judicial protection, the first
move for reform was initiated by the Tennessee
legislature. 142  As noted previously, compelling
policy reasons supported such a move. Indeed, the
Tennessee Supreme Court has recognized the value
of such a rule in terms of conserving judicial
resources by reducing the amount of court time
spent resolving disputes over what took place
142 The legislature's first proposal to adopt a mandatory
recording requirement was contained in SB0343/HB 1138.
Tennessee Proposal, supra note 5. Note that additional
versions of a mandatory recording bill were introduced in the
most recent Legislative session. See SB 1679/HB204. These
versions are substantially similar to the original bills and do
not raise materially different issues regarding the discussion in
this article.
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during an interrogation, but has nonetheless
declined to adopt a rule requiring such recording. 1
43
As the court commented in State v. Odom, the issue
of electronic recording of custodial interrogations
"is one more properly directed to the General
Assembly."' 144 Such legislation, if adopted, would
allow state courts to sidestep the question of
whether such recording is a constitutional
prerequisite for the admissibility of confessions.
The Tennessee proposal would require
electronic recording, by video or audio, of the entire
interrogation, including that which preceded the
confession. The bill would essentially prohibit the
"softening up" of a suspect, then capturing the
admonishments, waiver, and confession in a
subsequent session. The proposed recording
requirement was limited to a custodial interrogation
conducted at a place of detention. Both the
Miranda rights and any waiver of those rights
would have to be captured on the recording. All
voices would have to be identified and, upon
motion, defense counsel would receive a copy of
the interrogation prior to any hearing requiring the
recorded confessions or waivers.
Further, the proposed bill would also apply to
written statements made during the course of
custodial interrogations, which would be
inadmissible as evidence unless the defendant
voluntarily and knowingly waived her or his
Miranda rights. Any statements made by a suspect
during custodial interrogation which are not
recorded in compliance with the proposal would be
admissible for impeachment purposes only. The
141 See Godsey, 60 S.W.3d 759 at 772.
'44 Odom, 928 S.W.2d at 23-24.
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preponderance of the evidence burden in that
situation would be upon the suspect to show that he
was subjected to a custodial interrogation that was
not recorded, and later subjected to a recorded
interrogation involving the same offense.
Moreover, the bill required electronic recording
of the entire police interview before a particular
admission became admissible. For maximum
objective value, the entire interrogation session
needs recording, beginning with the first
introduction of the parties. It is extremely
important that all preliminaries be recorded because
they are often a breeding ground for claims of
physical and psychological pressure and could
undermine the reliability of any subsequent
recording. Merely capturing the defendant's
incriminating comments without also recording the
police "lead-in" would give an imbalanced picture
of the entire event. Frequently, what takes place in
the beginning of an interrogation dictates the
outcome. 145 It is clear that a recording of properly
trained officers eliciting a confession from a suspect
could withstand legal challenges. A recording
lacking the initial contact between interrogator and
suspect fails to accomplish the primary objective of
a recording requirement: creating an accurate,
detailed, and complete record of an interrogation.
The exclusionary requirement of the proposal
was tempered by certain exceptions. These
exceptions included statements made by a suspect
in open court during a trial, before a grand jury, or
at preliminary hearing; res gestae statements 146;
145 See, e.g., Stephan, 711 P.2d at 1164 (quoting Harris, 678
P.2d at 413-14).
146 The term res gestae is commonly confused with the excited
utterance hearsay exception. NEAL COHEN, SARAH
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statements not produced during custodial
interrogation; statements made in circumstances in
which videotaping was not feasible; and statements
made under other exigent circumstances. If the
State sought to demonstrate that any of the
exceptions should apply, it would have to do so by a
preponderance of the evidence. The numerous
exceptions contained in the bill adequately
addressed feasibility concerns likely to be voiced by
law enforcement. Apart from the exigent
circumstances exception, the general feasibility
exceptions would have allowed officers to show
that it was not possible for them to record the
particular interrogation.
One drawback of the legislation was that it
would have allowed an audio recording in lieu of
videotaping. An audio recording would obviously
not capture the physical nuances of the parties nor
would it show the physical environs. Much as DUI
enforcement utilizes videotape to capture a person's
actions, a videotape would more reliably record the
entire context of an encounter. The parties' actions
and demeanor, which are of paramount importance
in an interrogation setting, would be largely ignored
by use of a sound recording.
Moreover, there would be difficulty in
indicating when multiple interrogators were present;
an audio recording alone may not always clearly
indicate which person was talking. If the
interviewer and interviewee consistently talk over
each other, neither may be understood. Perhaps
SHEPPEARD & DONALD PAINE, TENNESSEE LAW OF
EVIDENCE, 532 (1995). The proposal does not define the
term or distinguish it from the spontaneous statement
exception under section (g) (6) of the Tennessee Proposal.
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most important, however, is that descriptions of
head, eye, facial, or hand movements would not be
conveyed to a listener without a verbal clarification.
In short, a sound recording by itself simply cannot
convey the entire context within which the words
are conveyed.
The House and Senate Judiciary Committees
directed the Tennessee Law Enforcement Advisory
Council to study and evaluate issues related to
electronic recording of custodial interrogations of
suspects and to report its final findings or
recommendations following the convening of the
103rd General Assembly. 147 The purpose of the
Advisory Council 148 is to monitor and evaluate the
status of technological developments and related
issues to Tennessee law enforcement, and to submit
its findings to the governor and legislative judiciary
committees.
The Comptroller's Office of Research
developed a survey for all Tennessee law
enforcement agencies in November, 2002.
Tennessee law enforcement personnel from 400
agencies responded to the survey. 149 43 percent of
agencies that responded electronically record
custodial interrogations. 15 The primary reasons
cited for not recording interrogations included the
following: sufficiency of a written statement;
unwillingness of suspects to speak if they are
recorded; prohibitive equipment cost; and concerns
14' H.R.J. Res. 862, 102nd Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Tenn.
2002).
148 Delineated in TENN. CODE ANN. §38-13-101 et. seq.
149 TENNESSEE LAW ENFORCEMENT ADVISORY COUNCIL
CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION SURVEY, TENNESSEE
COMPTROLLER'S OFFICE OF RESEARCH (2002).
150 Id. at 2.
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about equipment malfunctions.' 5' Agencies
utilizing recording report that it provides numerous
benefits including enhanced law enforcement
credibility, availability of tapes for training, reduced
officer time in court, and ease of demonstrating that
the suspect has been treated fairly. 152 The major
drawback cited by those using recording was the
expense associated with recording custodial
interrogations. 153  Only 23.3 percent of agencies
using electronic recording recorded all custodial
interrogations. Of the agencies reporting that they
recorded some custodial interrogations, the decision
to record was based primarily on the severity of the
offense. 1
54
The Council identified several concerns
regarding electronic recording of custodial
interrogations. The most significant concern
centered on the costs associated with such
recording, 155 specifically costs associated with
recording all custodial interrogations. The proposal
mandated the recording of custodial interrogations
at a place of detention. Because some
interrogations undoubtedly occur outside of the
stationhouse, cost concerns could be lessened.
There was also a concern that recording would
not serve the interest of judicial economy because
confessions encourage plea bargains. 15 6 Common
sense would seem to indicate, however, that a tape
evidencing a voluntary confession would make a
151 Id.
152 id.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 3.
155 See Jennings, supra note 75, at 2.
156 Id. at 3.
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defendant less likely to challenge the admissibility
of the statement. Moreover, recordings would most
certainly lead to fewer allegations of improper,
abusive, or coercive interrogation procedures that
could result in civil litigation and involve judicial
resources beyond the criminal justice system.
The cost of failing to implement the recording
program would far outweigh the cost of recording
when the increased cost of criminal and civil
litigation due to allegations of improper police
conduct is figured in. The cost of the recording
equipment and videotapes is minuscule compared to
the cost of going to trial with tainted evidence and
the resulting lawsuits involving police accused of
unethical conduct.
DNA technology has cleared scores of
defendants years after their convictions, including
some who were on death row, many of whom had
confessed to crimes they did not commit. DNA
technology is costly, but its benefits are considered
invaluable. What price is too high to bolster the
truth-finding function of the law? Effectively using
electronic recordings of interrogations would likely
result in significant cost savings to the criminal
justice system as a whole.
In this society, with its advanced technology and
almost universal availability of recording
technology, there is no reason not to increase the
reliability of the criminal justice system as much as
possible by requiring recording. Resisting the use
of inexpensive technology to safeguard due process
and fairness is unjustifiable. The interrogation
event should speak for itself. The fact-finder should
not be required to filter through inferences drawn
from a "he-said, she-said" drama involving the
133
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disparate perceptions of individuals, each with their
own perceptual biases or shortcomings.
This Tennessee legislature's recording proposal
was tabled in spring 2004. If this proposal is not
implemented, reliability and accuracy will continue
to be sacrificed in the name of efficiency and
expediency. In the absence of legislative action on
recording, it falls to the judiciary to take the lead in
addressing the issue.
IV. The Tennessee Supreme Court's Supervisory
Powers Argument
The obvious judicial response given the
Tennessee Supreme Court's history is to adopt a
due process approach and find that the Tennessee
Constitution requires mandatory videotaping to
ensure a criminal defendant's basic rights to
fairness. The court has a history of interpreting
constitutional rights, both procedural and
substantive, more broadly than the United States
Supreme Court. 1
57
In addition, the state's due process approach has
found legal support in one other state. The Alaska
Supreme Court in Stephan v. State158 held under its
state constitution that due process required
electronic recording of stationhouse interrogations.
This approach has the added attraction of operating
as an extension of the United States Supreme
Court's Miranda decision, which is firmly
entrenched in this country's criminal process. 5 9
157 See State v. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430 (Tenn. 1989);
Planned Parenthood of Middle Tennessee v. Sundquist, 38
S.W.3d. 1 (Tenn. 2000).
58 Stephan, 711 P.2d at 1156.
59 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 436.
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Since Miranda was given a firm constitutional
grounding in the Supreme Court's Dickerson
decision, 16 what began as a prophylactic rule made
by judicial fiat has been strengthened. Videotaped
interrogations could share a similar lineage and
become enshrined as constitutional doctrine.
The court addressed this constitutional
approach, albeit in a cursory fashion, in State v.
Godsey.16 1 In Godsey, the court considered but did
not ultimately apply due process and other
constitutional considerations in support of
mandatory videotaping. Rather, the court elected to
leave the matter to legislative consideration.1
62
However, the Godsey case does not end the
inquiry into the court's possible involvement in this
matter. There is another compelling argument that
the court has not specifically addressed: the court
has the power and duty, under both statutory and
case law, in its supervision and administration of
the criminal justice system, to order videotaped
interrogations when significant public interest
demands it. This "supervisory powers" argument
has been the basis for court action in a number of
important areas in the criminal justice system
specifically and the judicial system generally.' 63
The basis for the Tennessee Supreme Court's
supervisory powers is perhaps best summarized in
Cantor v. Brading:
The supreme judicial and judicial
supervisory power [of the Supreme Court]
160 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
161 60 S.W.3d 759.
162 Id.
163 See infra notes 168, 169, 171-73.
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is an inherent power of the Supreme Court
and has been so recognized by the
legislative branch of our government.
T.C.A. §16-331 recognized that the
Supreme Court has power to take all
actions as may be necessary to the orderly
administration of justice within the State,
whether enumerated in that Code section
or elsewhere. T.C.A. §16-332 declares
that the power is of common law origin as
it existed at the time of our Constitution.' 
64
The court's supervisory or plenary powers are
clearly endorsed by the current statutory schemes in
T.C.A. §16-3-503 and -504. This power is in
addition to the court's ability to make specific rules,
either by drafting rules of court or court opinions.
An example of the court's supervisory power is
found in Rule 13 of the Supreme Court Rules. Rule
13 adopts a broad scheme of appointing attorneys
and resources to indigent defendants, setting out
elaborate procedures, standards and fees for the
appointment of counsel in capital and non-capital
cases. Section 3 in particular sets out standards of
experience and training that specifically govern who
may and may not sit as counsel in a capital case.
There is nothing in either the federal or Tennessee
constitutions, nor in case law decided under them,
specifically calling for these procedures. In fact, the
constitutional requirements related to the right to
assistance of counsel are generally couched in terms
of competency and effectiveness, and the United
States Supreme Court's standards for competency
of counsel are couched in broad terms requiring
164 Cantor v. Brading, 494 S.W.2d 139, 142 (Tenn. App.
1973).
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counsel to meet minimal standards of
performance. 1
65
Rule 13, at least as it applies to capital counsel,
goes well beyond the minimal standards demanded
by constitutional considerations. It appears to
enhance and embellish the specific rights to counsel
found in both the federal and Tennessee
constitutions. Furthermore, Rule 13 also comes
with a price tag. Experienced attorneys handling
death penalty cases will spend more time and
resources on the case than inexperienced attorneys,
and since attorneys bill the state for their fees in
appointed cases, the bills submitted by Rule 13
attorneys cost the taxpayers more.
Another example of the court using its plenary
powers to make rules that embellish and enhance
constitutional rights is in Section VII of Rule 11 of
the Tennessee Supreme Court Rules. The purpose
of this rule, which sets out detailed procedures for
appointing substitute judges in the absence of a
presiding trial judge, is to empower the state
constitution's guarantee of open proceedings.1
66
These examples illustrate the court's willingness
to address a problem, overlooked by the legislature,
in the administration of the criminal justice system,
as well as a willingness to promulgate rules of
conduct that ensure constitutional rights in spite of
potential financial impact. The court does not
accept the argument that it should refrain from
addressing a problem when legislative action is not
forthcoming. The language in Cary v. Cary is
compelling:
165 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
166 TENN. CONST. art. I, § 7.
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It is primarily for the Legislature to
determine the public policy of this state;
however, where there is no declaration
in the constitution or statutes and the
area is governed by common law
doctrines, it is the province of the courts
to consider the public policy of the state
as reflected in old, court-made rules.' 67
Many other examples of the Tennessee Supreme
Court's rulemaking fall into a second category:
adopting a procedure or rule under the plenary
powers as part of a court decision to deal with a
specific issue before it. State v. Reid168 is an
example of such a decision in which a "rule" is
announced as part of the court's opinion. The Reid
court approved of the trial court's adoption of a rule
establishing a notice requirement for the defense
when mental health evidence was to be admitted at
the sentencing phase of a case. This procedure was
adopted to standardize a response to a recurring
problem and was approved by the court despite the
defense argument that the court could not create a
statutory procedure when none was in place. The
absence of legislative activity is not the end of the
inquiry; rather, in some areas, it is the beginning.
In a similar area, the Tennessee Supreme Court,
in Van Tran v. State, 69 used its plenary powers to
establish a procedure to be applied by lower courts
when a death row inmate asserted a competency
defense to application of the death penalty. Van
Tran is another example of the court intervening
where it felt it necessary to protect a defendant's
167 Cary v. Cary, 937 S.W.2d 777 (Tenn. 1996).
168 State v. Reid, 981 S.W.2d 166 (Tenn. 1998).
169 Van Tran v. State, 6 S.W.3d 257 (Tenn. 1999).
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basic constitutional rights.' 70 Again, the court did
not hesitate to address an area of the law in which
the legislature had not set forth any rules or
procedures to ensure fairness and consistency.
Other examples of the court's exercise of its
supervisory powers specifically involve evidentiary
problems. For example, in Mathis v. State,171 the
court reversed a murder conviction by applying a
rule requiring that convictions based on the
testimony of an accomplice be corroborated by
independent evidence. 172 There is nothing in either
the federal or Tennessee Constitutions requiring
corroboration of accomplice testimony. In fact,
neither constitution says much about the types of
evidence that are admissible in a criminal trial. The
court's action suggests, however, that this
corroboration "rule" helps to ensure that convictions
are based upon reliable evidence. Similar to the
rule regarding the appointment of counsel, the
corroboration rule has potential costs to law
enforcement and prosecutors in the handling of
criminal cases. The costs associated with finding
and bringing to court corroboration witnesses
necessary to support a conviction are real.
In State v. Smith,'73  the court had the
opportunity to address another evidentiary issue.
The issue, a potential nightmare for the prosecution,
involved the introduction of hearsay testimony that
another person committed the crime for which the
defendant was being tried. The court set forth
170 See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
171 Mathis v. State, 590 S.W.2d 449 (Tenn. 1979).
172 See Proctor v. State, 565 S.W.2d 909 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1978).
"' Smith, 933 S.W.2d 450.
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standards that must be met before the introduction
of a third party's admission of guilt. Although this
case would seem to limit the scope of evidence
offered by a defendant, it nonetheless indicates the
court's concern with reliability of evidence.
It might be argued that the above examples are
distinguishable from the issue of videotaped
interrogations in that the above examples show the
court's exercise of its supervisory powers in
implementing procedures to be followed by the
lower courts. The videotaping issue, on the other
hand potentially involves the court's imposition of
rules on another branch of government, namely, law
enforcement.
A strong argument exists for the court to act in
the areas directly related to the supervision of the
lower courts of this state. The high court is the
repository of judicial power in the state, and without
question has the ultimate power to supervise the
practice of attorneys and lower courts. However,
this distinction should not bar rule-making in this
area.
First, the clear language of the Tennessee
Supreme Court indicates that its plenary power
extends broadly to the "administration of justice" in
Tennessee. 174 Moreover, as previously noted, the
court has adopted other rules that impose costs on
police, the prosecution and the public. Certainly,
the court's establishment of rules or guidelines for
admissibility of evidence is related to the
administration of justice, especially when
compelling public policy reasons require the court's
involvement. As such, one of the most important
174 Belmont v. Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 511 S.W.2d 461 (Tenn.
1974).
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functions of any court is ensuring the reliability of
evidence in a criminal case.
1 75
Further, the Tennessee Supreme Court expressly
adopted the United States Supreme Court's dictates
in the Miranda,176 Weeks, 177 McNabb, 7 8 and
Mallory179 cases, all of which involved United
States Supreme Court rule-making. The Tennessee
Supreme Court has never found the rules announced
in these cases unenforceable because they were
promulgated by the judicial system in the absence
of a legislative mandate. Moreover, the rules in the
above cases involved potential costs imposed on
law enforcement. Even before Dickerson,8 0 which
shows Miranda to be rooted in the federal
Constitution, the Tennessee Supreme Court
approved Miranda as a prophylactic rule to protect
a defendant's constitutional rights. In fact, the court
has intimated that its view of the self-incrimination
privilege is broader and more expansive than the
privilege in the federal Constitution.' 8 1  Rule-
making in the area of interrogations, thus, has been
a fixed part of the law in this state for years.
The final, and perhaps most compelling, reason
for judicial rule-making in this area is that the
defendant's rights are central to the notion of a fair
trial. The right against self-incrimination, the right
to confront witnesses and evidence, and the right to
the assistance of counsel are all fundamental and
necessary. The notion that videotaping of
... See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61.
176 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 436.
177 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
178 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
179 Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
180 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 428.
181 See Smith, 933 S.W.2d at 455.
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interrogations is necessary to protect those
important constitutional rights is compelling.
Rights are substantially enhanced by the
videotaping recuirement in the ways thoroughly
explored above. 82
The supervisory powers approach to this
problem has been adopted by one state's high court.
The Minnesota Supreme Court was asked in State v.
Scales'83 to follow the Alaska Supreme Court's
holding in Stephan v. State,184 and hold that the
Minnesota Constitution requires mandatory
videotaping. The Scales court instead mandated the
taping based on its inherent supervisory powers to
insure the fair administration of justice. The Scales
court held that recording of interrogations at a place
of detention was a "reasonable and necessary
safeguard" essential to preserving valuable
constitutional rights.' 
85
The voluntariness jurisprudence of the United
State Supreme Court developed initially in part to
ensure that the product of police interrogations is
reliable. As a general principle, then, it is
reasonable to demand that a court admit the most
reliable evidence available. Frequently that means
assessing the admissibility of a defendant's
statement.
Videotaping interrogations also touches on the
issue of reliability. All trial courts routinely deal
with this issue. Matters involving introduction of
hearsay evidence, the application of the best
evidence rule, and admission of expert testimony all
182 See supra pp. 404-07.
183 Scales, 518 N.W.2d at 587.
184 Stephan, 711 P.2d at 1156.
1s5 518 N.W.2d at 592.
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require courts to serve as gate-keepers.1 86  At
common law, courts served a similar function. In
the absence of formal rules of evidence, an even
greater responsibility was placed on the court to
evaluate evidence. Professor Jones perhaps states it
best: "It has been broadly stated that the best
evidence that is obtainable under the circumstances
of the case must be adduced to prove any disputed
fact."
1 87
It seems clear that the Tennessee Supreme Court
had the common law power to make rules related to
the determination of the reliability of evidence. As
seen in Smith 188 and Proctor,189 the court has
embraced this common law power in recent times.
By adopting a mandatory videotaping rule, the
Tennessee Supreme Court would simply continue a
tradition of intervening in evidentiary matters that
influence the "administration of justice" in this state
and for which there are no legislative solutions.
A major argument in support of videotaping a
defendant's interrogation is that by preserving the
entire context of the encounter, as well as the exact
words spoken by the parties, the court would allow
a more reliable version of the evidence to come
before the fact finder. The benefits to the fact
finder, as well as to the public's assurance that the
186 See, e.g. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 509
U.S. 579 (1993)(rejecting Frye's "general acceptance" test for
admissibility of scientific evidence and placing burden on trial
judge under Federal Rules of Evidence to make important
preliminary assessments of reliability of scientific
methodology).
187 1 BURR W. JONES, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE: CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL, §231,444 (1958).
188 Smith, 933 S.W.2d at 450.
89 Proctor, 565 S.W.2d at 909.
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trial procedure is fair, are clear.19° The question is
not whether the court is constitutionally required to
resolve this problem, although as discussed in
Section III.C., several state courts have found
constitutional grounding for their decisions
requiring mandatory taping. The argument is that
the court should use its plenary power as it has in
other areas in the criminal justice system when to
do so comes at little price to the government and
provides a compelling service to the adversarial
system.
Indeed, if the Tennessee Supreme Court began
as a general trial court that routinely dealt with
problems of reliability of evidence, then the modem
court, which derives much of its plenary power
from that era, clearly has the power to intervene in
this area where the legislature has not. Requiring
the videotaping of interrogations is surely no more
of an intrusion in police affairs than Miranda,
McNabb, and Mallory. All of these rules have one
thing in common: they ensure that justice is
administered more fairly than would be the case in
the absence of the rules.
By exercising its plenary power over the issue
of recording interrogations, the court would actually
accomplish two things. In addition to giving
vitality to important constitutional rights, it would
also ensure the fair administration of justice.
Moreover, videotaping is beneficial to all citizens.
A videotape of the interrogation event ensures the
availability of a more objective form of evidence for
courts to use in ruling on the propriety of the police
conduct. This will lead to fairer rulings as to
whether the evidence should be admitted in criminal
190 See supra notes 55, 73 and 87.
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proceedings. With better rulings, the public will be
assured that verdicts are based on more reliable
proof and are worthy of public support.
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Gender is an organizing principle, not a simple
variable, in migration.1
I. Introduction
The Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (hereinafter
"UNHCR") estimates that 80 percent of the
approximately 40 million refugees and internally
displaced persons are women and children. 2 In
2002, the United States received approximately
81,100 new applications for asylum. If these were
to follow the demographics of refugees as a whole,
nearly 65,000 of those applications would involve
women and children. In light of such striking
numbers, the UNHCR has asserted that "ensuring
equal treatment of refugee women and men may
require specific action in favour of the former.'A
1 Joan Fitzpatrick, The Gender Dimension of U.S. Immigration
Policy, 9 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 23, 24 (1997).
2 Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children,
2001 Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals: Women and War
1 (Feb. 2001), available at
http://www.reliefweb.int/library/GHARkitFilesFeb20O1/wom
an&war.html (last visited April 30, 2004). See also Nancy
Kelly, Gender-Related Persecution: Assessing the Asylum
Claims of Women, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 625, 625 n. 1 (1993)
(surveying statistics from various sources indicating that,
while precise numbers of female refugees are unknown,
reliable sources indicate that women account for well over half
of all refugees).
3 In addition, about 26,800 refugees resettled in the United
States in 2002. UNHCR, REFUGEES BY NUMBERS 11 (2003),
available at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/basics (last
visited May 19, 2004).
4 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Executive
Committee Conclusion No. 64 (1990), available at
http://www.uchastings.edu/cgrs/law/unhcr.html (last visited
February 22, 2004).
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The U.S. administrative and federal courts
adjudicating asylum petitions have evinced a desire
to make asylum determinations without
consideration of the applicant's gender, 5 but this has
not translated into equal treatment of applicants. In
what may be interpreted more benevolently as a
well-intentioned effort to ensure gender equality by
not overtly "favoring" one gender over the other,
the courts are actually falling prey to what one
commentator labeled a "gender paradox." 6 In other
words, courts are discriminating against one gender
by refusing to acknowledge that issues unique to
one gender require treating its members differently
in the legal context. Despite global advances in the
status of women over the last century, there still
exists a power differential rooted in culture and
gender, which must be taken into account in asylum
decisions if women's asylum applications are to be
adjudicated fairly.7
This Article contends that the only way to
achieve gender parity in asylum adjudication is to
recognize that there are certain inherent differences
in the experiences of women and men seeking
asylum. Furthermore, it is imperative that U.S.
governmental authorities recognize that certain
types of violence that are disproportionately
5 See, e.g., In re Kasinga, 211. & N. Dec. 357 (B.I.A. 1996).
The court notes, "The only distinguishing characteristic about
this case that I can perceive to set it apart from others we
already have decided is that it involves a woman. Reliance
upon such a distinction to support a separate category for
treatment of women's asylum claims, to my mind, would be
impermissible." Id. at 377.
6 Jenny-Brooke Condon, Asylum Law's Gender Paradox, 33
SETON HALL L. REV. 207 (2002).
7 For a more detailed discussion of the character and
implications of this power differential, see infra Part III.B.
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committed against women can be cognized in the
terms of the asylum statute as currently written,
thereby entitling victims of such violence to
protection under our current asylum laws.
8
To gain asylum under U.S. law, an applicant
must demonstrate her eligibility by demonstrating
several elements outlined in the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952 ("INA").9 She must
demonstrate that she is unwilling or unable to return
to her home country because she has been
persecuted or has a well-founded fear of future
persecution.'° She must also show that she was
8 Although Desir v. lchert, 840 F.2d 723, 726-27 (9th Cir.
1988), held that it is not necessary for asylum that women
have suffered "bodily harm or a threat to life or liberty,"
violence against women is a recurring theme in asylum
applications, and therefore should be defined. For the
purposes of this Article, "violence against women" is defined
in the same way as it is by the UNHCR. In its publication
Sexual and Gender-Based Violence Against Refugees,
Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons: Guidelines for
Prevention and Response 10 (May 1, 2003), available at
http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/home/+PwwBmeMUiECwwwwnwwwwwwwhF
qA72ZROgRfZNtFqrpGdBnqBAFqA72ZROgRZNcFqewXhc
nL lwcawDmaHnDmnGe2Rxw5nmaUodcnDqnawtwoD5Ba2
nh 1tnn5Ca2nB 1 GDnn5awDmafDBnGDwccOayo5pcwqnma7
nG5dD5Dzmxwwwwwww 1FqmRbZ/opendoc.pdf
(last visited April 6, 2004) (hereinafter "UNHCR Gender-
Based Violence Guidelines"), the UJNHCR defines "gender-
based violence" as "violence that targets individuals or groups
of individuals on the basis of their gender .... [or] violence
that is directed at a person on the basis of gender or sex" and
"violence against women" as gender-based violence that
"results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual and
psychological harm to women and girls." UNHCR Gender-
Based Violence Guidelines at 10.
9 Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(42)(A) (codified
as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(42)(A) (2004)).
10 Id.
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targeted for that persecution on account of at least
one of five statutorily protected factors: (1) race, (2)
religion, (3) nationality, (4) political opinion, or (5)
membership in a particular social group." Finally,
she must prove that she was unable or unwilling to
seek protection from the government of her home
country. '
2
Under the current scheme, many women
deserving of asylum are denied relief because their
cases do not to fit within the parameters of the law.
Typically, it is claimed that they do not fit within a
cognizable social group or that they were not
persecuted because of another statutorily recognized
ground for asylum. An exemplary case that has
received a great deal of attention in recent years is
that of Rodi Alvarado.
Alvarado, a Guatemalan, applied for asylum in
the United States after suffering years of continual,
horrific physical and sexual abuse at the hands of
her husband.13 Among many other abuses, he
threatened to cut off her limbs and face with a
machete if she ever attempted to leave him, kicked
her repeatedly in an attempt to abort their second
child, and kicked her genitals with enough force to
cause her to bleed for eight days. 14 The Board of
Immigration Appeals ("BIA") acknowledged that
''a woman [who] chooses the wrong husband" has
few options in Guatemala, where the government
ll Id.
12 Id. See also discussion infra Part II.
" In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 908 (B.I.A. 1999).
14 Id. at 908-10. Her husband committed countless offenses
against her catalogued by the BIA, including: raping her
"almost daily," using her head to break mirrors and beat
against furniture, and pistol-whipping her. Id.
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has failed to provide resources to deal with the
problem of domestic violence.'
5
Nonetheless, in its 1999 decision, the BIA
reversed the decision of an immigration judge and
denied asylum to Alvarado. The 10-5 majority
reasoned that Alvarado was ineligible for protection
because her situation was essentially personal rather
than political, 16 thus precluding her from fitting into
a social group cognizable under the statute.
17
Deeming that Alvarado's husband's behavior was
"senseless... and irrational ,,,18 the court
attributed Alvarado's abuse to the husband's
"warped perception of and reaction to her behavior.
. psychological disorder, pure meanness, or no
apparent reason at all."'19 In so doing, the BIA
effectively held that, as regrettable as the courts
may find Alvarado's history of abuse, the violence
directed toward Alvarado was ultimately random.
1 Id. at 910.
16 Id. at 916-17. The court reasoned that "there has been no
showing that the respondent's husband targeted any other
women in Guatemala, even though we may reasonably
presume that they, too, did not all share his view of male
domination." Id. at 917.
17 Id. at 917-20. In holding that Alvarado did not fit into any
cognizable social group, the court explained:
[T]he respondent has shown that women living
with abusive partners face a variety of ...
problems in obtaining protection or in leaving
the abusive relationship. But the respondent has
not shown that "Guatemalan women who have
been involved intimately with Guatemalan male
companions, who believe that women are to live
under male domination" is . . . a recognized
segment of the population, within Guatemala.
Id. at 918.
1d. at 908.
Id. at 927.
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In effect, the courts told Alvarado and other
women fleeing situations of "private" violence that
their cases are simultaneously too narrow and too
broad to fit within the courts' interpretation of the
INA. 20 Their situations are too narrow because they
are considered to be the victims of random violence,
placing them outside the scope of asylum law. The
cases are too broad in the sense that women
suffering domestic abuse fail to fit within a discrete
social group, since domestic violence is framed as a
problem for all women generally. The text of the
INA itself, however, is flexible enough that it does
not have to be interpreted so as to exclude asylum
seekers fleeing this type of violence. As Anita
Sinha put it, "the problem for asylum claims
involving gender-related persecution is in the
20 See, e.g., In re M-S-M- (Immigr. Ct. July 1999), available
at http://www.uchastings.edu/cgrs/summaries/100-
199/summary 1 26.html (holding that because a domestic
abuser had no connection with the Mexican government or
law enforcement, his wife was not "persecuted" for purposes
of the INA); In re D-K- (Immigr. Ct. Dec. 8, 1998), available
at http://www.uchastings.edu/cgrs/law/ij/1 17.html (rejecting a
battered woman's asylum petition for failing to show "that the
violence against her is related to anything more than evil in the
heart of her husband"); In re F-L-, available at 31 (Immigr.
Ct. July 24, 1998), at
http://www.uchastings.edu/cgrs/law/ij/216.pdf (ruling that
forced prostitution did not constitute persecution); In re A-, at
13 (Immigr. Ct. Jan. 8, 1998), available at
http://www.uchastings.edu/chrs/law/ij/263.pdf (finding that
the situation of a woman applying for asylum on the basis that
she feared "a violent attack by the male members of her family
based on her defiance of their wishes that she not marry her
husband" was a "personal family dispute" not covered by the
INA); In re G-R- (Immigr. Ct. Oct. 20, 1997), available at
http://www.uchastings.edu/cgrs/summaries/1 -
50/summary37.html (finding no nexus between domestic
abuse and any enumerated ground for asylum).
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interpretation and not the letter of the law."
21
Ultimately, even if an asylum applicant
demonstrates all of the elements required under the
INA, asylum is an essentially discretionary
22
remedy, and it should remain so in order to
maintain the flexibility required to respond to the
complex realities of refugees' situations.
Following the controversial ruling in the case of
In re R-A-, the Department of Justice (hereinafter
"DOJ") proposed a regulation attempting to provide
guidance to asylum adjudicators confronted with
issues of gender-based persecution.
23
Unfortunately, the proposed regulation, as currently
written, is deeply flawed. 24 Indeed, it may be better
for the cause of women asylum-seekers if that
regulation, which has languished in a pending state
for nearly four years, is never codified.
Nonetheless, the fact that women such as Rodi
Alvarado are not being granted asylum
demonstrates the need to provide clearer guidance
to asylum adjudicators and judges, who must be
informed about the realities of gender
discrimination and how the existing law can address
them. This Article contends that such guidance
should come in the form of clearer regulations
interpreting the existing law, rather than statutory
amendment or any other proposed solutions.
21 Anita Sinha, Note, Domestic Violence and U.S. Asylum
Law: Eliminating the "Cultural Hook "for Claims Involving
Gender-Related Persecution, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1562, 1591
(2001).
22 See CHARLES GORDON ET AL., 3-33 IMMIGRATION LAW AND
PROCEDURE §§ 33.05[31[b][iii], 34.02[111], 34.02[12][d].
23 Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588
(Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208).
24 The specific flaws in the DOJ regulation are discussed in
more depth in another part of this Article. See infra Part II.C.
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Part II of this Article surveys the current state of
U.S. asylum law and identifies the sources of
problems for women seeking asylum on gender-
based grounds. Part III investigates the theoretical
underpinnings of power and gender. Part III
concludes that, if redrafted statutory or
administrative materials are to advance the position
of women refugees, they must take into account the
most current understanding of issues underlying the
inequitable treatment of women seeking asylum.
Domestic or personal violence must be understood
as essentially political because of the power
relations implicated between men and women in
patriarchal societies. Part IV considers proposed
solutions to the problem of gender disparity in
asylum decisions and evaluates their potential to
create a more egalitarian system of asylum
adjudication.
II. Asylum Law in the United States
In order to understand the quandary of women
making gender-based asylum claims, it is necessary
to understand, in some detail, the underpinnings and
mechanics of asylum law. Asylum and refugee law
must incorporate aspects of international law into
domestic law in a manner that adheres to the
mandates of each. The BIA described the essential
purpose of this body of law as "provid[ing]
surrogate international protection where there is a
fundamental breakdown in state protection., 25 The
federal courts are, in a sense, standing in for an
international tribunal.26
25 In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 912.
26 Of course, wherever international law informs, or attempts
to inform, domestic law, a jurisdictional tension is created
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Generally, U.S. asylum law could benefit from a
re-examination of the principles of international law
from which it arose, as well as how those principles
between the two. See generally BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP
R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW (4th ed. 2003); LORI F.
DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW (4th ed. 2001). See
also Andrew L. Strauss, Where America Ends and the
International Order Begins: Interpreting the Jurisdictional
Reach of the U.S. Constitution in Light of a Proposed Hague
Convention on Jurisdiction and Satisfaction of Judgments, 61
ALB. L. REv. 1237, 1248 n.63 (1998) (quoting Murray v. The
Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804))
("[A]n act of congress ought never to be construed to violate
the law of nations, if any other possible construction
remains."); Lisa Cox, Comment, The Legal Limbo of
Indefinite Detention: How Low Can You Go?, 50 AM. U. L.
REv. 725, 753 n.164 (2001) (noting that a properly-enacted,
constitutional domestic law will displace a conflicting
international law if the purpose of enacting the new domestic
law is specifically to supersede the international law); W.
Fletcher Fairey, Comment, The Helms-Burton Act: The Effect
of International Law on Domestic Implementation, 46 AM.
U.L. REv. 1289 (1997).
The charge upon the immigration courts, then, is to
adjudicate asylum petitions with regard to both domestic and
international mandates by giving appropriate consideration to
each. According to some scholars, this relative independence
of U.S. federal and international law can be beneficial for
refugees. For example, Deborah Anker, described the
relationship between the international and domestic law
characteristics of refugee law as uniquely suited to "avoid[]
controversies that have been most sensitive and divisive in
debates concerning ... cultural relativism in general."
Deborah E. Anker, Refugee Law, Gender, and the Human
Rights Paradigm, 15 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 133, 146 (2002).
Professor Anker lauds the fact that refugee law "does not
attempt to set a corrective agenda, tell another country how to
act, or propose plans for eradicating particular practices,"
thereby avoiding "debates within the [international] human
rights community [that] have been, at times, almost
immobilizing, reflecting an unresolved theoretical standoff."
Id.
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have been fleshed out in case law in a manner that
has perpetuated some of the gender biases inherent
in the underlying international instruments27 and the
cases themselves. 28 First, though, it is necessary to
understand how the law of asylum operates.
A. History of Refugee Status Based on
Gender
The first step toward a grant of asylum is
proving that one meets the legal criteria of a
refugee. Although proving refugee status by itself
is an insufficient basis for asylum, establishing such
status is a prerequisite for a successful asylum
application. The Refugee Convention of 195129
was the first international treaty to include a
definition of "refugee." According to Article 1A(2)
of the Refugee Convention, the term "refugee"
applies to:
[Any person who] owing to well
founded fear of being persecuted for
reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group
or political opinion, is outside the
country of his nationality and is unable
or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
avail himself of the protection of that
27 See supra note 2.
28 Nancy Kelly points out that the development of asylum law
has taken place primarily through the cases of male applicants,
meaning that most existing case law involves the examination
of activities traditionally dominated by males. Kelly, supra
note 2, at 636.
29 The Refugee Convention of 1951, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T.
6259, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (hereinafter
"Refugee Convention").
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country; or who, not having a nationality
and being outside the country of his
former habitual residence as a result of
such events, is unable or, owing to such
fear, is unwilling to return to it.
30
It is important to note that, despite comprising the
majority of refugees in the world,3' women are not
mentioned anywhere in this definition. Not only do
they not appear as a protected class, reference to
gender does not even merit inclusion as a pronoun.
This oversight was not unusual for the 1950s, a time
during which patriarchal culture was well
entrenched and little questioned in most of the
32world. Nonetheless, many of the current problems
women face during the asylum process can be
attributed, at least in part, to the fact that a
definition created without regard for the gendered
reality of refugee situations has become the model
for so many others.
33
Although the United States is not a signatory to
the Refugee Convention, the United States did sign
the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees, which required the implementation of the
30 Id. at Art. 1A(2). The 1951 Convention applied only to
people affected by events taking place before January 1, 1951.
31 See supra note 2.
32 "[The drafters of the Refugee Convention] did not
deliberately omit persecution based on gender-it was not
even considered." Judith Kumin, Gender: Persecution in the
Spotlight, 2:123 REFUGEES 12 (2001), available at
http://www.unhcr.ch/1951convention/gender.html (last visited
May 19, 2004).
33 Andrea Binder, Gender and the "Membership in a
Particular Social Group " Category of the 1951 Refugee
Convention, 10 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 167, 170 (2001);
Condon, supra note 6, at 214; Kelly, supra note 2, at 627.
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language of the Refugee Convention in U.S.
domestic laws.34 It was not until thirteen years
later, when Congress was in the process of revising
the procedure of admitting refugees into the United
States, that language resembling the Refugee
Convention's definition of "refugee" was
incorporated into the Immigration and Nationality
Act 35 via the Refugee Act of 1980 (hereinafter
"Refugee Act").
36
B. The Current Landscape of U.S. Asylum
Law
The language used in the Refugee Act is similar
to that used in the Refugee Convention,37 meaning
34 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967,
19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 8791
(hereinafter "Protocol"). The Protocol was drafted in response
to the Refugee Convention's failure to protect people who
became refugees as a result of events taking place after
January 1, 1951. It made the Convention's provisions
applicable to displaced persons regardless of the date of the
displacing events. Cf note 29.
15 § 101(a)(42)(A) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§
1 101(a)(42)(A)(2004)).
36 The Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102
(codified as amended in various sections of 8 U.S.C.).
37 The term "refugee" is defined in the Refugee Act as:
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such
person's nationality or, in the case of a person
having no nationality, is outside any country in
which such person last habitually resided, and
who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is
unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of
the protection of, that country because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution
on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or
457
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that the U.S. standard conforms with the
international standard and shares in its benefits as
well as its shortcomings. Having an asylum
decisionmaker determine that an asylum applicant
fits within the definition of "refugee" is only a
preliminary step toward attaining asylum under U.S.
law.38 Successful applicants must also prove that
they are unwilling or unable to return to their home
country because they have suffered past persecution
or have a well-founded fear of future persecution on
account of one of the five protected characteristics,
race, religion, nationality, political beliefs, or
membership in a particular social group. 39 Further,
applicants must show that their persecution was
either directly caused or indirectly condoned by the
government of that country. n
1. Persecution requirement
To gain asylum, it is not sufficient to
demonstrate that conditions in the applicant's
country of origin are generally oppressive. An
applicant must also demonstrate that she has been
persecuted in the past or that she has a "well-
political opinion.
INA § 101(a)(42)(A). The resemblance to the language of the
Refugee Convention was a deliberate decision of Congress,
which explicitly stated its intent to adopt the Convention's
definition. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 96-781, at 19 (1980).38 See INS v. Cardoza-Fonesca, 480 U.S. 421, 443 (1987)
(stating that "an alien who satisfies the applicable standard
under § 208(a) does not have a right to remain in the United
States; he or she is simply eligible for asylum, if the Attorney
General, in his discretion, chooses to grant it") (emphasis in
original).
39 INA § 101(a)(42)(A).40id.
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founded fear of persecution" for the future.4' If an
applicant bases her claim on past persecution, she
may still have to demonstrate that she would be in
danger if she returned to her home country.42 This
breaks down into two elements that must be proven
in order to meet eligibility requirements: (a) a
"well-founded fear" and (b) "persecution."
a. Well-founded Fear
The United States Supreme Court has set out a
two-pronged test for the "well-foundedness" of an
applicant's fear, which involves both an objective
and subjective component.43 The subjective
component requires the applicant to establish to the
adjudicator's satisfaction that the applicant actually
experienced fear. If actual fear is established, the
objective component requires that the adjudicator
assess the reasonableness, or well-foundedness, of
41Id. See also 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1). When an applicant
demonstrates past persecution, she is eligible for asylum.
Asylum may still be denied as a matter of the adjudicator's
discretion, however, if it does not appear that the applicant is
very likely to suffer further persecution if she returns to her
home country. The B.I.A. held in In re Chen, 20 I. & N. Dec.
16 (1989), that an asylum adjudicator can be justified in
exercising a favorable grant of discretion for humanitarian
reasons even when the likelihood of future persecution is slim.
42 The regulations interpreting the INA indicate that an
applicant who has suffered persecution in the past will be
presumed to have a fear of future persecution "unless a
preponderance of the evidence establishes that since the time
the persecution occurred conditions in the applicant's country.
. .have changed to such an extent that the applicant no longer
has a well-founded fear of being persecuted if he or she were
to return." Aliens and Nationality, 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i)
(2003).
43 Cardoza-Fonesca, 480 U.S. at 431.
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the applicant's fear. An applicant's petition may be
granted only when she has adequately demonstrated
both components.
The objective component involves an inquiry as
to the essential rationality of the applicant's fear44
based on evidence presented by the applicant.45
The adjudicator must find that a reasonable person
would be fearful in similar circumstances.46
Acknowledging the difficulties applicants may
encounter in attempting to provide objective,
corroborative evidence, several courts have held
that it is not necessary to demonstrate actual
persecution in order to show objectively rational
fear. If the applicant can demonstrate that she is
44 id.
45 The applicant's proof must show that:
- the applicant possesses a characteristic or
belief that a persecutor seeks to overcome in
others by means of punishment (the evidence
need not show that the persecutor actually
harbors "punitive" or "malignant" intent);
- the persecutor is already aware, or could
become aware that the applicant possesses this
belief or characteristic;
- the persecutor has the capability of punishing
the applicant; and
- the persecutor has the inclination to punish the
applicant.
GORDON ET AL., supra note 21, at § 33.04[11[b][ii][B][II]
(citations omitted).
46 In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).47 See, e.g., INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 425 (1984) ("The
well-founded-fear standard is more generous than the clear-
probability-of-persecution standard."); Cordon-Garcia v. INS,
204 F.3d 985, 990 (9th Cir. 2000) ("A well-founded fear may
be based on no more than a ten percent chance of actual
persecution.") (citing Velarde v. INS, 140 F.3d 1305, 1310
(9th Cir.1998)); Aguilera-Cota v. INS, 914 F.2d 1375, 1383-
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similarly situated to others who are "routinely
subject to persecution," her fear can be deemed
objectively rational.48
If the applicant's fear is found to be objectively
rational, the adjudicator then must move to the
subjective prong of the Supreme Court's test and
determine whether the applicant actually
experienced fear related to her persecution.49
Because discerning an applicant's subjective state
of mind is necessarily a more speculative endeavor
than determining the facts of country conditions, the
courts have given some guidance on what does and
does not qualify as a subjective experience of fear.
For example, the United States Supreme Court has
held that failing to apply for asylum in countries
through which an applicant has passed-or even in
which an applicant has resided and worked-on the
84 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the petitioner's testimony of a
threat of persecution is sufficient to establish a well-founded
fear of persecution). See also M.A. v. U.S. INS, 858 F.2d 210
(4th Cir. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 899 F.2d 304 (4th Cir.
1990).48 M.A., 858 F.2d at 214. The Ninth Circuit also observed that
proof of a well-founded fear is not necessarily precluded by:
(1) the absence of a showing that either the
applicant or any family member has actually
been harmed or harassed for political activities;
(2) the fact that he or she was able to obtain a
passport or exit visa; or (3) the fact that in
fleeing persecution, the applicant has sought
sanctuary in a country where he or she believes
the opportunities will be best.
GORDON ET AL., supra note 21, at §
33.04[1][b][ii][B][II] (citing Garcia-Ramos v. INS,
775 F.2d 1370, 1374-75 (9th Cir. 1985)).
49 Cardoza-Fonesca, 480 U.S. at 431.
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way to the United States does not conclusively
prove an applicant's lack of fear.
50
b. Persecution
The INA contains no definition of
"persecution," but rather leaves the meaning of that
term to be determined on a case by case basis. Not
surprisingly, courts have formulated somewhat
conflicting definitions of what constitutes
persecution. The Board of Immigration Appeals
has held that a punitive or malicious intent is not
required for an act to constitute persecution.5 The
Ninth Circuit found that cumulative experiences
may add up to persecution. 52 In one of the more
precise definitions, the Seventh Circuit deemed
persecution to be "punishment or the infliction of
harm for political, religious, or other reasons that
this country does not recognize as legitimate. 53
Several courts have agreed that one of the
characteristics distinguishing persecution from
merely annoying or harassing conduct is its
egregiousness. The Seventh Circuit wrote that "the
conduct in question need not necessarily threaten
the petitioner's life or freedom; however, it must
rise above the level of mere harassment to constitute
persecution. ' 54 The Ninth and Third Circuits
50 Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 509 U.S. 155 (1993).
51 Kasinga, 211. & N. Dec. at 365.
52 Korablina v. INS, 158 F.3d 1038, 1045 (9th Cir. 1998).
53 Mitev v. INS, 67 F.3d 1325, 1330 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting
DeSouza v. INS, 999 F.2d. 1156, 1158 (7th Cir. 1993)).
54 Sofinet v. INS, 196 F.3d 742, 746 (7th Cir. 1999) (internal
quotations omitted). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
similarly opined that "persecution does not require bodily
harm or a threat to life or liberty." Singh v. INS, 134 F.3d
164
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similarly noted that "[p]ersecution is an extreme
concept that does not include every sort of treatment
our society regards as offensive. 55
2. The "On Account Of" Requirement
Even if an applicant makes a sufficient showing
of well-founded fear, the applicant's petition can
succeed only when she can prove that she was
targeted for persecution "on account of' her race,
religion, nationality, political opinion, or
membership in a particular social group. 56 If an
applicant is unable to demonstrate that the
persecution was directed toward her because she
possessed or was perceived to possess 57 one of the
962, 967 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Desir v. Ilchert, 840 F.2d 723,
726-27 (9th Cir. 1988)).
55 Ghaly v. INS, 58 F.3d 1425, 1431 (9th Cir. 1995); Fatin v.
INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1243 (3d. Cir. 1993).
56 These five categories together constitute the so-called
"protected categories." Although the meaning of each of these
five categories has been litigated, the "social group" category
has been the subject of far more attention than the others. See
discussion infra Part H.B.4.
57 Because the prevailing concern is whether the asylum
applicant was actually in fear, the Supreme Court suggested in
.N.S. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 482-83 (1992), that
protection may be warranted even when a persecutor has
falsely or mistakenly imputed a political opinion to the asylum
applicant. Numerous Circuit Courts of Appeals have
subsequently affirmed the "imputed political opinion"
doctrine. See, e.g., Ravindran v. I.N.S., 976 F.2d 754, 760 (1st
Cir. 1992) ("An imputed political opinion, whether correctly
or incorrectly attributed, may constitute a reason for political
persecution within the meaning of the Act.") (quoting
Alvarez-Flores v. INS, 909 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1990)); DeBrenner
v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 629, 635-36,(8th Cir. 2004) (considering
that "the political views the persecutor rightly or in error
attributes to [a] victim[ ]. If the persecutor attributed a
463
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five characteristics explicitly set forth in the statute,
she is ineligible for asylum. 58 The causal
relationship required between the protected
characteristic and persecution has frequently been
referred to as the "nexus" requirement, and the
problems inherent in attempting to demonstrate a
persecutor's state of mind have been the subject of
much scholarly attention.
59
political opinion to the victim, and acted upon the attribution,
this imputed view becomes the applicant's political opinion as
required under the Act.") (quoting Sangha v. I.N.S., 103 F.3d
1482, 1489 (9th Cir. 1997)). See generally Joseph J. Bassano
et al., Political Opinion Imputed to Alien by Persecutor, AM.
JUR. ALIENS § 1248 (2004).
58 Some courts have recognized that even when an applicant is
unable to demonstrate a nexus between one of the protected
characteristics and the persecution, she may still be entitled to
some protection under the United Nations' Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Feb. 4, 1985,
S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, art. 3,
available at http://ohcr.org/english/law.cat.htm [hereinafter
"Torture Convention"]. See, e.g., Kamalthas v. INS, 251 F.3d
1279, 1280 (9th Cir. 2001) ("The inability to state a
cognizable asylum claim does not necessarily preclude relief
under the Convention Against Torture."). See also the INS
application of the Torture Convention at 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)
(2005).
5 9 See, e.g., Michelle Foster, Causation in Context:
Interpreting the Nexus Clause in the Refugee Convention, 23
MICH. J. INT'L L. 265 (2002) (examining different standards of
causation in refugee law; comparing them to those in tort,
equity, and anti-discrimination law; and concluding that the
standard's inadequate definition has led to inconsistent asylum
determinations); James C. Hathaway, International Refugee
Law: The Michigan Guidelines on Nexus to a Convention
Ground, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 207 (2002) (proposing rules by
which to interpret the nexus requirement); Karen Musalo,
Irreconcilable Differences? Divorcing Refugee Protections
from Human Rights Norms, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1179, 1182
(1994) (contending that the nexus requirement "places an
166
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The nexus test first set forth by the United
States Supreme Court in 1NS v. Elias-Zacarias has
been called "one of the most demanding" in the
world for the burden it places on asylum
applicants. 61 The two-part test first requires the
applicant to show that she actually possesses the
protected characteristic on account of which she
alleges she was harmed.62 Next, the asylum
applicant herself must establish that her persecutor
was motivated by that characteristic. 63 This second
unrealistic evidentiary burden on the applicant, who must
divine the motivation of her persecutor and then carry the
burden of proof on this issue").
60 502 U.S. 478 (1992).
61 Karen Musalo, Beyond Belonging: Challenging the
Boundaries of Nationality: Revisiting Social Group and Nexus
in Gender Asylum Claims: A Unifying Rationale for Evolving
Jurisprudence, 52 DEPAUL L. REv. 777, 786 (2003).
Numerous countries have had to contend with this requirement
because of language in the Refugee Convention defining
refugees as those persecuted "for reasons of race, nationality,
religion, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion." Refugee Convention, supra note 29, Art. 1A(2). In
interpreting the Convention's language, courts in other
countries have developed tests that leave room for the
meaning of "nexus" to differ based on circumstances of the
case. These range from "sole cause" to "but-for" to
"contributing cause." Still other nations have left the term's
definition open entirely. Musalo, Beyond Belonging, supra at
789, n.68.
62 Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483.
63 Id. Elias-Zacarias was a young Guatemalan man who
feared he would be killed by anti-government guerrillas
because he had refused to join and fight with them. The
Supreme Court rejected his claim on grounds that he had not
proven that he would be killed or otherwise harmed by the
guerrillas on account of his political beliefs rather than his
refusal to participate in their fight. In effect, the court required
Elias-Zacarias to offer proof of his persecutor's state of mind,
a requirement that has been criticized for its unrealistic
465
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part of the Elias-Zacarias test effectively limits the
court's analysis to the relationship between the
individual perpetrator and the applicant.
Although the regulation proposed in the wake of
Rodi Alvarado's case has not been approved, its
implications for the nexus requirement bear
mention.64 The proposed regulation would require
applicants whose persecutors may have had mixed
motivations in persecuting them (such as domestic
abusers) to demonstrate that the persecutor was
primarily motivated by one of the enumerated
grounds under the INA.65 Trying to prove the of the
state of mind of a domestic abuser would create
numerous complications for an applicant's case. 66
expectation that an asylum applicant can mobilize such proof.
See Shayna S. Cook, Repairing the Legacy of INS v. Elias-
Zacarias, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 223 (2002); Musalo,
Irreconcilable Differences, supra note 61, at 1182.
64 See 65 Fed. Reg. 76588 (Dec. 7, 2000). Attorney General
John Ashcroft did state in testimony before the Senate in
March of 2003 that he would personally be reviewing this
regulation, so it may be enacted or rejected in the near future.65 Id. at 76592. The commentary accompanying the rule
describes the mixed motives requirement as follows:
[The proposed regulation] allows for the
possibility that a persecutor may have mixed
motives. It does not require that the persecutor
be motivated solely by the victim's possession of
a protected characteristic. It does, however,
require that the victim's protected characteristic
be central to the persecutor's decision to act
against the victim. For example, under this
definition it clearly would not be sufficient if the
protected characteristic was incidental or
tangential to the persecutor's motivation.
Id.
66 For discussion of these potential complications, see Condon,
supra note 6, at 235-38; Christina Glezakos, Domestic
168
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3. The State Action Requirement
In order to meet the "state action" requirement,
an applicant must demonstrate that agents of her
country's government, or a person or group the
government is unwilling or unable to control,
actually persecuted or threatened her with
persecution.67 The requirement of state
involvement is thus directly bound up with the
definition of persecution. A government is said to
be "unable or unwilling to control" actions taken
against a citizen when, among other things, an
asylum applicant can demonstrate a pattern of
Violence and Asylum: Is the Department of Justice Providing
Adequate Guidance for Adjudicators?, 43 SANTA CLARA L.
REv. 539, 562-63 (2003).
67 See, e.g., In re Villalta, 20 I. & N. Dec. 142, 147 (B.I.A.
1990); In re H-, 211. & N. Dec. 337 (B.I.A. 1996); Kasinga,
211. & N. Dec. at 365; In re Acosta, 19 1. & N. Dec. 211, 222-
23 (B.I.A. 1985). These decisions are consistent with the
position taken by the Handbook for determining refugee status
under the Refugee Convention and Protocol, written by the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, as well as
with the discussions that took place in Congress before
passage of the Refugee Act. See Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees, The Handbook on
Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status
Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees 65 (Geneva, 1979), available at
http://www.asylumsupport.info/publications/unhcr/handbook.
htm [hereinafter "UNHCR Handbook" or "Handbook"]; H.R.
REP. 95-1452 at 5 (1980), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4700, 4704 (defining "persecution" as "the infliction of
suffering or harm, under government sanction"). Note that the
House Report includes the state action requirement as a
necessary element of persecution.
467
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governmental unresponsiveness to her situation. 6
8
Although governments are not expected to
safeguard each citizen from all harms at all times,
they are expected "to take reasonable steps to
control the infliction of harm or suffering," as
reflected in their policies.
69
4. The Social Group Requirement
The language "membership in a particular social
group" was added to the INA in 1980 along with the
rest of the definition of "refugee" from the Refugee
Convention. 70 Social group is not defined in the
INA itself, and the legislative history of the statute
does not shed any light on what the legislature
intended the term to mean.71 The courts, therefore,
have been left to determine the legal contours of the
68 Mgoian v. INS, 184 F.3d 1029, 1036 (9th Cir. 1999). See
also In re S-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1328, 1335 (B.I.A. 2000)
(holding that attempts to seek protection from the government
were unnecessary to a successful petition for asylum where
applicant demonstrated that such attempts would be not only
futile, but also potentially dangerous).
69 65 Fed. Reg. 76588, 76591 (Dec. 7, 2000) (quoting §
208.15(a)(1) of proposed rule). Country conditions and
applicants' circumstances may bear on what constitutes
adequate access to government protection. In some countries,
for example, a woman who is abused by her husband may be
able to gain state protection when she has the support of other
family members, whereas a woman without such support
would be able to obtain only more limited protections.
Asylum adjudicators are instructed to consider such
circumstances in their evaluations of whether a state is
complicit in the persecution. Id.70 INA § 208(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1).
71 See Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1239 (discussing the lack of legislative
history on social group).
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term on a case-by-case basis, resulting in somewhat
incongruent definitions of "particular social group."
For example, the Seventh Circuit case of
Bastanipour v. INS defined a social group as a
people targeted because of their disloyalty to the
72ruling regime. The First Circuit, however,
adopted a broader definition and held that social
groups are comprised of people sharing "a
characteristic that either is beyond the power of an
individual to change or... that it ought not be
required to [change]. 73
The size or potential size of a social group has
been given some attention as a basis for defining the
group. The Ninth Circuit, for example, concluded
that "[m]ajor segments of the population of an
embattled nation, even though undoubtedly at some
risk from general political violence, will rarely, if
ever, constitute a distinct 'social group' for the
purpose of establishing refugee status., 74 Some
jurists argue that a group ceases to be a "social
group" if it is comprised of too large a segment of
the population.
75
72 Bastanipour v. INS, 980 F.2d 1129, 1132 (7th Cir. 1992).
Note that this definition resembles that in the UNHCR
Handbook, supra note 67, at 77-78, which states that social
group membership may be the reason for persecution when the
group's ideology conflicts with that of the government.
73 Ananeh-Firempong v. INS, 766 F.2d 621, 626 (1st Cir.
1985).
74 Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1577 (9th Cir.
1986).
75 See, e.g., In reH-, 211. & N. Dec. at 350 (Board Member
Heilman, dissenting) ("For all intents and purposes, the
majority has concluded that all persons who have been harmed
or who fear harm due to civil war will be entitled to asylum in
the United States .... Indeed, if one pursues the majority's
logic, all warring sides persecute one another, and this means
that all civil wars are nothing more than acts of persecution.").
469
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The most concerted effort to define "social
group" occurred in In re Acosta.76 The Acosta court
examined the other four bases of persecution in the
INA, and found that each of them was either
impossible for the individual to change or "so
fundamental to individual identity or conscience
that it ought not to be changed or required to be
changed.,77 Using the doctrine of ejusdem
generis,78 the Board of Immigration Appeals held:
[The social group category
encompasses] persecution that is
directed toward an individual who is a
member of a group of persons all of
whom share a common, immutable
characteristic. The shared characteristic
See also Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1242-43 ; Safie v. INS, 25 F.3d 636,
640 (8th Cir. 1994). In both Fatin and Safie, the courts
rejected asylum applications from Iranian women at least in
part on grounds that the social group comprised of Iranian
women persecuted under the ruling regime was too broad a
group definition.
However, it is worth nothing that the majority opinion in
In re H- rejected the position that a social group cannot be
defined so as potentially to render enormous numbers of
people eligible for asylum, noting that every member of a
social group, no matter how large, must individually prove his
eligibility for asylum. 211. & N. Dec. at 343.
76 19 I. & N. Dec. 211. The case involved a Salvadoran taxi
driver who claimed he was a member of a taxi cooperative
targeted for violence by guerrillas after he and his fellow
drivers refused to participate in a strike.77 Id. at 233.
78 Ejusdem generis is a canon of statutory construction
defined as follows: "When a general word or phrase follows a
list of specific persons or things, the general word or phrase
will be interpreted to include only persons or things of the
same type as those listed." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 535
(7th ed. 1999).
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might be an innate one such as sex, color
or kinship ties, or in some circumstances
it might be a shared past experience such
as military leadership or land
ownership.
79
In 1996 the BIA explicitly recognized that
gender may constitute an element of a social group
with In re Kasinga. In that case, the INS agreed
with the applicant's characterization of female
genital mutilation (hereinafter "FGM") as "'based
on the manipulation of women's sexuality in order
to assure male dominance and exploitation, ' 81 even
though the practice could be construed from one
perspective as having "subjectively benign intent." 82
The court held that FGM was a form of persecution
79 Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233.
80 211. & N. Dec. at 365-66. See B.J. Chisholm, Comment,
Credible Definitions: A Critique of U.S. Asylum Law's
Treatment of Gender-Related Claims, 44 How. L.J. 427, 432
n. 19 (2001) (citing FAUZIYA KASSINDJA, Do THEY HEAR YOU
WHEN YOU CRY (1998)). The Chisholm Article refers to the
woman by the proper spelling of her name, Fauziya Kassindja
(which was misspelled by the immigration judge and the
BIA), but to the case by its codified misspelling. Kassindja
was a young woman who fled her native Togo because she
was afraid she would soon be subjected to the female genital
mutilation (FGM) common to the women of her tribe. The
perpetrators of the feared harm in this case were the tribal
elders who would perform the rite, which posed a problem vis-
A-vis the Elias-Zacarias nexus test insofar as the elders
ostensibly did not intend to harm Kassindja, per se. Instead,
they believed that they were helping her take part in a
culturally important rite of passage.
81 Kasinga, 211. & N. Dec. at 366 (quoting Nahid Toubia,
Female Genital Mutilation: A Callfor Global Action 9, 42
(Gloria Jacobs, ed. 1993) (quoting Raqiya Haji Dualeh
Abdalla, Somali Women's Democratic Organization)).
82 Id. at 367.
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directed at Kassindja on account of her membership
in a social group comprised of "young women of
the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe who have not had
FGM, aspracticed by that tribe, and who oppose the
practice.
Despite the fact that FGM is imposed on all the
girls in the Tchamba-Kunsutu tribe precisely
because they are female, the BIA declined to find
that the social group targeted for persecution was
comprised simply of the tribe's female members.
This is another example of the courts' enforced
gender-blindness which has compelled asylum
litigators to craft ever more intricate descriptions of
persecuted groups to attempt to fit persecution
against women into the statutory requirements. 84 It
is the same error the court would later repeat in the
case of Rodi Alvarado. But a recent case from the
Ninth Circuit may signal broader recognition of
gender-based persecution as grounds for asylum.
The case of Mohammed v. Gonzales85 was the first
to expressly recognize that all female citizens of a
country can comprise a particular social group
under U.S. law, at least when persecution against
females is "deeply imbedded in the culture
throughout the nation and performed on
approximately 98 percent of all females."86 The
83 Id. at 368. The Ninth Circuit recently rejected the
requirement that an applicant demonstrate opposition to FGM
in order to be eligible for asylum, writing that FGM is
inflicted on women not because of women's opposition to the
practice, but because of their femaleness. See Mohammed v.
Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 797 n.16 (9th Cir. 2005).84 See infra note 86.
85 400 F.3d 785 (9th Cir. 2005).
86 Somali national Khadija Mohamed applied for asylum on
the basis that she had been forced to undergo FGM. Her
attorneys crafted a definition of social group based on the
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Ninth Circuit's reasoning in this recent decision
may herald a shift toward broader recognition of
gender-based persecution as grounds for asylum,
and at the least will permit more realistic
descriptions of groups of persecuted women.
C. Limitations of Gender as a "Particular
Social Group"
Once they have overcome the hurdle of proving
persecution, most refugees seeking asylum on
gender-based grounds have argued that the
treatment to which they were subjected was directed
at them on account of their gender. To be able to
bring a claim under the INA, an asylum seeker must
show that the perpetrators of the mistreatment
would direct their actions toward anyone in the
group of which she is a member. This means that
such asylum seekers have had to argue that women
comprise a social group, usually within certain
social or political confines.
87
definition from Kasinga involving her status as a female
member of her particular tribe, but the court explicitly rejected
the narrower description, favoring a social group defined
simply as females from Somalia. "Although we have not
previously expressly recognized females as a social group, the
recognition that girls or women of a particular clan or
nationality (or even in some circumstances females in general)
may constitute a social group is simply a logical application of
our law." Id. at 797 (footnote omitted).
87 See, e.g., In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 918 (BIA 2001)
(holding that the group comprised of "Guatemalan women
who have been involved intimately with Guatemalan male
companions, who believe that women are to live under male
domination" is not a legitimate social group under the INA);
Kasinga, 211. & N. Dec. at 368 (holding viable the social
group comprised of "young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu
Tribe who have not had FGM, as practiced by that tribe, and
473
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The inconsistent results engendered by this
approach prompted the Director of the INS Office
of International Affairs to issue a memorandum to
Asylum Officers in 1995 "to provide the INS
Asylum Officer Corps with guidance and
background on adjudicating cases of women having
asylum claims based wholly or in part on their
gender." 88 These guidelines do acknowledge that
women "may... have had experiences particular to
their gender," and directly state that "rape
(including mass rape in, for example, Bosnia),
sexual abuse and domestic violence, infanticide and
genital mutilation ... may serve as evidence of past
persecution on account of one or more of the five
grounds." 89 However, they do not give any
substantial guidance on how adjudicators should
frame gender-specific violence in terms of the
protected categories, nor do they give any guidance
for avoiding stereotyping of gender-based claims. 90
who oppose the practice"); Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1241 (suggesting
that the group comprised of "Iranian women who refuse to
conform to the government's gender-specific laws and social
norms" may constitute a social group). But see In re D-K-, at
§ V. 7, available at
http://www.uchastings.edu/cgrs/law/ij/117.html (interpreting
the Fatin case to contain dicta that "gender, in and of itself,
may be the defining characteristic of a particular social
group").
8 Memorandum from Phyllis Coven, Office of International
Affairs, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to All INS Asylum Office/rs
Considerations for Asylum Officers Adjudicating Claims from
Women 1 (May 26, 1995), available at
http://www.uchastings.edu/cgrs/law/guidelines/us.pdf (last
visited on May 21, 2004) [hereinafter "DOJ Guidelines"].89 Id. at 4.
90 See Diana Saso, The Development of Gender-Based Asylum
Law: A Critique of the 1995 INS Guidelines, 8 HASTINGS
WOMEN'S L.J. 263, 282 (1997) (contending that the DOJ
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Perhaps the most important aspect of the DOJ
Guidelines, however, is the fact that they are non-
binding against any court or adjudicator. The
memorandum's author subsequently testified before
the House Committee on International Relations
that the Guidelines "do not enlarge or expand the
grounds for asylum that were specified by Congress
and the understanding the courts have reached about
those grounds." 91
Also problematic is the courts' focus on the size
of the group implicated in particular definitions of
"social group. ' ' 92 The courts' decision to reject
definitions of social groups which, in their view,
include too many people has been especially
burdensome to women fleeing domestic abuse or
other violence because of their gender. 93 Women in
those types of situations have the most difficulty
meeting the evidentiary requirements to prove they
qualify for asylum under the NA due to the nature
of the crimes committed against them.
While the courts' reluctance to open the
proverbial floodgates is understandable, the concern
that acknowledging gender-based violence as a
ground for asylum would result in a flood of
Guidelines fail to educate officers as to why women's gender-
based claims are susceptible to unfair stereotyping, such as the
assumption that sexual violence against a woman is caused by
the woman); Condon, supra note 6, at 217.
91 Victims of Torture: Hearing Before the House Comm. on
Int '1 Relations, Subcomm. on nt 'l Operations and Human
Rights, 104th Cong. (May 8, 1996) (testimony of Phyllis A.
Coven, Director of International Affairs, Immigration and
Naturalization Service). Available at 1996 WL 10164383.
92 See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
93 For discussion of the different forms of violence against
women, see infra Part III.
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immigrants is misplaced.94 As discussed above,
even when an asylum applicant meets all criteria for
a grant of asylum, asylum remains a discretionary
remedy under U.S. immigration law. 95 Moreover,
courts should be evaluating cases based on their
individual merit, not on the total number of people
potentially affected. If the evidence shows that men
in a particular country abuse their wives on account
of their gender, the courts should recognize that
conclusion.96 Ignoring such a fact would mean
adjudicating asylum cases based on the number of
refugees implicated rather than on legitimate
interpretation of the INA.9 7 If, despite current
trends, an increase in the number of asylees
becomes a legitimate concern, Congress should
address the issue by enacting new measures
applicable to all asylum applicants, rather than
immigration judges on a case-by-case basis. 98
94 Canada, for example, recognizes gender-based persecution
as sufficient for membership in a particular social group, yet it
has not experienced a surge of asylees claiming such. See
Arthur C. Helton & Alison Nicoll, Female Genital Mutilation
as Ground for Asylum in the United States: The Recent Case
of In re Fauziya Kasinga and Prospects for More Gender
Sensitive Approaches, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 375,
387 (1997).
95 See supra note 22, at 34.02[12][d].96 See Condon, supra note 6, at 232.97 See Rex D. Khan, Why Refugee Status Should Be Beyond
Judicial Review, 35 U.S.F. L. REv. 57, 71-74 (2000) (arguing
that the United States justifies the number of refugees it
admits based on political interests rather than humanitarian
concerns).
98 See Condon, supra note 6, at 233-34 ("Allowing judges to
turn a blind eye to valuable evidence of motive is not a fair
solution to fears of opening the refugee floodgates and would
deny women with significant motive evidence equal access to
refuge.").
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III. Linking Gender and Persecution
In perhaps every human society, social status
equates to power. Social standing is derived from a
complex combination of factors that may include,
inter alia, length of time or "establishment" in a
community, wealth, family, religious preference, or
political opinion. By any such measure, most
women refugees arriving in the United States fall at
the bottom of the social pile-among the most
disempowered of the disempowered. Observing the
workings of immigration courtrooms, one study
concluded that power differences can account for
bias in immigration courts and law.99 The
following discussion of gender and power theory
will shed light on why certain women who are
fleeing situations of gender-based violence are
being denied asylum, and also why the decision to
deny them the protections of U.S. asylum law is
illogical and unacceptable.
A. Categories of Violence
In all parts of the globe, women are subjected to
gender-based violence, but different types of
violence against women have potentially different
ramifications for the law. The most important
distinction to understand is that "' [t]he concept of
women being persecuted as women is not the same
as women being persecuted because they are
99 Nancy Ann Root & Sharyn A. Tejani, Note, Undocumented:
The Roles of Women in Immigration Law, 83 GEO. L.J. 605,
607 (1994).
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women."'"00 To put it another way, some acts of
violence may be specific (if not exclusive) to one
gender without being inspired by the victim's
gender. Such violence fits into one of a few basic
categories: harm that can be done only to women,
10 1
harm that is more commonly inflicted on women
than on men,1°2 and harm inflicted on women
because they are women. 03 Legislatures and courts
address each category of violence somewhat
differently.
The first type of violence, which involves harm
that can be done only to women's bodies, is
relatively easy to recognize as being committed
based on gender. The U.S. government
100 Binder, supra note 32, at 167 (quoting the Refugee
Women's Legal Group, Gender Guidelines for the
Determination of Asylum Claims in the UK § 1.11 (1998)).
See also Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights, Refugee
Women at Risk: Unfair US. Laws Hurt Asylum Seekers (2002)
("Around the world women often suffer persecution just
because they are female, and experience persecution
differently because they are women.").
101 Examples of harms that can only be inflicted upon women
are practices such as female genital mutilation and forced
abortion. Also included would be domestic violence directed
against uniquely female parts of the body, such as the abuse to
the genitalia suffered by Rodi Alvarado. See supra note 13
and accompanying text.
102 Types of violence that are more common, but not exclusive
to, women include domestic violence, trafficking, rape, and
other forms of sexual assault.
103 This sort of violence includes the overt enactment and
enforcement of state policies directed toward gender
subjugation such as those formerly practiced by the Taliban in
Afghanistan. However, this category also includes the subtle
acceptance of unwritten social policies or traditions that
demand gender dominance and submission, such as the
practice of honor killing or the routine killing of female
infants.
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acknowledges acts such as forced abortion and
FGM as problematic for women. However, this
recognition was given only once the U.S. culture
became more familiar with these practices."' Both
FGM and forced abortion have been addressed in
the INA, but the attention that these practices have
received has been insufficient to substantively
impact asylum seekers.'
0 5
104 While cultural unfamiliarity with certain practices against
women has sometimes been used to justify grants of asylum,
see Sinha, supra note 21, at 1565-66, such unfamiliarity has at
other times meant an uphill battle in getting U.S. law to
recognize these practices as persecution. Female genital
mutilation is such an example. Until the case of Fauziya
Kassindja, fear of FGM was not considered a basis for asylum.
Kasinga, 211. & N. Dec. 357. While it is difficult to speculate
as to why a defacing practice that is by no means a recent
development would take so long to be widely recognized,
scholarly debates over the relativism of cultural mores
certainly played a role. Some have advanced the argument
that the fact that because FGM is accepted by the dominant
factions within the cultures in which it is practiced, it ought
not necessarily be construed as persecutory against members
of that culture. For an evaluation of such arguments,
including the tension between imposing international human
rights standards and respecting the cultural implications of
FGM, see Hope Lewis, Between Irua and "Female Genital
Mutilation ": Feminist Human Rights Discourse and the
Cultural Divide, 8 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 1 (1995); Sinha, supra
note 20, at 1585.
105 FGM was incorporated into the INA by means of Pub. L.
106-386, Div. B, Title V, § 1513(a) (Oct. 28, 2000), which
allows for illegal immigrants to obtain legal status at the
Attorney General's discretion if they were victims of FGM.
This law only applies, however, if the act was committed on
U.S. soil and if the victim agreed to help prosecute the
perpetrator. Id. Such a provision obviously has no impact on
applicants for asylum who are subjected to or threatened with
FGM in their home countries, and who have to rely on the
Kasinga decision.
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The second type of violence involves harms that
are inflicted more frequently against women, but
which also can be done upon men. U.S. law has
criminalized many of these forms of violence, but
the law has not always recognized them as being
gender motivated. Acts of this type, such as rape,
are not always gender motivated, but it is generally
agreed that they spring at least in part from the
exercise of a power differential.10 6 The fact that
men may be victimized in similar ways
demonstrates that gender cannot be isolated as the
motivation for such violence. In societies that are
still largely patriarchal, however, the power
Forced abortion was included in the INA via Executive
Order No. 12,711, 55 Fed. Reg. 13897 (April 11, 1990),
codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1101, Note, which directed the
Secretary of State and the Attorney General to give special
consideration to any alien who expressed fear of forced
abortion or coerced sterilization in her home country.
However, the case of Dong v. Slattery, 84 F.3d 82 (2d Cir.
1996), held that the Order did not have the force of law, thus
precluding its enforcement in the courts.
106 See, e.g., Linda Kelly, Stories from the Front: Seeking
Refuge for Battered Immigrants in the Violence Against
Women Act, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 665, 666-67 (arguing that
lawmakers must recognize the dynamic of power and control
in domestic violence to enact effective solutions to it); Nancy
Kelly, supra note 2, at 640-41, 641 n.75 (identifying two of
the most pervasive problems in women's asylum cases as
adjudicators' difficulty conceptualizing forms of sexual abuse
as violence and their propensity to attribute personal
motivations to perpetrators of sexual persecution); Elizabeth
M. Iglesias, Rape, Race, and Representation: The Power of
Discourse, Discourses of Power, and the Reconstruction of
Heterosexuality, 49 VAND. L. REv. 868, 892-96 (1996) ("Rape
as power refers to the ways men use sex and sexuality to
establish dominance."). See also Special Rapporteur's
Violence Against Women Report, 1995/85, at 7 PP 23, 14, 53
UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/53.
182
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy, Vol. 1, Iss. 3 [2014], Art. 1
http://trace.tennessee.edu/tjlp/vol1/iss3/1
GENDER AND ASYLUM
differential may frequently translate into violence
committed by men against women.
The third type of violence, harm caused to
women because they are women, refers to
embedded cultural practices of violence against
women by which patriarchal structures are
reinforced. These types of situations, such as the
pervasive hostility toward Afghani women created
by the Taliban, are perhaps the most easily
conceived of as political for purposes of the INA.
Violence of this sort is, however, susceptible to
arguments of cultural relativism,'0 7 and its
pervasiveness sometimes makes it more difficult to
combat. The practice of systematic, mass rape in
the context of armed conflicts of recent decades is
another example.'
0 8
107 See Lewis, supra note 104.
108 Much has been written on the use of mass rape as gender-
based persecution (and even as a form of attempted genocide)
in times of armed conflict. For more on this subject, see, e.g.,
Anker, Refugee Law, Gender, supra note 26, at 142 (arguing
that rape was systematically carried out against women during
Haiti's 1991 coup d'etat because women "played an important
role in the formation of democratic institutions, because of
their status and role in helping civil society, because of
involvement in activities to improve local communities,
because of the political activities of male relatives-and
because they were left behind"); Binder, supra note 33, at 174
n.35 ("Forced pregnancy was part of the pervasive pattern of
gender crimes in the Bosnian war."); Richard J. Goldstone,
Prosecuting Rape as a War Crime, 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L
L. 277 (2002) (advocating the prosecution of mass rape as a
crime against humanity); Krishna R. Patel, Recognizing the
Rape of Bosnian Women as Gender-Based Persecution, 60
BROOK. L. REv. 929, 930 (1994) (arguing that "systematic
rape has become a tool of genocide and torture" in the Bosnian
conflict); Mattie L. Stevens, Student Article, Recognizing
Gender-Specific Persecution: A Proposal to Add Gender as a
Sixth Refugee Category, 3 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 179,
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B. Categories of Power
Scholars have increasingly looked to the
connection between violence and power for answers
to the fundamental questions of why certain types of
violence persist. Even international legal
documents have begun to recognize the connection
between the degree of women's empowerment and
the violence committed against them.' 09 However,
the term "power" is deployed with various
meanings in various contexts, so defining it is
197-98 (1993) (quoting from a European Community
investigation into the Bosnian conflict which found that rape
was a "policy of terror" which could not be viewed as
"incidental to the main purpose of the aggression, but as
serving a strategic purpose in itself.").
For a discussion of other examples of culturally
embedded and sanctioned violence, including female genital
mutilation, honor killing, and gender slavery, see Allen White,
Female Genital Mutilation in America: The Federal Dilemma,
10 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 129, 151-53 (2001).
109 Although the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 34/180
(Dec. 18, 1979) (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981) [hereinafter
"CEDAW"], contained no language about power, the
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women,
drafted by the UN General Assembly in 1993, recognized:
[V]iolence against women is a manifestation of
historically unequal power relations between
men and women, which have led to domination
over and discrimination against women by men
and to the prevention of the full advancement of
women, and that violence against women is one
of the crucial social mechanisms by which
women are forced into a subordinate position
compared with men.
G.A. Res. 48/104 (Dec. 20, 1993) available at
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/48/a48rl04.htm.
184
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy, Vol. 1, Iss. 3 [2014], Art. 1
http://trace.tennessee.edu/tjlp/vol1/iss3/1
GENDER AND ASYLUM
critical to understanding what a particular author
intends or legal document implies. Numerous
useful definitions have been formulated, so it is
worthwhile to examine several of them that are
relevant to asylum law.
1. Dominance-Subjugation and Patriarchy
Both individual and political power can be
wielded in ways that advance egalitarian ideals just
as much as they can be wielded to others' detriment.
To the extent that feminist jurisprudence has been
concerned with power relations, it has largely
focused on the type of power typical of patriarchy:
power used to dominate or subjugate another or
others. " 0 When men have power and dominance
by virtue of societal convention, this often translates
into men utilizing their power to subjugate women
as a class.
One of the primary ways in which domination is
enforced is through various forms of violence
against women. Such violence, according to
Charlotte Bunch, reinforces messages of
domination:
[S]tay in your place or be afraid.
Contrary to the argument that such
110 For discussion of the development of feminist
jurisprudence, see generally Hilary Charlesworth et al.,
Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85 AM. J. INT'L L.
613 (1991); Deborah Rhode, Gender and Jurisprudence: An
Agenda for Research, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 521 (1987); Ann C.
Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay,
95 YALE L.J. 1373 (1986); Robin West, Jurisprudence and
Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988). For discussion of
feminist jurisprudence as specifically applied to asylum law,
see Musalo, supra note 60.
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violence is only personal or cultural, it is
profoundly political. It results from the
structural relationships of power,
domination, and privilege between men
and women in society. Violence against
women is central to maintaining those
political relations at home, at work, and
in all public spheres."'
The pervasive problem of domestic violence against
women is frequently cited as a paradigmatic
expression of male dominance and female
submission. 112
2. Relational Power
One envisioned alternative to dominance-type
power focuses on the relationship between the
111 Charlotte Bunch, Women's Rights as Human Rights:
Toward a Re-vision of Human Rights, 12 HUM. RTS. Q. 486,
490-91 (1990).
112 See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Pendo, Recognizing Violence
Against Women: Gender and the Hate Crime Statistics Act, 17
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 157 (1994) (noting many attempts to
reconstrue gender-motivated violence committed against
women as having causes other than gender); Patricia A. Seith,
Note, Escaping Domestic Violence: Asylum as a Means of
Protection for Battered Women, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1804,
1843 (1997) (identifying pervasive domestic violence as a
"form of social control"); Kristin L. Taylor, Note, Treating
Male Violence Against Women as a Bias Crime, 76 B.U. L.
REV. 575, 594 (1996) (remarking that violence against women
is often utilized as a punishment for deviation from gender
stereotypes). See generally R. EMERSON DOBASH & RUSSELL
DOBASH, VIOLENCE AGAINST WIVES: A CASE AGAINST THE
PATRIARCHY (1979); RICHARD A. STORDEUR & RICHARD
STILLE, ENDING MEN'S VIOLENCE AGAINST THEIR PARTNERS
(1989).
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people involved in the power relation. The work of
psychologist Carol Gilligan has demonstrated that
the act of problem-solving is itself a gendered
process.13 Gilligan's work with children indicates
that, in solving hypothetical moral dilemmas, girls
tend to employ an "ethic of care,"1 14 whereas boys
tend to use an "ethic of rights."" 5 Although
psychological theory traditionally privileged the
type of reasoning used by the boys, some legal
scholars argue that no system of law can be truly
objective if it does so. It will simply reproduce
traditional, male reasoning without accounting for
the factors considered in "feminine" reasoning.
That system will fail to reflect and regulate reality
as we expect of a legal system. 116
Philosopher Sara Ruddick, one proponent of a
relational mode of thinking, states in way of
definition, "To be powerful is to have the individual
"13 See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE:
PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT
(1982).114 /d. at 164. Girls in these experiments tended to explain
their analyses in terms evocative of relationships,
communication, responsibility, and context.
115 Id. at 164, 174. The boys' explanations of their analyses
tended to focus more on abstract terms of fairness, logic,
rationality, and winning, and less on relationships.
116 Gilligan herself writes, "The failure to see the different
reality of women's lives and to hear the differences in their
voices stems in part from the assumption that there is a single
mode of social experience and interpretation." GILLIGAN,
supra note 113, at 174. For an examination of the myriad
ways in which feminism has informed the law, including
critiques of Gilligan's position, see generally Charlesworth et
al., supra note 110. See also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia
in a Different Voice: Speculations on Women's Lawyering
Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39 (1985); Suzanna
Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional
Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543 (1986).
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strength or collective resources to pursue one's
pleasures and projects.' ' 17 For Ruddick, the ideal
alternative to the dominance-subjugation paradigm
is to be found in the power a mother has over her
children. 118 In illustration of her point, she notes
how mothers' primary objectives for their children
revolve around nurturance and protection rather
than dominance and subjugation. 1 9 Reconceiving
our notions of what power entails to reflect the
nurturing power relation, argues Ruddick, is a
necessary precursor to realizing equality-not only
with regard to gender, but also to race, economic
standing, and other factors.
This relational understanding of power is useful
for its emphasis of both the social and individual
aspects of power. It also hearkens to the aim of
individual empowerment as the end of positive
power relations. Such an aim is consistent with the
goals of the basic international documents affirming
human rights, including the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights,' the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights,' 2 1 the International
"7 SARA RUDDICK, MATERNAL THINKING 37 (1989).
118 For these purposes, Ruddick is focused on the function of
the relationship rather than the gender of the caretaker,
defining a "mother" as "a person who takes on responsibility
for children's lives and for whom providing child care is a
significant part of her or his working life." Id. at 40.
Obviously, this is an idealized portrait of motherhood, a
fact Ruddick candidly admits. She is careful to acknowledge
the disparity between mothers' wishes for themselves and
their children, and what they actually accomplish, but
ultimately focuses on the nature of the relationship rather than
the result of the childrearing as most important. Id.
20 G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N.
Doc. A/810 (1948).
121 Opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A
(XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21 st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 51, U.N.
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Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, 122 but, perhaps foremost, the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women.'
23
3. Legal or Collective Empowerment
Lawyer and scholar Patricia Williams sees
rights conferred by law as "islands of
empowerment."' 124 Those who fall outside (or
between the lines) of legal definitions conferring
rights are the disempowered, according to this way
of thinking. Williams argues:
[T]he line between rights and no rights is
most often the line between dominators
and oppressors. Rights contain images
of power, and manipulating those
images, either visually or linguistically,
is central in the making and maintenance
of rights. In principle, therefore, the
more dizzyingly diverse the images that
are propagated, the more empowered we
will be as a society.
125
Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force
Mar. 23, 1976).
122 Opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A
(XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc
A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3,
1976).
123 CEDAW, supra note 109.
124 Patricia J. Williams, On Being the Object of Property (a
gift of intelligent rage), in THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND
RIGHTS 216, 233 (1991).
125 Id. at 233-34.
189
et al.: Vol 1 No 3
Published by Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange, 2014
488 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY VOL. I: 3
Williams' focus on a type of collective
empowerment provides a compelling contrast to the
rhetoric of individualism that pervades much
discussion of power. It also comports well with the
stated goals of international organizations and
treaties concerned with the advancement of
women. 126 In the framework suggested by
Professor Williams, the goal of the legislator should
be to ensure that the law, as written, accounts for
the greatest number of voices possible in order to
further empowerment of as many people as
possible. Immigration judges in such a system
would, ideally, be more conscious of the interface
between generally applicable laws and individuals
with their unique stories. They would be, perhaps,
more conscious of how each case was contributing
to a larger tapestry of case law and less moved by
the potential number of people implicated by their
decisions.
126 See, e.g., United Nations Fourth World Conference on
Women: Declaration and Platform for Action, reprinted in 35
I.L.M. 401, 407 (1996) ("Women's empowerment and their
full participation on the basis of equality in all spheres of
society, including participation in the decision-making process
and access to power, are fundamental for the achievement of
equality, development, and peace."); United Nations Inter-
Agency Network on Women and Gender Equality, Women 's
Empowerment in the Context of Human Security (1999) (last
visited April 18, 2004), at
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ianwge/collaboration/finalco
mIm1999.htm (recommending a general strategy of
empowerment of women in order to improve human security);
United Nations Office of the Secretary General, Agenda for
Development: Empowerment of Women 124 (1997) (last
visited on March 3, 2004) at
http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/women.htm ("Empowering
women is essential for achieving the goals of sustainable
development centered on human beings.").
190
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy, Vol. 1, Iss. 3 [2014], Art. 1
http://trace.tennessee.edu/tjlp/vol1/iss3/1
GENDER AND ASYLUM
4. Other Relevant Definitions
The UNHCR has chosen to define power in
terms of its effects on individuals. In its Guidelines
on Gender-Based Violence, the UNHCR succinctly
defines power as "the capacity to make
decisions."' 127 The Guidelines go on to frame
positive uses of power as those that "affirm ... self-
acceptance and self-respect [and], in turn, foster[]
respect and acceptance of others as equals."' 28 The
use of power to dominate "imposes obligations on,
restricts, prohibits and makes decisions about the
lives of others."'129 Focusing on effects upon
individual people may diminish, to some degree, the
collective aspect of domination. This oversight is
understandable, however, insofar as it facilitates
quantification of the effects of power relations, an
end which is vital to the UNHCR's mission of
monitoring refugee statistics and helping remedy
refugee situations around the globe.
IV. Understanding and Utilizing Power Theory
in Asylum Adjudication
If adjudicators properly understood the power
dynamics inherent in many forms of persecution of
women, asylum applicants fleeing forms of
persecution considered to be more personal than
political, and therefore outside the scope of the
protection of asylum, would benefit. If stereotypes
of domestic violence and rape as merely private
127 See UNHCR Gender-Based Violence Guidelines, supra
note 8, at 13.
128 id.
129 Id.
489
191
et al.: Vol 1 No 3
Published by Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange, 2014
490 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY VOL. I: 3
violence were eliminated, the burden of proving the
causal nexus between persecution and a protected
ground would be significantly lowered for many
women. If adjudicators recognized that "the context
of a relationship between a man and a woman, in a
patriarchal culture' 130 can, in itself, be politically
charged, then courts would have no choice but to
interpret certain forms of persecution that are
currently deemed personal as being politically
based.
To accomplish this end, some advocate adding
gender to the INA as a sixth protected ground.
Then, women demonstrating they had been
persecuted on account of their gender would meet
the criteria for asylum.' 31 However, the costs of
pushing such an amendment through Congress
would be significant, as would be the effort to
adequately educate legislators for whom
immigration is but one of many issues competing
for attention. Furthermore, adding sex or gender as
130 Sinha, supra note 21, at 1594 (quoting a letter from Karen
Musalo & Stephen Knight, Center for Gender and Refugee
Studies, to Director of Policy Directives and Instructions
Branch, INS, at 8 (Jan. 18, 2001)) (hereinafter "CGRS
comments") (on file with the New York University Law
Review).
131 For a sampling of arguments for adding gender as a sixth
protected category to the INA, see Condon, supra note 6, at
250 (arguing that adding gender as a sixth category would
eliminate definitional barriers of social group, have a
psychological impact on adjudicators, and resolve the reliance
on the social group category for a variety of gender-based
claims); Emily Love, Equality in Political Asylum Law: For a
Legislative Recognition of Gender-Based Persecution, 17
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 133, 152 (1994); Mary M. Sheridan,
Comment, In Re Fauziya Kasinga: The United States has
Opened its Doors to Victims of Female Genital Mutilation, 71
ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 433, 463 (1997).
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a sixth enumerated ground would not immediately
eliminate the source of the problem: the underlying
gender bias in the law and its adjudicators.132
Adjudicators could still potentially apply
stereotyped conceptions of gender-based violence to
deny asylum to women even if gender were in the
statute.
A more efficient and satisfactory solution would
be for the Department of Homeland Security to
enact a regulation, binding upon adjudicators,
interpreting the existing statute to account for the
fact that "private" violence can be politically
motivated. Because the regulation proposed in the
wake of Alvarado's case is so deeply flawed, an
entirely new directive should be drafted. That
directive should eliminate the additional burdens
imposed by the Alvarado regulation.133 Sinha
suggests that a new regulation should directly state
that "opinions concerning treatment or rights based
on gender, such as feminism, will be considered a
political opinion."' 134 This language is a good start,
but the new regulation should also educate
adjudicators about how to recognize and supersede
stereotypes in asylum cases involving violence
against women. It should specify that violence
against women is not merely a private matter but
also a political one implicating power relations
within a culture or society. The new regulation
should also give substantive guidance on how this
type of violence can qualify as political persecution.
132 See Anker, supra note 26, at 139.
133 See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
134 Sinha, supra note 21, at 1594 n.176 (quoting from CGRS
comments at 9).
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V. Conclusion
Asylum case law contains numerous examples
of how courts have failed refugee women because
of their stereotyping and misconceptions about the
nature of violence against women. With the benefit
of regulations that account for the realities of
violence committed against women, the current
statutory scheme could more fairly adjudicate the
cases of women who seek refuge in the United
States from what has been considered "private"
violence that is outside the scope of the INA.
Women who risk everything to flee abusive
situations deserve to have their suffering
acknowledged as persecution, regardless of whether
it is race, religion, or their gender, in combination
with their cultural provenance, that caused them to
be targeted for persecution.
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